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CIVIL PROCEDURE
M. MINNETTE MASSEY* AND MARION WESTEN**
Rule amendments,1 effective January 1, 1966, and judicial activity
accounted for substantial changes in the field of Civil Procedure during
the period of this Survey.2 The adoption of third party practice,' the
absolute right of one dismissal without prejudice (nonsuit?),' provision
for depositions in foreign countries," and reform re substitution' illustrate
several of the major areas of change which took place through the recent
amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. These and other
important amendments and judicial interpretations are contained herein.
The style of this article follows that of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure and of previous Survey articles, with the subject matter being
divided into three principal headings and appropriate sub-headings, to
wit:
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B . V enue ............................................................... 598
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* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
** Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor for Fresh-
men Research and Writing.
1. In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 1965 Revision, 178 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1965) (herein-
after cited as 1965 REVIsioN].
On June 15, 1966, the Supreme Court of Florida, 187 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1966), adopted
the Rules of Civil Procedure 1967 Revision, effective after midnight December 31, 1966.
The major thrust of the Revision is the procedural consolidation of Law and Equity. Rule
1.040 provides that "[ihere shall be one form of action to be known as a civil action." The
State of Florida now will be truly a code pleading jurisdiction.
The statutorily styled numbering system of the rules leaves much to be desired. Its
contribution will be negative and leads to unnecessary confusion.
The committee notes are also inadequate. There is a general absence of cross-referencing
between the prior Florida Rules and those most recently adopted. In addition thereto, there
are all too few references to the corresponding Federal Rules.
Well might the bench, bar and law students cry out like Queen Gertrude:
"One woe doth tread upon
another's heel,
so fast they follow."
2. This article considers the cases reported in Volumes 156-177 So.2d, inclusive.
3. FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.41.
4. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a).
5. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.23(b).
6. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.19.
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I. LAW AND EQUITY
A. Process
1. RIGHT OF PROCESS
A trial judge does not have discretion to refuse to permit process
to issue. In Linning v. Duncan' the judge refused to issue process based
upon his belief that he was statutorily required to hear the claim "not
more than twenty-one (21) days from the date of mailing such notice.
.8 The appellate court construed the statute in light of the require-
ments of due process of law, and held that the prompt and expeditious
issuance of process and service thereof is required in every instance as
soon as an action is commenced.
If, because of the congested condition of the trial calendar, a
hearing cannot be held upon the return date of process as pro-
vided by the statute, the court may of its own motion enter an
order continuing the trial date until such time as its calendar will
permit the trial to be scheduled.9
7. 169 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
8. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-961, § 3.
9. Supra note 7, at 865.
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2. CONSEQUENCES OF INSUFFICIENT OR NO PROCESS
a. Setting Aside Default Judgment
One month after the entry of the judgment, the appellant-corpora-
tion moved to set aside a default judgment, and for leave to file its an-
swer.' ° Service of process had been attempted on the corporation by serv-
ing, as president, an individual co-defendant who had no connection with
the corporation at the time of suit. The Secretary of State had incorrectly
advised the plaintiff's counsel that the named individual was the president,
and that no designation of resident agent had been made. The appellate
court" held that under the facts the trial court grossly had abused its
discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment.
b. Dissolving Temporary Injunction
In Pascul v. George Davis & Co.," after the trial court entered a
temporary injunction, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and
dissolve the injunction for lack of jurisdiction over his person. There
was no service of process upon the defendant. The appellate court af-
firmed the denial of motion to dismiss the complaint, but reversed the
denial of the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. The chancellor
has the power to issue the temporary injunction prior to service of pro-
cess; however, it is then incumbent upon the plaintiff to cause service to
be made upon the defendant within a reasonable time after the institution
of the suit.
[T] he mere fact that the temporary injunction is dissolved [be-
cause of the failure to secure service of process upon the de-
fendant] will not remove the defendant from the effect thereof
in the event a permanent injunction should be entered after
service of process and subsequent to final hearing.' 3
3. ACTING WITHIN JURISDICTION-NON-RESIDENTS
A competent court cannot render an enforceable judgment unless
the party seeking it obtains judicial jurisdiction over the defendant.
Several recent cases in this area touched upon the peculiar problems con-
cerning non-residents, individual and corporate. Traditionally the prob-
lems lend themselves to classification in the conflict of laws field. Such
problems involving non-residence, viz, motorists, corporations, business
10. The motion also stated a meritorius defense. See North Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber,
143 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1962); Florida Civil Practice Before Trial, § 18.6 (1963).
11. Holiday Ranch, Inc. v. Roudabush, 171 So.2d 558 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
12. 170 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
13. Id. at 467. In dissent Judge T. Pearson stated:
I cannot agree that the defendant will be bound by the terms of the temporary




ventures, insurance companies, and property owners have been carefully
analyzed in this issue as part of the Survey of Conflicts of Law.
4. RULE AMENDMENTS
Subsections (b), (d), (e) and (g) of Rule 1.311 have been amended
by adding (or, where more appropriate, by substituting) the general term
"iprocess" to (or for) summons in these subsections so as to make it more
clear that the appropriate original process is to be issued by the clerk. 5
5. LEGISLATION
a. Aircraft and Watercraft Operators
The statute enacted in 1959 applicable to non-resident operators of
watercraft was expanded in 1965 to include operators of aircraft. Under
the statute, they are deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as
their agent for service in any action against them "growing out of any
accident or collision in which such non-residents . . . may be involved
while . . . operating, navigating or maintaining an aircraft . . . in the
state."16
b. Nonresident Charitable Organizations
Charitable organizations which have their "principal place of busi-
ness without the state, or are organized under and by virtue of the laws
of a foreign state" and "solicit contributions from people in this state"
are not only subject to the provisions of this act, but also "shall be deemed
to have irrevocably appointed the Secretary of State" as their agent for
service of process in "any action or proceeding brought under the pro-
visions of [... the Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act] ."7
c. Personal Representatives
Whoever shall be issued letters of administration of a decedent's
estate must designate some resident of the county as his agent or attorney
for the service of process, which designation
shall be taken to constitute the consent of the person so desig-
nated that service of any process upon the designated agent or
attorney shall be sufficient to find the person so designating in
any suit or action against such personal representative, either in
his representative capacity or personally; provided that such
personal action must have accrued in the administration of such
estate.1 8
14. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3, as amended, 1965 REVISION, at 17.
15. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132 (1965).
16. FLA. STAT. § 47.162 (1965).
17. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-218, § 12.
18. FLA. STAT. § 732.45(2) (1965).
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This rule applies to any personal representative, resident or non-resident
of Florida, but not to corporate fiduciaries.
B. Venue
1. NON-RESIDENTS
Under the common law, venue of a transitory action was proper in
any county where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant could be
secured, but service of process could not be obtained outside of the county
of issuance. Florida's general venue statute 9 had been held to re-
move non-residents from its scope and was regarded as a limitation on
the common law right to bring an action in any county where the defen-
dant could be found. 0 The 1963 Legislature eliminated the second para-
graph of the statute,2' eliminating the provisions requiring the filing of
an affidavit of good faith and establishing the non-applicability of the
venue statute to non-residents. The revisor's notes attached to the stat-
ute indicate that the good faith requirement is considered obsolete and
superfluous in view of Rule 1.5 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.2
In Jones v. Christina,3 the plaintiff sued Massachusetts defendants
in the Dade County Circuit Court for injuries arising out of an auto-
mobile accident in Sumter County. The defendants moved to dismiss or
to transfer on the ground that the venue was improperly laid in Dade
County since the cause of action had not arisen there. The defendants'
contention was based upon the 1963 amendment of section 46.01
which eliminated "[t]his section shall not apply to suits against non-
residents. 24
The trial court held that the amending section was enacted contrary
to article III, section 16 of the Florida Constitution, and denied the
defendants' motion. On March 23, 1965, the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed and then certified the case to the Supreme Court of
Florida as one dealing with a question of "great public interest."
Subsequently, the 1965 Legislature adopted the Omnibus Bill, re-
19. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1965):
Where suits may be begun.-Suits shall be begun only in the county (or if the
suit is in the justice of the peace court in the justice's district) where the defendant
resides, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation
is located.
If brought in any county or justice district where the defendant does not reside,
the plaintiff, or some person in his behalf, shall make and file with the complaint,
an affidavit that the suit is brought in good faith, and with no intention to annoy
the defendant. This section shall not apply to suits against non-residents. (Em-
phasis supplied.)
20. State ex rel. Bernhart v. Barrs, 152 Fla. 631, 12 So.2d 576 (1943).
21. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-572, § 12; FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1963).
22. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-572, § 12.
23. Jones v. Christina, 172 So.2d 855 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
24. Supra note 19.
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enacting the 1963 statutes. This bill was signed by the governor on April
19, 1965, and was filed in the Secretary of State's office on the following
day. It took effect immediately upon becoming law. By section 6 of this
statute 5 the Legislature re-inserted the provision rendering venue pro-
visions of the statute inapplicable to non-residents. Thus the confusion
created by the 1963 enactment was remedied.26
2. VENUE IN CAUSES OF ACTIONS ARISING FROM
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
A contract which requires the payment of money in its fulfillment,
but which does not specify the place of payment, will be construed to
imply that the place of residence or place where offices are maintained by
the payee is the contemplated place of payment. Three recent decisions
adhere to this previously established position.28 In one of the three, the
supreme court2 9 reaffirmed the stated doctrine in an action in general
assumpsit on an implied contract for reasonable value for a broker's
service:
The law appears settled that an action of this kind may be
maintained in the county of plaintiff's residence. Several sessions
of the Florida legislature have elapsed since the interpretation
of F.S. § 46.01, in Croker v. Powell, occurred without modifica-
tion thereof by the legislative branch. No good purpose would
be served to judicially change this rule of venue long established
and followed in this state.80
The plaintiff, a domestic corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Duval County brought an action there to rescind a purchase of
securities consummated in Orange County. The sale was alleged to be
in violation of the statute.8' The defendant maintained no office nor trans-
25. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-2, § 6: FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1961),
is amended to read: 46.01 Where suits may be begun.-Suits shall be begun only in
the county (or if the suit is in the justice of the peace court in the justice's district)
where the defendant resides, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the
property in litigation is located. This section shall not apply to suits against non-
residents.
(Reviser's note. The above amendment to section 46.01, Florida Statutes, 1961, re-
moves only that provision of said section which has been superseded by the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and retains all the provisions of the section relating
to venue.)
26. On certiorari the supreme court reversed the holding that the subject statute was
unconstitutional and affirmed the district court of appeal's action in refusing to apply FLA.
STAT. 46.01 to non-residents. Jones v. Christina, 184 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1966).
27. Massey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. MiAmi L. REV. 599 (1966); Massey & Westen, Civil
Procedure, 18 U. Mixbrn L. Ray. 750 (1964).
28. Duggan v. Tomlinson, 174 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1965) ; Ryder Leasing, Inc. v. Jorge, 168
So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Brunswick Goldenrod Corp. v. Downsborough, 156 So.2d 670
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
29. Duggan v. Tomilson, 174 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1965).
30. Id. at 395.
31. FLA. STAT. § 517 (1963).
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acted any business in Duval. In reversing and remanding, the appellate
court held82 that the statutory remedy33 for the alleged unlawful sales of
securities does not override the statutory enactments as to venue, hence
venue was proper where the cause of action accrued, 4 Orange County."
3. ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AGENCIES
Venue in actions brought against the state agencies with headquarters
at the seat of government are to be brought, as a matter of preference
which is discretionary with the agency involved, in seat in situations
involving construction of the rules or regulations of the agency.36 In a
suit for damages, interlocutory appeals were taken from orders entered
by the circuit court of Dade County, which denied a motion to dismiss
made by the defendant, State Road Department. The grounds for mo-
tion to dismiss were improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
The trial court rejected the attack on the merits, but ordered the cause
to be transferred to Leon County. 7 In modifying the trial order, the
appellate court opined :38
We think the trial judge was eminently correct in conclud-
ing that the cause had been filed in the wrong circuit, but upon
such a finding, he should have limited his order to the transfer
as provided by § 53.17, Fla. Stat., without ruling upon the legal
sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint.
In a contract action against the State Road Department instituted
in Dade County, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dis-
32. Orlando Auto Auction, Inc. v. Crown Capital Corp. (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
33. FLA. STAT. § 517.21 (1963).
34. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1963).
35. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.39 (governing transfer of causes).
36. Star Employment Serv., Inc. v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 122 So.2d 174, 177 (Fla.
1960) ; Massey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. MiAmi L. REv. 599 (1962).
37. FLA. STAT. § 53.17 (1965). Transfer of cases laid in a wrong venue.-(1) Any
court in this state in which is filed a case (including actions at law, suits in equity
and statutory proceedings) laying venue in a wrong court or district may transfer
such case to the proper court in any county or district of this state where it might
have been brought in accordance with the venue statutes of this state. Where the
venue of the case might have been brought under the venue statutes in two or
more counties or districts the person bringing such case may select the county or
district to which the case may be transferred; but if no such selection be made the
matter shall be determined by the judge of court.
(2) Where a case is laid in a wrong venue and no timely objection is made
thereto by one or more of the parties the court may proceed to a final disposition
of the cause which shall be binding on the parties.
(3) The fees earned by the clerk or judge of the court wherein a case is laid
in the wrong venue shall, upon the transfer thereof hereunder, be retained by him.
Where a court is operating under a flat fee system, the fee received by the clerk or
judge upon the filing of the case shall be deemed earned by him as of the time of
filing, and another fee shall be required of the person filing the cause,
in accordance with the statutes applicable in county or district to which trans-
ferred, which if not paid within thirty days from the said transfer, shall justify
dismissal without prejudice of the cause.
(4) Nothing herein shall apply to any criminal prosecution.
38. Reed Constr. Corp. v. State Road Dept., 165 So.2d 816 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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miss on the ground of improper venue. On appeal39 the court rejected the
plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred because the action was
ex contractu, but agreed the cause should be transferred rather than
dismissed for improper venue.
4. CONTRACTS CONCERNING REAL PROPERTY
The plaintiffs brought suit in Palm Beach County for the construc-
tion of agreements to purchase land, for an accounting and to compel the
defendant to execute releases. The defendant counterclaimed for an
order construing the agreement in his favor and for foreclosure of the
mortgage, and also moved to transfer the cause to Citrus or Levy County,
the counties wherein the land was located. One of the defendants resided
in Palm Beach County. The lower court denied the motion to transfer
and dismissed the foreclosure counterclaim. In affirming, the appellate
court held:4o
The court below had proper jurisdiction of the parties and
of the subject matter because the cause of action accrued in
Palm Beach County and one of the defendants .. .was a resi-
dent of and maintained his office in Palm Beach County.
The cause of action alleged in the counterclaim is local in
nature. The Circuit Court of Palm Beach County did not have
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the counterclaim because
the action of a mortgage foreclosure is quasi in rem and local
and must be brought in the county where the land lies.
In Baum v. Corn41 a trustee bought land with funds belonging to
himself and others, and took title under a trust for a group, without any
instrument defining the duties or rights of the parties. The beneficiaries
sued the trustee for an accounting and innocent mortgagees were joined
as additional defendants. The court held that the action sought was not
a legal determination of title to the land, but was rather a transitory
action in equity for which proper venue is determined by the residence
of the parties to the action.
A Brevard County plaintiff brought a suit in the county of his res-
idence for seeking specific performance against an Illinois trustee, whom
he served by publication. 2 The defendant moved to dismiss, inter alia, on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and venue. Publication was found not
to give the court personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant;
its only jurisdiction was to enter a judgment affecting the land which was
located in Brevard. "This proceeding, although in the form of a personal
39. Foy v. State Road Dept., 166 So.2d 688 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
40. Cohen v. Century Ventures, Inc., 163 So.2d 799, 801 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
41. 167 So.2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964),
42. FLA. STAT. § 48.01 (1965).
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action, is in fact only a proceeding quasi in rem operating upon the prop-
erty on some interest therein. 4
An action upon an insurance policy is transitory in nature and may
be maintained in the county where the defendant resides. In Firemen's
Ins. Co. v. Olson,44 the trial and appellate courts rejected the defendant's
contention that a suit upon a fire insurance policy is local in nature and
must be brought where the alleged loss was sustained. The defendant had
also contended that even if the action were transitory, a motion to dismiss
founded upon improper venue should have been granted because the
plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of showing venue. This contention
was rejected by the appellate court. "The burden of pleading and proving
that venue was improper is upon the defendant.
' 45
5. GUARDIANSHIP
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled46 that venue, pursuant to the
guardianship statute,47 was improper48 in any county other than that of
the incompetent's residence. Jurisdiction and venue are not synonymous.49
Jurisdiction in guardianship matters is vested in both the county judge's
court of the county where the incompetent, resides as well as in the
county in which he may be found."0 After regaining sanity one may not
collaterally attack adjudication of incompetency entered by the county
judge of the county where the incompetent was found, even though venue
was proper only where he resided.5'
6. CHANGE OF VENUE-FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL
Not to be confused with the doctrine of forum non conviens,52 the
statutes provide for a change of venue "upon either party presenting a
sufficient application praying for such change."53 In a case of first im-
pression, the first district held54 that the statute55 providing that eminent
domain actions shall be tried in the county in which the land is located,
43. Grammer v. Roman, 174 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
44. 176 So.2d 594 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
45. Supra note 44, at 596.
46. In re Guardianship of Mickler, 163 So.2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1964).
47. FLA. STAT. § 744.11(1) (1965).
48. Justice Caldwell dissented on the ground that actual presence, albeit temporary,
of the incompetent in Taylor County should be sufficient. The decision was yes. Supra note
46, at 261.
49. 152 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
50. FLA. STAT. § 394.01 and 394.22(1) (1963).
51. Bambrick v. Bambrick, 165 So.2d 449 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
52. See Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, 18 U. MiAmI L. Rv. 745, 752 (1964);
Bayitch, Conflict of Laws in Florida 1957-1963, 8 U. MIAmi L. REv. 269, 292 (1963); Note,
15 U. MiAmi L. REv. 420 (1961).
53. FLA. STAT. § 53.02 (1963).
54. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Major Realty Co., 161 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1964).
55. FLA. STAT. § 73.01 and 73.21 (1963).
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does not prohibit a change of venue in order to secure a fair and impartial
trial. The court reasoned that the Legislature could not have intended
to so proscribe the procedure relating to eminent domain proceedings as to
deprive a property owner of due process"8 by refusing him the opportunity
of a trial before a fair and impartial jury.
The basic concepts of our jurisprudence require that the courts
be ever vigilant to protect the rights of the individual to the ex-
tent of making sure that at every judicial trial involving his
liberty or property, his rights shall be determined by fair and
impartial jurors. The importance of preserving this right for
transcends the additional cost or inconvenience of the parties
which may result from a change of venue in an eminent
domain proceeding when granted under circumstances autho-
rized by law. We therefore hold that the trial court was em-
powered by F.S. § 53.01 to order that the venue of this action
be changed. ...
Where adverse public sentiment is contended to have precluded a
fair trial in the situs where the action was brought, the scope of the trial
court's discretion is broad. The burden of showing abuse of discretion
is on the movant, and this burden is heightened by a general appellate
court conclusion that the trial court is better able to rule on such matters
of local fact than is the appellate court. 8
C. Judge's Power to Reassign Cases
The plaintiff brought a "massive attack," challenging the validity
of all acts of the legislature affecting Broward County adopted since
1944. The judge to whom the cause was assigned, who happened to be
the presiding judge of the circuit, transferred the cause to a judge who
was not a resident of Broward County. That judge dismissed the com-
plaint with prejudice. Among the issues ultimately placed before the
appellate court was the authority of a presiding judge to assign the
cause to a judge of the same circuit residing in another county. The
district court held that Rule 1.1(c)(1) provides "ample authority for
presiding judges of a circuit to assign cases to a particular judge for the
efficient and speedy disposition of the business of the court."5 9 Subsec-
tion 1 of Rule 1.1(c) provides that:
The presiding judge shall be the administrative officer of the
court and shall be responsible for the efficient and speedy dis-
position of the business of the court.6°
56. FLA. CONST. art. 16 § 29.
57. Supra note 54; at 840. A strong dissent urges that the issue was properly raised as
to whether a proper showing had been made by the defendant that a change of venue was
necessary to insure a fair trial. He believed that no adequate showing had been made.
58. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Hardee, 167 So.2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
59. Peters v. Meeks, 171 So.2d 562, 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
60. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.1(c)(1).
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
D. Commencement of Action: Statute of Limitations
A civil action,- except an ancillary proceeding, is deemed com-
menced 6 and the statute of limitations tolled"' when the complaint is filed.
Where the suit is against a decedent's estate, however, the plaintiff must
be certain not only that he has commenced his action within the permis-
sible period, but also that he has complied with the requirements of the
non-claim statute.3 In Hayes v. Thomas,64 the second district affirmed a
summary judgment for the defendant, in a wrongful death action where
no claim was filed against the estate within the period required by the
non-claim statute, although the wrongful death action had been brought
within the requisite two-year period. 5 The statute of limitations does not
refer to actions against a decedent's estate, the validity and enforceabil-
ity of which are controlled by the expressly applicable provisions con-
tained in the Florida probate law.
An interesting situation occurs when a judgment for the plaintiff
in a suit which has been timely commenced is reversed on appeal. Section
95.0666 provides:
If an action shall be commenced within the time prescribed
therefore, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed
on appeal or writ of error, the plaintiff . . . may commence a
new action within one year after the reversal.
The one-year period begins to run from the date the appellate court is-
sues its mandate, not from the date that the appellate decision is filed
with the clerk of the appellate court.67
E. Service of Pleadings and Papers
1. AMENDMENTS
The recent amendments to the rules6" have produced several changes
in Rule 1.4.69 Subsection (a) has been broadened in two respects. It now
requires service upon all parties of all papers " unless the court otherwise
orders," and has relieved the attorney of the responsibility of deciding
who is affected by his pleading, as was previously required when service of
papers was to be made "on each party affected thereby." Subsection (d)
has also been broadened to require either the original or a certified copy
of all papers to be placed in the court file, so that that file will be complete.
61. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.2(a).
62. Hayes v. Thomas, 161 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
63. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1963).
64. 161 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
65. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (1963).
66. FLA. STAT. § 95.06 (1963).
67. Levin v. Brooks, 159 So.2d 914 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
68. 1965 REVsION.
69. Id. at 17-18.
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Subsection (e) now expressly requires that the clerk file papers, originally
filed with the judge as of the date they were filed with the judge. This
express provision in Rule 1.4(e) is intended to eliminate an apparent
conflict with section 28.21(2), which requires the clerk of the circuit
court "to note the filing by each party to any cause.. . of any appearance
or pleading therein, and of any step taken in the clerk's office in connec-
tion with said cause, such noting to be at the time of such filing and of
taking such step.""
Although the committee suggested' the repeal of subsection (f) (2)
of Rule 1.4 as unnecessary, the rules, as amended, have retained subsec-
tion (f) in its entirety. Subpart (2) of subsection (f) provides that where
practicable, the certificate of service (of the paper upon the other parties
to the litigation) of counsel shall be endorsed on the face of the paper
filed. It was the committee's view that the place of the notation of the
certificate of service should be a matter of convenience.
2. SERVICE OF NEW AND ADDITIONAL CLAIMS ON DEFAULTING PARTIES
In a case of first impression in Florida,"2 the plaintiff filed a com-
plaint in which she alleged certain acts of misconduct by the defendant,
which, if proved, would constitute grounds for divorce. While noting her
possible right to that relief, the plaintiff, nevertheless, expressly prayed
only for separate maintenance, unless an absolute divorce be prayed for
prior to the entry of the final decree. The defendant filed no pleadings,
although he had been personally served with process. A decree pro con-
fesso73 was entered against him. On the day following the final hearing,
the plaintiff moved for entry of a final decree of divorce on the ground that
the defendant had allegedly brought suit against her for divorce in
Oklahoma after the plaintiff had commenced her suit for separate main-
tenance in Florida. The court granted the plaintiff's motion and entered
a final decree of divorce, without notifying the defendant of the plaintiff's
motion for an absolute divorce. The defendant appealed and obtained
a reversal notwithstanding that the allegations and proof required in the
suit for separate maintenance were identical with those which would have
been required in a suit for divorce, and also notwithstanding the fact that
the complaint contained a prayer for general relief. Rule 1.4(a) which
formed the basis for the opinion expressly requires "that pleadings assert-
ing new or additional claims for relief against [parties against whom a
decree pro confesso has been entered] shall be served in the manner pro-
vided by law for service of summons." The rule is predicated upon salu-
tary considerations of procedural due process, which, at the very least,
70. (Emphasis added.)
71. Committee Notes.
72. Kitchens v. Kitchens, 162 So.2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
73. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.9.
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"would require that notice be given to a party who had suffered a default,
or decree pro confesso where the complaint has been amended in a
matter of substance after the entry of such default." 4
3. TIME
a. Computation
Rule 1.6(a) has been amended 75 to exclude from the computation of
time prescribed or allowed by the rules, by statute or by court order,
Saturdays and half-holidays as well as Sundays and legal holidays. The
change was made in recognition of the fact that so many offices are closed
on Saturdays.76 As amended, the computation of time is now the same
under both Florida Rule 1.6(a) and Federal Rule 6(a). The Rule, as
written, might raise some doubts as to whether half-holidays were to be
excluded from the computation, as prior to the amendment of Rule 1.6, it
was expressly provided that they were not exempt from inclusion in the
computation of the applicable time period. That sentence has been de-
leted from the amended Rule, which is completely silent respecting the
status of half-holidays 77 but the committee notes state that together
with Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, half-holidays are excluded
from computation.
b. Extending Time
As a general rule, when an act is required or allowed to be done
within a specified time, the court, for good cause shown, has discretionary
power to enlarge the period for performance. If the request therefor is
made before the expiration of the prescribed period, the extension may
be granted with or without notice,78 but if the motion for an extension is
made after the prescribed period, notice must be given to the other parties
and an extension may be granted if failure to act was the result of ex-
cusable neglect.79
However, the newly amended Rule 1.6(b) has expanded the areas
in which the court is without power to grant an extension of time to in-
clude motions to alter or amend judgments under Rule 2.8(g), as
amended, and for relief from judgments under Rule 1.38(b). 80 The ex-
ception to the court's discretionary power to extend time is also applicable
74. Kitchens v. Kitchens, supra note 72, at 541.
75. 1965 REVIsION, at 18.
76. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132 (1965).
77. 1965 REvisioN.
78. Houston Corp. v. Hofmann, 161 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
79. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.6(b).
80. "When rules 2.8(g) and 1.38(b) were adopted in 1962, rule 1.6(b) was not amended
to take cognizance of the changes." Committee Notes. For a discussion of the purpose and
effect of the addition of rules 1.38(b) and 2.8(g) see Barns & Mattis, 1962 Amendments to
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U. ML1u L. RPv. 276, at pp. 289-97 and 299-301.
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under Rule 3.16, as amended,8' to petitions for a rehearing on motion of
the parties, and to orders for a rehearing when the court is acting sua
sponte. These exceptions, of course, are in addition to those previously
contained in Rule 1.6(b), and which are still retained-specifically, a
court may not extend the time for making a motion for a new trial, or for
taking an appeal, or for making a motion for a directed verdict. As
amended, Florida Rule 1.6(b) is now substantively identical with Federal
Rule 6(b), with the exception that time cannot be extended under the
Florida rule for a motion non obstante verdicto.
F. Attorneys
1. AMENDMENTS
Amended Rule 1.582 now provides, in part, that:
Every pleading and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in
his individual name.
The words "other papers" were added to pleading because of the 1962
amendment to Rule 1.7(a)"8 limiting the meaning of pleading. 4 The
only other substantive change in Rule 1.5 was the deletion of subsection
(e), in conformity with the committee's suggestion8 5 that a provision
relating to proceedings for disciplining or disbarring attorneys was in-
appropriately included among rules of civil procedure. Transfer to the
Integration Rule was recommended.
2. STIPULATIONS
Rule 1.5(d) provides, in part:
No private agreement or consent between the parties or their
attorneys in respect to the proceedings in a cause shall be of any
force before the court, unless the evidence thereof shall be in
writing, subscribed by the party or his attorney, against whom
it is alleged.
The mandate of this rule has reference only to agreements affecting
judicial proceedings, and it is inapplicable to settlement agreements be-
tween the parties arising out of the cause of action on which the litigation
is based. Thus, in Coe v. Diener,80 the district court found that there was
no statute requiring a settlement agreement to be in writing and that
81. 1965 REvisioN, at 30.
82. 1965 REviSiON, at 18.
83. See Barns & Mattis, 1962 Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
17 U. MILAn L. REv. 276, 277.
84. See Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132 (1965).
85. Ibid.
86. 159 So.2d (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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Rule 1.5(d) was inapplicable to settlement agreements. The rule only
has reference to permissible procedural modifications between the parties
and their attorneys.
G. Pleadings
1. PLEADrNGS REQUIRED OR ALLOWED
The pleadings which are allowed are: a complaint or a petition when
so designated by statute or rule; an answer; an answer to a counterclaim,
denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains
a cross-claim; a third party complaint, if a person who was not an original
party is summoned as a third party defendant; a third party answer, if
a third party complaint is served. No other pleadings shall be allowed,
except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party
answer.8 7
As amended, Rule 1.7(a) provides for third party pleadings, con-
sistently with the newly permitted third party practice under amended
Rule 1.8(b).18 The committee reports indicate that the term "reply to
a counterclaim" has been re-worded for clarity, to read "answer to a
counterclaim"; reply refers only to affirmative matter directed to an
answer.
89
Provision for a petition, in lieu of a complaint, where so designated
by statute or rule has also been made to accurately denominate the initial
pleading required in special statutory proceedings,9" and by Rules
1.22(a), 2.17, 2.19, etc.
Subsections (b) and (e) of Rule 1.7 have been retained, but sub-
section (e) has been re-designated as subsection (d) since subsection (d)
of the 1962 rules is no longer necessary after the amendment to Rule
1.7(c). Subsection (c) now reads:
(c) Contents. Every pleading and other paper shall contain a
caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the
action, the file number, and a designation as in (a) or (b) of this
rule. The caption of the pleading or paper shall also state the
name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indica-
tion of the other parties.
The words "other papers" have been added to pleadings because of the
1962 amendment to subsection (a) which limited the meaning of "plead-
ing." The addition of the file number comports with the requirement
of Federal Rule 10(a), and is intended to assist clerks in filing.
87. 1965 REVISION, at 18.
88. See the discussion of amended rule 1.8(b) infra note 99 and accompanying text.
89. 39 FLA. B.J., 1132 (1965).
90. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 176.16 (1963).
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The purpose of the pleadings is to "present, define and narrow the
issues,9 ' and to form the foundation of, and to limit the proof to be sub-
mitted on the trial."92 The objective sought in the present rules is to
reach the issues of law in one affirmative and one defensive pleading."
Under existing rules, the only instance in which legal issues not raised in
the pleadings may be tried and decided are those where the issue, although
not pleaded, is tried by the consent of the parties.94
Where a claim or a defense is based upon a bond, note, bill of ex-
change, contract, account or document, the instrument, or a copy thereof,
or a copy of the material portions of the instrument must be attached to
the pleading. Exhibits attached to a pleading are considered a part thereof
for all purposes. 95
Subsection (b) of Rule 1.10, as amended,96 now provides that:
... Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a
different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or
in any motion.
Federal Rule 10(c) contains this same provision, which recognizes
and authorizes a common practice.
9 7
2. THE COMPLAINT
a. Methods of Attack
The rules abolish technical forms of seeking relief.98 The complaint
should simply ".set forth a short and plain statement of the ultimate
facts on which the pleader relies,99 and if it informs the defendant of the
nature of the cause against him, it shall be held sufficient."' 00 The com-
91. See, e.g., Wise v. Quina, 174 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) ; Staskiewicz v. Krause,
159 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
92. 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 1 (1961).
93. See Hart Properties, Inc. v. Slack, 159 So.2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1963), discussed infra,
note 94 and accompanying text.
94. FLA. R. Cry. P. 1.15(b), Hart Properties, Inc. v. Slack, supra note 93.
95. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.10(a), as amended, 1965 REvIsIoN, at 19. Subsection (a) now uses
the word "pleading" instead of listing the various pleadings. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.10(b).
96. 1965 REVISION.
97. See Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B. J. 1132, 1133
(1965).
98. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(a).
99. FA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b). In Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 175 So.2d 198, 200
(Fla. 1965), the Supreme Court of Florida said,
To plead ideas or conclusions are permissible when applied to stated facts. Con-
clusions do not make a pleading bad, but they serve no useful purpose unless sup-
ported by facts shown in support of the conclusion. When appropriate facts are
alleged, conclusions serve a useful purpose in pointing out the inferences intended
to be relied on by the pleader, and the point of law upon which the court may make
its conclusion of law as applied to the facts.
See also, Central & So. Fla. Flood Control Dist. v. Scott, 169 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964);
Loving v. Viecelli, 164 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
100. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b); Richardson v. Sams, 166 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964);
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plaint "must state a cause of action and must contain allegations of fact
sufficient to show the jurisdiction of the court."' 0 '
[T]he test of the sufficiency of a complaint is whether, if the fac-
tual allegations of the complaint are established by proof or
otherwise, the plaintiff will be legally or equitably entitled to
the claimed relief against the defendant.
A different rule, however, uniquely applies in declaratory judg-
ment proceedings. All the appellate courts of Florida have
recognized the rule that in such proceedings, the test of the
sufficiency of the complaint is not whether the complaint shows
that the plaintiff will succeed in getting a declaration of rights
in accordance with his theory and contention, but whether he
is entitled to a declaration of rights at all.'02
Nevertheless, even in a complaint seeking a declaratory decree, "the
rules of pleading require that sufficient facts be stated in a complaint
to apprise the defendant of what it is that the plaintiff complains so that
he may make such defense as he may have."'03 Thus, it would seem that
in a declaratory judgment proceeding,' the complaint will be immune
from successful attack, if under any theory of the facts as alleged in the
complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief. It is submitted
that this result does not differ from that which would obtain in other
actions at law or suits in equity since Rule 1.8(b) states, "Every com-
plaint shall be considered to pray for general relief."105 This provision
is analogous to one contained in Federal Rule 54(c).'
If the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to inform the de-
Tims v. Orange State Oil Co., 161 So.2d 844 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Beikirch v. City of Jack-
sonville Beach, 159 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). In Neville v. County of Sarasota, 158
So.2d 534 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), the defendant was charged with violation of FLA. STAT.
ch. 253 (1963), and the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction. In affirming the trial court's
order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action, on the ground that the plaintiff did not set forth the ultimate facts on which it
relied, but paraphrased the language of the statute, the Second District Court of Appeal
concluded at p. 536 that in stating a statutory right of action, it is safe to follow the language
the statute prescribes.
[Wihile the complaint might not meet the niceties of the situation, it nevertheless
states in clear and unambiguous language that appellants have done and are doing
certain acts for which a temporary injunction should issue. The Rules provide that
if the complaint informs the defendant of the nature of the cause against him, it shall
be held sufficient....
101. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b).
102. Hankins v. Title & Trust Co., 169 So.2d 526, 528 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
103. Saks v. Smith, 145 So.2d 895, 896 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), followed in American Fid.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 174 So.2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
104. FLA. STAT. ch. 87 (1963).
105. Oster v. Krause, 168 So.2d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Winchester v. Florida Elec.
Supply, Inc., 161 So.2d 668 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Arcade Steam Laundry v. Bass, 159 So.2d
915 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), discussed infra note 128 and accompanying text.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) provides that ". . . every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
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fendant of the nature of the cause of action against him,'07 "it is not
necessarily ground for dismissal that the allegations are so vague or
ambiguous [that] a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading thereto without their amplification."' In these
circumstances a defendant may properly move for a more definite state-
ment1" 9 or avail himself of the discovery procedures provided by the
rules." 0
One of the basic purposes of a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a cause of action"' is to test the legal sufficiency of the
complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and it is
essentially analogous to Federal Rule 12(b)(6).112
The motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) performs sub-
stantially the same function as the old common law general
demurrer. A motion to dismiss is the usual and proper method
of testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint. For the purpose
of the motion well pleaded material allegations of the complaint
are taken as admitted; but conclusions of law or unwarranted
deductions of fact are not admitted.
A [complaint] may be dismissed on motion if clearly without
any merit; and this want of merit may consist in the absence
of law to support a claim of the sort made, or of facts sufficient
to make a good claim, or in the disclosure of some fact which
will necessarily defeat the claim. But a complaint should not
be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty
that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of the claim. Pleadings are to
be liberally construed .... "I
107. In Johnson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 169 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964),
the court noted that "[ilt is established that under the law of this State, it is only necessary
for the complaint to state facts sufficient to indicate that a cause of action exists and not
to anticipate affirmative defenses."
108. Oster v. Krause, 168 So.2d 558, 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
109. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(e).
110. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21, 1.22, 1.24, and 1.25 (Depositions), 1.27 (Interrogatories to
Parties), 1.28 (Production of Documents), 1.29 (Examination of Parties and Property),
1.30 (Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents).
111. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b)(6).
112. The federal rule is differently stated in that the motion is denominated as failure
to state a "claim upon which relief can be granted." (Emphasis added.) This language is,
of course, a definition of "cause of action." Both the federal and the Florida rules mean the
same thing. Martin v. Highway Equip. Supply Co., 172 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
113. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE, § 12.08 at 2244-45 (2d ed. 1965). Where a plaintiff
sought a mandatory injunction it was not a sufficient averment to establish the jurisdiction
of a court of equity to allege generally that the plaintiff seeks the relief to prevent irrepa-
rable harm to himself. Mandatory injunctions are looked upon with disfavor by the courts
and are granted but sparingly and cautiously. The remedy at law must be inadequate,
and the complainant in alleging irreparable injury must state facts which will enable the
court to judge whether the injury will in fact be irreparable, and mere general allegations
of irreparable injury will not suffice. First Nat'l Bank v. Ferris, 156 So.2d 421 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1963).
Similarly, in actions grounded upon the Florida Guest Statute, FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1963),
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When a complaint is tested by this rule of law, conclusions of law
are ignored.1 4 Thus, a motion to dismiss is not a proper method of
attacking a complaint that is only insufficient in that it alleges improper
elements of damage or insufficiently alleges proper elements of damage.
If the complaint states a claim upon which at least nominal damages may
be awarded, a motion to dismiss may not be granted,"' but in such case,
the defendant's remedy is to move to strike"' the surplusage, or for a
more definite statement."'
The adequacy of an initial pleading may also be challenged by a
motion for judgment or decree on the pleadings," 8 by a motion for sum-
mary judgment," 9 or by a motion for involuntary dismissal. 2 °
In Rubin v. Gordon,' the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to
circumvent the customary procedural channels for testing the sufficiency
of a complaint in a libel action by writing the trial judge a letter, ask-
ing the court to dismiss his complaint with prejudice so that he might
appeal the final order and have the district court determine whether or
not the complaint in its entirety stated a cause of action for libel per se.
In dismissing the appeal, the third district held that the plaintiff
could not challenge the correctness of an order that was entered at his
instance, and further concluded
that the procedure employed circumvented the normal channels
of pleading, and, in effect, attempted to make the appellate
court the first court to consider and rule upon the sufficiency
of the plaintiff's complaint. Such a procedure would, in effect,
permit the plaintiff to do indirectly what he could not do direct-
ly under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.' 22
Where an order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a cause of action is properly before an appellate court, the complaint
is there construed most strongly against the pleader, and the appellate
in which a defendant's liability is predicated upon a showing of gross negligence, "[t]he
burden of pleading is accordingly more meticulous than in ordinary negligence cases, which
permit a more general mode of pleading." It must fairly appear internally, from the complaint
itself, that the defendant's course of conduct was of the gross or wilful or wanton character
sought to be charged. Frank v. Lurie, 157 So.2d 431, 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
114. Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 175 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1965).
115. Arcade Steam Laundry v. Bass, 159 So.2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
116. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(f) provides the ". . . court may order stricken from any
pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Hodges v.
Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 174 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
117. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(e); Wajay Bakery, Inc. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,
177 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
118. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(c); Hammond v. Times Publishing Co., 162 So.2d 681 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1964); Kahl v. Board of County Comm'rs, 162 So.2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
119. FLA. R. CiV. P. 1.36(b) ; Hart Properties, Inc. v. Slack, 159 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1963).
120. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(b).
121. 165 So.2d 824 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
122. Id. at 825.
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court will not supply an essential allegation by inference. 123 Perhaps it
can be argued that counsel invited his own error in Rubin v. Gordon.1
24
However, this was not the case in Pegg v. Bertram . 5 At common law,
pleadings were construed most strongly against the pleader. This rule
is "unquestionably extinct in jurisdictions governed by the federal
rules or their counterparts.'
12 6
b. Pleading Multiple or Inconsistent Causes of Action
Under Rule 1.8(f), as amended,127
[A]ll averments of claim or defense shall be made in consecu-
tively numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall
be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set
of circumstances... . Each claim founded upon a separate trans-
action or occurrence and each defense, other than denials shall
be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation
facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.
Under Rule 1.8 (g), a pleader may set up in the same action as many
claims or causes of action in the same right as he may have. One may
plead two or more statements of claim alternatively in one count or in
separate counts. This rule is substantially analogous to Federal Rule
10(b). In Arcade Steam Laundry Co. v. Bass,2 ' the second district held
that failure to comply with the formal requirements of Rule 1.8(f) and
(g) does not subject a complaint to dismissal upon motion of an adverse
party where the allegations of the complaint are otherwise sufficient to
state a claim upon which the defendant is entitled to relief. The de-
fendant's proper remedy is by motion to compel separate statement of
claim.' 2
If a plaintiff with multiple claims against a single defendant decides
to consolidate those claims and to litigate them in a single action, he
must be careful to adequately allege and prove the damages to which he
is entitled under each of his claims. Otherwise, he may find that he has
been barred from future prosecution of a claim previously dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action. In Carol Management Corp. v. Maxwell
Co., 30 the plaintiff sought to recover the balance due under ten purchase
123. Pegg v. Bertram, 176 So.2d 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
124. Supra note 121.
125. Supra note 123.
126. JAmEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 2.12 (1965); 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 1.13(1)
(2d ed. 1965).
127. 1965 REvisioN, at 18. Rule 1.8(f) was more succinctly restated to refer to all
averments of the "claim or defense" instead of listing the various pleadings individually.
128. 159 So.2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
129. This is the result reached by the cases under analogous federal rule 10(b). See 2
MooR, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 10.04, p. 2011 (2d ed. 1965).
130. 156 So.2d 773 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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order agreements made with the defendant on different dates for furniture
and fixtures. As to nine of the agreements, the court found in favor of
the plaintiff. With respect to the tenth purchase order agreement, the
judgment permitted the plaintiff to institute subsequent litigation, as
there was an apparent inadequate tender of proof in that regard. The
appellate court held that the judgment below was inconsistent with the
spirit, if not the letter of Rule A, in that it permitted piecemeal litigation
analogous to splitting a cause of action, rather than the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action. The court should dispose of
all of the issues in a cause where the plaintiff chooses to bring one
action to recover the full amount allegedly due under several separate
agreements.
c. Pleading Special Matters
"Where fraud, mistake or condition of mind are alleged in a com-
plaint, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake are required to
be stated with such particularity as the circumstances permit."'' In
testing the sufficiency of a complaint, which charges the defendant with
fraudulent misconduct against a motion to dismiss, "the court must take
as true all material well pleaded allegations. Those allegations are then
viewed in light of the applicable substantive law to determine the ex-
istence of a cause of action."'
13 2
Florida procedure requires that "[w]hen items of special damage
are claimed, they shall be specifically stated."'33 In Wajay Bakery, Inc.
v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,'84 the plaintiff assigned as error on
appeal the trial court's order granting the motion to strike the plaintiff's
claim for special damages. In reversing, the third district held, "If the
only reason for striking this claim for special damages was because suf-
ficient facts to support the claim were not alleged, defendants' proper
remedy was a motion for more definite statement pursuant to Rule
1.11 (e)."' 85
3. DEFENSES
a. Waiver of Defenses
Although a defendant may be held to have waived a defense which
he has failed to assert either by motion or in his answer, the mere fact
131. Williams v. Guyton, 167 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.9(b).
See also Kutner v. Kalish, 173 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) and the cases cited therein at
765, n.1.
132. Kutner v. Kalish, supra note 131, at 765, together with the cases cited in nn.5-6
therein.
133. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.9(f).
134. 177 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
135. Wajay Bakery, Inc. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., supra note 134, at 546.
See also, Arcade Steam Laundry v. Bass, 159 So.2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), which held
that a claim for special damages is sufficient if it notifies the defendant of the nature of
the special damages claimed. A motion to dismiss is not a proper method of attacking a
complaint that is only insufficient in that it inadequately alleged proper elements of damage.
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that the attorneys for the parties enter into a stipulation'"6 extending the
time in which the defendant may answer a complaint will not constitute
sufficient grounds upon which to find that the defendant has waived the
defenses of insufficiency of service of process' 37 or of lack of jurisdiction
over his person.' Under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he
former distinction between general and special appearances has been
abolished."' Rule 1.11(b) provides, inter alia, "that no defense or
objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or
objections in a responsive pleading or motion."
b. Raising Affirmative Defenses by Motion
Under Florida practice, affirmative defenses may generally be as-
serted only in answer to a complaint or counterclaim. 40 It is reversible
error for a court to consider these defenses in determining whether or not
to grant a motion to dismiss."4 However, a limitation on the general rules
exists where the complaint shows on its face that it is invalid.
In Martin v. Highway Equip. Supply Co., 14 2 a case of first impression
in Florida, the complaint alleged breach of an oral agreement, to lease
certain equipment for a five-month rental period, with provisions for pur-
chase and credit at purchase, for prior rental payments. The complaint
contained no averments which would remove the agreement from the
application of the statute of frauds relating to the sale of personal prop-
erty. 43 In sustaining the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court held:
When the complaint affirmatively shows that the claim is based
on an oral contract, the defense of the statute of fraud may be
raised by a defendant by motion to dismiss under Rule 1.11 (b),
Rules of Civil Procedure .... Rule 1.11(b) is like Rule 12(b),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that clause (6) of
the federal rule reads "(6) failure of the pleading to state a
136. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.5(d).
137. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b) (5).
138. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b) (2).
139. Paulson v. Faas, 171 So.2d 9, 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
140. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d). The recent revision of the Florida Rules substantially
changes this statement. The new Revision provides:
[a]ffirmative defenses appearing on the face of a prior pleading may be asserted
as grounds for a motion or defense under Rule 1.140(b) ; provided that this shall not
limit amendments under Rule 1.190 even if such ground is sustained. In re Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598, 604 (Fla. 1966).
141. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 172 So.2d 248 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1965) ; Preston v. Grant Advertising, Inc., 166 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964);
United States Rubber Co. v. Lucky Nine, Inc., 159 So.2d 874 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (On re-
hearing). This rule was enunciated in Fletcher v. Williams, 153 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1963). That case contained a strong dissent. For a resume and comments on the case, see
Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure Survey, 18 U. MIA L. REv. 745, 762, n.145 and ac-
companying text.
142. 172 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
143. FLA. STAT. § 725.02 (1963).
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claim upon which relief can be granted... ."'4 Both rules mean
the same.
"A [complaint] may be dismissed on motion if clearly without
any merit, and this want of merit may consist . . .in the dis-
closure of some fact which will necessarily defeat the claim."
Since the plaintiff's alleged oral contract comes within the
scope of the statute of frauds, it is not good. . . . If the
complaint had merely alleged the contract without disclosing
whether it was oral or written, then with a liberal construc-
tion of the complaint, on motion to dismiss the court could not
rightfully hold that it failed to state a claim on which relief
could be granted and it would have been error to have sustained
the motion to dismiss.45
c. Pleading Affirmative Defenses
The distinguishing characteristic of affirmative defenses is that
"[t]hey don't deny the facts of the opposing party's claim, but they
raise some new matter which defeats the opposite party's otherwise ap-
parently valid claim." 46 Among the affirmative defenses enumerated in
Rule 1.8(d) are assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, estoppel,
failure of consideration, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limita-
tion, waiver "and any other matter constituting an avoidance." The listed
affirmative defenses are intended as illustrative rather than exclusive,1
47
144. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b) also differs from FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) in that the federal
rule provides for the interchangeability of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action pursuant to 12(b)(6) with a motion for summary judgment, where "matters out-
side the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the court."
145. Martin v. Highway Equip. Supply Co., Inc. supra note 142, at 247-48 (Emphasis
added.) See also Jackson Grain Co. v. Kemp, 177 So.2d 513 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). See also
Petitte v. Welch, 167 So.2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) in which the plaintiff sued the owner
of an automobile for damages arising from the negligent operation of the automobile by
a third person on the premises of a service station where the defendant had left the car
in the possession of the service station operator. The plaintiff's action was grounded on the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine recognized in Florida. In affirming the order granting
the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 1.11(b)(6), the appellate court
held that under prior Florida decisions, the vicarious liability of the owner for injuries
arising from the negligent operation of his automobile by a third person had been limited
to those situations in which the injury occurred while the car was being operated on a
public highway with the owner's consent and in the instant case the complaint affirmatively
showed that it was being operated on private premises while in the possession of the
service station operator.
Under the provisions of FiA. STAT. § 51.12 (1963) the complaint would have been legally
sufficient with respect to the element of the owner's liability for the driver's negligence if
it had alleged merely the operation of the driver and the name of the owner without
the necessity of alleging the relationship existing between the owner and the driver.
However, where the complaint affirmatively showed ". . . that the automobile was not
being operated by an agent or servant of the defendant owner, but on the contrary that
it was being operated by a person under the direction and control of the filling station
operator," id. at 22, so that the statute was inapplicable, the complaint was subject to a
motion to dismiss by the defendant for failure to state a cause of action.
146. Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray, 171 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
147. Ibid., Preston v. Grant Advertising, Inc., 166 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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and not infrequently the admissibility of evidence either at the hearing
on a pre-trial motion 48 or on final hearing 49 will turn upon whether or
not the inferences to be drawn from the offered proof relate to an un-
pleaded affirmative defense. This is so because Florida practice permits
the filing of a general denial5 in answer to a complaint and because un-
der the rules,
A party shall be deemed to have waived all defenses and objec-
tions which he does not present either by motion as herein be-
fore provided, or if he has made no motion in his answer or
reply.' 51
Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray152 provides an illustration
of the problem of characterizing a defense, to wit: blackout. The second
district concluded "that evidence of a sudden loss of consciousness goes
to the general issue of negligence"'15 3 and if proved, would negate the
alleged negligence of the defendant's employee truck driver. The cogent
148. Whitfield v. Whitfield, 161 So.2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
149. On the defendant's appeal from an adverse judgment in an action to recover for
goods sold, the district court sustained the lower court's ruling sustaining the plaintiff's
objection to the admission of evidence relating to the alleged quality of goods delivered and
to the strength of the concrete delivered on the ground that the defendant's answer had
consisted of a general denial and "never was indebted," and contained no affirmative de-
fenses raising an issue of set-off for inferior goods. Clutter Constr. Co. v. Naples Bldrs.
Supply Co., 166 So.2d 813 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
150. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(c). General denials are not favored and should not be used
[u]nless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all of the averments of
the preceding pleading . ..but when he does so intend to controvert all of its
averments, including averments of the grounds upon which the Court's jurisdiction
depends, he may do so by general denial. (Emphasis added.)
151. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b). The rule contains three exceptions to its waiver provisions.
A party may at any time raise:
(1) the defense of failure to state a cause of action (or the objection of failure to
state a legal defense to a claim),
(2) the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, or
(3) the defense that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
In the following cases decided during the Survey period, failure to adhere to the pleading
requirements of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d) resulted in a judicial determination of waiver pursuant
to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(h): Wingreen Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 So.2d 408 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1965) ; Gordon Internat'l Advertising, Inc. v. Charlotte County Land & Title Co.,
170 So.2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). 4
In Houston Corp. v. Hofmann, 161 So.2d 243, 247 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), the concurring justice
suggested,
The question may arise as to whether the defense of res judicata which has arisen
after the institution of a suit may be pleaded in bar in the same cause of action. I
find that such a defense is permitted and the courts seem to draw no distinction
between the pleading of one action in bar of a second action and pleading an order
in the same proceeding as a bar to subsequent proceedings or recovery in the same
cause.
152. Supra note 146.
153. Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray, 171 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
But see, Goodrich v. Malowney, 157 So.2d 829 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), in which, in an action
for conversion of stock, a defendant who had filed in answer to the complaint a general
denial was held to have established no basis in his defense pleadings for the admission of
evidence either with respect to the plaintiff's alleged duty to render an accounting or with
respect to a debt allegedly owed by the plaintiff to the corporation. See also Staskiewicz v.
Krause, 159 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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dissent would have characterized the defense of "sudden blackout"
as a matter constituting avoidance within the meaning of Rule 1.8(d):
A litigant and the courts ought not to be left to the processes
of discovery to ascertain the issues to be tried, but one relying
upon the defense of sudden blackout should declare his defenses
as explicitly as the plaintiff declares his grounds for relief. To
hold otherwise invites strong probabilities of a plaintiff being
"bushwacked" at trial. 154
d. Waiver of Irregularities in Pleading Affirmative Defenses
Unless a plaintiff is alert to the pleading and procedural irregularities
practiced by his opponent, he may find that he has forfeited his right to
object to those defects on appeal either from an interlocutory order 55
or from a final order, judgment or decree. 6' Hack v. Great Am. Ins. Co. 5"
is a case in point. The court there held that the plaintiff cannot argue for
the first time on appeal that the defendant waived his right to set up an
arbitration award by virtue of his failure to plead it as an affirmative
defense. Proper procedure required the plaintiff to object when the de-
fendant raised his affirmative defense by motion prior to hearing.
e. Res Judicata and Its Kindred
Certain purchasers of several lots in a subdivision brought suit in
equity against their grantor and the purchasers of one-half of one lot
known as Beach Block 7, seeking a declaration that they were entitled
to recreational rights in Beach Block 7, and seeking injunctive and other
equitable relief. 5 ' The chancellor held "that the plaintiffs had 'acquired
by implied covenant a private easement in said Beach Block 7 . . .' ,,259
and that the plaintiffs' grantors thus became bound not to use that prop-
erty other than for the purposes stated in their representations. How-
ever, the court, also concluded that the defendant buyers of a portion
of Beach Block 7 were innocent purchasers for value and that their con-
veyance was unencumbered by the plaintiff's easement. The court granted
injunctive relief against the grantors, but concluded that the suit should
be dismissed as to the buyers and that cancellation of the deed to them
should also be denied. Subsequently thirteen of the original fifteen plain-
tiffs 6 . brought an action at law to recover damages for their loss of
154. Id. at 434.
155. Although this Survey is primarily concerned with civil procedure in the trial courts,
it seems appropriate to note in passing that interlocutory appeals may be taken in an equity
suit from any order or decree and in actions at law from orders relating to venue or juris-
diction over the person. FLA. App. R. 4.2, 1962 Revision.
156. FLA. App. R. 4.2, 1962 Revision.
157. 175 So.2d 594 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
158. Wise v. Quina, 174 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
159. Id. at 594.
160. Later all but one of these plaintiffs withdrew leaving in the law action only a single
plaintiff, who had also been a party plaintiff to the equity suit.
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recreational rights. The circuit court held that since the plaintiff might
have sought damages as alternative relief in the equity suit on the possible
basis of that court's inability to grant full equitable relief due to the
intervention of the rights of innocent third parties, 6 ' he was estopped by
judgment from bringing a law action because he had had his day in court
in the equity suit, and he should not be permitted to split his cause of
action.
The plaintiffs in both cases appealed from the summary final judg-
ment and the cases were consolidated for hearing and appeal. The district
court held that the summary judgment was erroneously entered since the
complaint contained no prayer for damages, or for any other relief in
law.
The nature of the relief prayed for in the equity suit is, of
course an important consideration in determining whether the
final decree is res judicata as to the action at law. Further-
more, the said final decree fails to provide for, or even to refer
to, the assessment of damages against any of the defendants....
The doctrine of res judicata means that the judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction directly rendered upon a particular
issue is conclusive as to the parties and the issue so decided in
the same or any other controversy. . . . That doctrine is to be
differentiated from the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, under
which, where the second action between the same parties is upon
a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue upon the
determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.'
Res judicata is an affirmative defense which must be asserted by
proving the following essential factors:
1. Identity of the thing sued for;
2. Identity of the cause of action;
3. Identity of the persons and parties to the action; and
4. Identity of the quality in the person for or against whom
the claim is made.
The test used for determining the identity of the thing sued for and the
identity of the cause of action is the identity of the facts essential to
the maintenance of the suit."6 3 As a concession to the ancient historic
rivalry between the Chancellor and the Chief Justice, equity declined to
take jurisdiction unless the plaintiff alleged and proved that he was
161. Under the Equitable Maxim that "Equity does not do justice by halves," when a
court of equity has once acquired jurisdiction in a case, but finds it impractical in a case to
award the relief prayed for, it will retain its jurisdiction and assess and award damages.
162. Wise v. Quina, supra note 158, at 594-595. See also Mease v. Daley, 165 So.2d 415
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) for a decision predicated upon a situation "analogous to estoppel by
judgment."
163. State Road Dept. v. Lewis, 196 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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threatened with irreparable harm for which he had no adequate remedy
at law. The facts necessary to be proved in an action at law and in a
suit in equity were not identical. The burden of proof in the equity suit
was greater and the chancellor's relief discretionary. Therefore, the
cause of action was said not to be merged in a final decree, in which
no money had been awarded. "Since the original cause of action is not
merged in a decree in favor of the plaintiff, which is not for the payment
of money, the plaintiff is not thereby precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata from maintaining an action at law or a suit in equity upon the
original cause of action."' 4
The salutary purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is predicated
upon considerations of comity and upon the desirability of an end to
litigation. The plaintiff who has had his day in court ought not to harass
the defendant with multiple suits and the prior judgment or decree should
be determinative not only of those issues which were actually litigated but
also of those issues which might have been litigated.'65
Akin in spirit and in purpose to the doctrine of res judicata is the
prohibition against splitting a cause of action. In Bowie v. Reynolds, 66
the plaintiff had previously brought a wrongful death action against the
same defendant for his wife's wrongful death as the result of an auto-
mobile collision in which he had sought funeral expenses and loss of
consortium. In a subsequent action he sought to recover damages and
for damage to his car arising from the same collision. On appeal the
district court held that the statutory wrongful death action16 7 created
a right of action where none previously existed since a husband could not
claim damages at common law for loss of consortium resulting from his
wife's death caused by another's wrongful act. Although it was the iden-
tical tortious act of the defendant that caused the death of the plaintiff's
wife and injuries to the plaintiff's body and property, such act gave rise
to two separate and distinct causes of action. Since two separate causes
of action existed in the plaintiff's favor, his attempt to seek recourse in
two separate independent actions did not constitute splitting a single
cause of action.
In another recent case, arising in the third district, the plaintiff sued
the defendants in Texas to foreclose a chattel mortgage.
164. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 46, comment a (1942).
165. E.g., in Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 157 So.2d 199 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963), the plaintiff had filed suit against the executor of her deceased ex-husband's estate
to set aside an ex parte divorce decree previously obtained on constructive service of process
on the ground that her ex-husband was not a bona-fide resident of Florida for the requisite
statutory period at the time that he obtained the divorce decree. The wife neither appeared
nor submitted herself to the court's jurisdiction in the divorce proceedings. In affirming the
trial court, the district court held that by choosing not to appear in the divorce suit, the
non-resident wife was precluded from filing suit years later to set aside the decree for
matters which could have been litigated by her in defense of the divorce suit.
166. 161 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
167. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01-.02 (1963).
[VOL. XX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Texas judgment of foreclosure adjudicated the balance due
on the promissory note secured by the chattel mortgage, ren-
dered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defen-
dants for the unpaid balance of the note, plus interest and
attorney's fees, described the chattels subject to the adjudica-
tion of foreclosure and authorized the seizure and sale of the
property by a sheriff or any constable of the state of Texas to
satisfy the judgment.6 8
While the Texas suit was still pending, the plaintiff sued the defendants
in Florida to recover on the note which had allegedly been endorsed by
the defendants. On the plaintiff's appeal from an adverse summary judg-
ment, the court, sua sponte, considered the effect on the status of the
Florida action of the pending Texas litigation. Held: Reversed.
The pendency of a prior action in a foreign jurisdiction is not
grounds for abatement of a subsequent action in Florida ....
However, the state courts . . . have recognized the power to
stay a proceeding until the determination of a prior pending ac-
tion . . . The general rule as to stay of later actions in one
jurisdiction on account of the pendency of a prior action in
another jurisdiction contemplates that the cause of action on
which the two actions are predicated or the issues involved are
identical. 109
Here they were identical. The court reversed the summary judgment
for the defendants and remanded the case to the trial court with instruc-
tions to stay the proceedings until the conclusion of the Texas proceed-
ingsY.70 It further said that it would be premature to consider the defen-
dants' appellate argument that the plaintiff was precluded by the doc-
trine of election of remedies' 7 ' from maintaining its action in Florida.
f. Joinder and Misnomer of Defenses
Rule 1.8(g) provides:
A party may also state as many separate ... defenses as he has,
regardless of consistency, and whether a defense be based on
legal or on equitable grounds, or on both. All pleadings shall
be construed so as to do substantial justice.
72
Thus, under this provision the traditionally equitable defenses of "waiver
or estoppel" may be asserted and relied upon, in actions at law as well as
168. A. J. Armstrong Co. v. Romanach, 165 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
169. Id. at 818-819.
170. Id. at 819.
171. The doctrine of election of remedies, like those of res judicata, estoppel by judg-
ment and merger, is predicated upon the same considerations of public policy that induced
the court to stay the Florida proceedings in the principal case.
172. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(g).
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in suits in equity. 7 In Frank v. Levine,1 4 the appellate court reversed
an order of dismissal, and held inter alia, that
the trial judge may have been motivated by an assumption that
equitable considerations which could limit recovery of a defi-
ciency when sought in equity in a foreclosure suit, were not
available as equitable defenses or partial defenses in a law
action for such a deficiency. However, equitable defenses may
be pleaded in law action,... and there would appear to be no
reason why equitable considerations sufficient to limit a defi-
ciency award in equity should not serve equally when pleaded
and proved in an action at law to recover a mortgage foreclosure
sale deficiency.
175
Similarly, in the interest of preferring substance over form, the
rules provide176 that "[w]hen a party has mistakenly designated a de-
fense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court, on
terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been
a proper designation." Thus, in Tischler v. Tischler,77 the second dis-
trict held, on appeal from an adverse decree in a suit to domesticate an
Illinois divorce decree awarding permanent alimony and support money,
that the trial court had erroneously stricken certain defenses mistakenly
designated as a counterclaim, which went to the equities between the




The committee notes 78 explaining the amendments to Rule 1.13171
state:
This rule has been changed to provide for third party practice
and to make the rule shorter. There is no other change in
substance.
This is not so. Subpart (a) (previously subpart (1) of amended Rule
1.13 has been restated so that it is now substantially identical with
Federal Rule 13 (a). Both rules now exempt a defendant from the neces-
sity of pleading a compulsory counterclaim if:
(1) at the time the action was commenced, the claim was the
subject of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party
173. Enfinger v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 156 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1963).
174. 159 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
175. Id. at 666.
176. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d).
177. 173 So.2d 769 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
178. 39 FIA. BJ. 1132, 1133 (Dec. 1965).
179. 1965 REvrsioN, at 20-21.
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brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a per-
sonal judgment on the claim, and the pleader is not stating a
counterclaim under this rule.""
These exceptions to the necessity of pleading a counterclaim arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the principal suit
were not previously contained in Rule 1.13(1). Except for amendment
of Rule 1.13, recognizing third party practice'' and modifying the con-
ditions under which a cross-claim may be brought, differences are in
choice of language merely.
b. Statutory Replevin
The unequivocal mandate of Rule 1.13 ( 1 ), which requires the defen-
dant to file as a counterclaim any claim that he has against the plaintiff
"arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the action and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction," must be
read in pari materia with the provision of Rule A making the rules ap-
plicable
to all suits of a civil nature and all special statutory proceedings
... with the exception that the form, content, procedure and
time for pleading in all special statutory proceedings shall be
as prescribed by the statutes providing for such proceedings,
unless these rules shall specifically provide to the contrary.
Recent cases, involving the defendant's right to assert a counterclaim
in an action of replevin indicate that the parties' rights in the area of
replevin will be governed by the exception of Rule A rather than by the
order of priority announced both by legislative fiat" 2 and judicial order,'
requiring that the rules of civil procedure, adopted by the Supreme Court
of Florida, as authorized by the Florida Constitution,8 4 supersede exist-
ing conflicting rules and statutes, or parts thereof.
In National Leasing Corp. v. Bombay Hotel, Inc.,88 the third district
concluded that the non-joinder provisions of section 46.08 are substantive
and therefore not subject to modification, repeal or change under the
supreme court's rule-making power. The court further held that the Su-
preme Court of Florida should not be held to have impliedly repealed
either the joinder provisions of section 46.08, or the procedural provisions
180. 1965 REvisiow, at 20.
181. See part 6, Third Party Practice, of this Section, infra.
182. FLA. STAT. § 25.371 (1963) provides:
When a rule is adopted by the supreme court concerning practice and procedure
and such rule conflicts with a statute, the rule supercedes the statutory provision.
183. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1962).
184. FIA. CoisT. art. V, § 3.
185. 178 So.2d 730, 731 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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of chapter 78 of the Florida Statutes. It humbly suggested that any other
construction would constitute judicial legislation.
It is arguable that the third district's interpretation of the effect of
Rule 1.13(1) upon Florida Statute 46.08 is inconsistent with the an-
nounced purpose of the rules "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action," and likewise inconsistent with the pur-
pose of 1.13 (1) to require all claims arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence between the same parties to be finally litigated in a single
suit. However, this construction appears to be well established and two
other cases reaching the appellate courts during the survey period were
similarly decided.
In First Nat'l Bank v. First Bonded Warehouse,'88 where the
defendant-warehouse's counterclaim against the plaintiff, holder of a
retain title contract, for storage costs due on the chattels which were
the subject of the retain title contract was dismissed "without prejudice
to the defendant to bring and maintain said cause of action in a separate
suit." In Van Hoose v. Robbins,'87 a landlord's counterclaim for rent
arrearages in a replevin action brought by a tenant to recover certain
personalty was also dismissed. The court noted that replevin is a posses-
sory action, which by statutory prescription cannot be joined with other
causes of action. It further said that
Although a counterclaim may be allowed in some instances, the
present "counterclaim" was properly dismissed because it did not
plead anything to offset the right of the plaintiff to recover the
described property nor did it assert a specific charge against the
property sought to be replevied.'88
Both of these decisions relied in part on the authority of the National
Leasing Corp. case; it is submitted that they are all anachronistic.
c. Anti-Trust
In the area of anti-trust violations, Florida courts have shown a
more progressive attitude. They give effect to Rule 1.13(1) by permit-
ting a defendant to counterclaim for damages resulting from the plaintiff's
alleged violation of Florida's anti-trust laws. 8 The defendant in Har-
drives Co. v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., 90 a contract action to recover
for goods sold to the defendant on open account, had attempted to assert
such a counterclaim, but the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss the counterclaim, which was reversed on appeal. At common law,
186. 174 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
187. 165 So.2d 209 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
188. Id. at 211.
189. FLA. STAT. ch. 542 (1963).
190. 166 So.2d 810 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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agreements in unreasonable restraint of trade were not unlawful in the
sense of being criminal, but were merely void and unenforceable. They did
not give rise to a civil action for damages in favor of one injured thereby.
"Statutes such as our anti-trust acts have the effect of rendering such
contracts unlawful in an affirmative or positive sense and punishable as
a crime."'' By the weight of authority subsequent to the passage of these
acts, one harmed by illegal anti-trust activities is entitled to recover
damages in a proper case, and the absence of an express statutory remedy
does not preclude such action. The Florida court concluded that the
federal courts which disallow such a counterclaim base their decision
upon the fact that Congress had provided an independent treble damage
action that precluded the counterclaim. Since Florida's anti-trust laws
contain no express, exclusive remedy, our Rule 1.13(1) requires that a
claim based on alleged anti-trust violations arising out of the same trans-
action or occurrence be asserted.
d. Omitted Counterclaims
Rule 1.13(f), as amended, provides that:
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight,
inadvertence or excusable neglect, or when justice requires,
he may set up the counterclaim by amendment with leave of
the court.9 2
As the language of the rule indicates, the right to assert omitted counter-
claims is not absolute, but rests in the sound discretion of the court to
be exercised after it has considered all the relevant facts and circum-
stances involved in the particular case. Thus, it was held in Aydelott v.
Greenheart (Demerara) Inc.'93 that the trial court did not err in denying
the defendant's motion for leave to file a counterclaim long subsequent
to the entry of a summary judgment for the plaintiff. Although the pro-
posed counterclaim was in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim, it
appeared that the matters which it attempted to raise were essentially
within the defendant's knowledge when he answered the complaint, and
the defendant was unable to show an abuse of judicial discretion.
5. CROSS-CLAIMS
Rule 1.13 (7), unlike Federal Rule 13 (g), expressly requires a cross-
claim to be within the jurisdiction of the court. If the venue in a local
action is considered jurisdictional 94 (in that it relates to the power of
the court to entertain the suit) then if the cross-claim is characterized as
local, it cannot properly have been maintained where venue is improper.
191. Id. at 812.
192. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(f), as amended, 1965 REVISIoN, at 20. (Emphasis added.)
193. 162 So.2d 286 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
194. See WRIGHT, FEERAL Couas, § 42, pp. 134-35 (1963).
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On the other hand, if it were considered that the venue, even in local
actions, only relates to the place where a suit may be brought, then
improper venue would not go to the power of the court to entertain the
cross-claim, but would merely constitute a defense to be asserted either
by motion" 5 or in the answer' to the cross-claim, and the defense would
be deemed waived'917 if not asserted in either manner. If cross-claims are
treated as ancillary there probably could be no venue objection.
Another interesting problem raised by the recent amendment to
1.13(g), which was formerly designated as 1.13(7), and not commented
upon in the committee notes, is the effect of restating the rule in sub-
stantially the identical language as is contained in Federal Rule 13(g)
by dropping the clause requiring the cross-claim to be within the jurisdic-
tion of the court.
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of either the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the sub-
ject matter of the original action. The cross-claim may include
a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be
liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted
in the action against the cross-claimant. 98
The federal courts treat cross-claims as within their ancillary jurisdiction,
since by definition they must be closely related to existing action, and,
therefore, independent jurisdictional grounds are not required nor can
there be any venue objection. 99
Of course, Rule 1.13(g), as amended, must be read in pari ma-
teria with Rule 1.13(j) (formerly designated as Rule 1.13(10)) as
amended. 00 This rule provides for the transfer of any action involving
a counterclaim or cross-claim exceeding the jurisdictional limits of the
court to the court in the same county having jurisdiction of the demand
in the counterclaim or cross-claim. But suppose the jurisdictional ques-
tion arises not out of the amount involved, but out of the venue of a local
action? Generally, where the Florida rule is substantially identical with
the corresponding federal rule, Florida courts have followed federal
precedent. But since under the Florida rules, jurisdiction is not entirely
ancillary, it is not clear whether the Florida courts will--or should-
follow federal precedent in this area.
195. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.11(b) (3).
196. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.8(c).
197. FA. R. Cxv. P. 1.11(h). However, the opinion in the Baum case indicates that
the defendants had properly raised the venue objection in the trial court.
198. 1965 REvisioN, at 21.
199. The federal view characterizing cross-claims as ancillary is succinctly discussed in
WRIGHT, FwER..L CouRTs, § 80, p. 307 (1964).
200. 1965 REWsioN, at 21.
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6. THIRD PARTY PRACTICE COMES TO FLORIDA
One of the most significant modifications to Florida procedure
results from the addition to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure of Rule
1.41 which permits third party practice.
Rule 1.41. Third Party Practice
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any
time after commencement of the action a defendant as a third
party plaintiff may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. The
third party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if
he files the third party complaint not later than twenty days
after he serves his original answer. Otherwise he must obtain
leave on motion upon notice to all parties to the action. The
person served with the summons and third party complaint,
hereinafter called the third party defendant, shall make his de-
fenses to the third party plaintiff's claim as provided in Rules 1.8
and 1.11 and his counterclaims against the third party plaintiff
and cross-claims against other third party defendants as pro-
vided in Rule 1.13. The third party defendant may assert against
the plaintiff any defenses which the third party plaintiff has
to the plaintiff's claim. The third party defendant may also
assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim against the third party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert
any claim against the third party defendant arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plain-
tiff's claim against the third party plaintiff and the third party
defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided in
Rules 1.8 and 1.11 and his counterclaims and cross-claims as
provided in Rule 1.13. Any party may move to strike the third
party claim or for its severance or separate trial. A third party
defendant may proceed under this rule against any person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part
of the claim made in the action against the third party defendant.
(b) When Plaintiff May Bring in Third Party. When a
counterclaim is asserted against the plaintiff, he may cause a
third party to be brought in under circumstances which under
this rule would entitle a defendant to do so.
201
This rule is substantially identical with Federal Rule 14, "except it allows
a 20-day period within which the third party complaint may be filed
without leave of court instead of 10 days." ' 2 Florida Rule 1.41 also ex-
201. 1965 REvISION, at 27.
202. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1136 (Dec.
1965).
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pressly provides for defenses to a third party complaint to be asserted
either by answer or by appropriate motion, whereas Federal Rule 14
expressly provides only for defenses by motion pursuant to Federal Rule
12. However, the defensive pleadings required under either rule are, in
fact, the same since both Florida Rule 1.7(a), as amended, 03 and Federal
Rule 7(a) provide "There shall be . . . a third party answer, if a third
party complaint is served."
Third party practice "is intended to avoid circuity of action, and
to dispose of the entire subject matter arising from one set of facts in
one action thus administering complete and even-handed justice, ex-
peditiously and economically."" 4
Other rules amended to reflect the introduction of third party prac-
tice include: 1.4(a), requiring the service on all parties of all papers;
1.8 (b), relating to the requirements for stating a claim for relief; 1.11 (a),
which provides for the time within which defenses may be made; and
1.13(a), (b) and (f), relating to the assertion of counterclaims.0 5
7. STRIKING SHAM, IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL
PLEADINGS
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff, in a personal injury action,
had served written notice of her claim upon the City Attorney in com-
pliance with the pertinent provisions of the city charter.20 ' As a matter
of fact, the person whom the plaintiff had notified was the director of
the city's department of water and sewers, whose reply lulled the plain-
tiff into believing that adequate notice had been given. The city answered
by way of general denial, and also alleged affirmatively that any injuries
suffered by the plaintiff resulted from her own negligence. The city then
moved for judgment on the pleadings 20 7 and to strike a sham pleading,
208
attached to which was the city attorney's affidavit that he had not re-
ceived a written notice of the claim.0 9 On appeal it was held that the
trial court's dismissal could not be sustained on the basis of a finding that
the pleading was a sham. Since the city's answer was by general denial,
the plaintiff was not precluded from asserting that the city was estopped
from denying it had received the requisite notice, although she had not
pled the facts giving rise to the alleged estoppel 1° As the same court
203. 1965 REVISiON, at 18.
204. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, § 76, at 287 (1963). See also 1A BARRON€ & HOLTZOFT,
FED. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 422 (Wright ed. 1960).
205. 1965 REVISION, at 19-20.
206. CITY oF MiAmi CHRTR, § 93.
207. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(c).
208. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.14.
209. "The motion to strike shall be sworn to and shall set forth fully the facts on which
the movant relies and may be supported by affidavit .... " FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.14(b).
210. Brooks v. City of Miami, 161 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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remarked in another case, "It cannot be said that the falsity of the
(plaintiff's) allegations clearly appears and that (her) complaint is a
mere pretense set up in bad faith."21'
8. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
a. Amendments
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and
the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may
amend it at any time within twenty days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in
response to an amended pleading within twenty days after ser-
vice of the amended pleading unless the court otherwise orders;
provided that if a motion or pleading has been served in response
to the original pleading and a party does not plead or move in
response to the amended pleading, the original response shall
be considered as pleaded to the amended pleading.212
Subsection (a) of Rule 1.15 has been amended to enlarge the time
within which a party may respond to an amended pleading from ten to
twenty days, and to resolve a conflict between the districts created by
the recent decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in the case of
Scarfone v. Denby.213 The Scarfone case involved an original answer
which was not permitted to stand over as an answer to an amended com-
plaint. The second district upheld the trial court, basing its conclusions
upon the mandatory language of Rule 1.15(a) and upon the omission
from Rule 1.15(a) of the express provision, contained in former equity
Rule 3.6, which permitted an answer to an original complaint to stand
over to an amended complaint. The decision conflicted directly with that
of the third district in Ramalgi Realty Co. v. Craver.21 '4 As is clear from
the amendment to Rule 1.15(a), the Florida Supreme Court disagreed
with the second district and resolved the resulting conflict in favor of
the decision reached by the Third District Court of Appeal in the Ramalgi
case.
215
Florida courts are committed to the concept that leave to amend
211. Becker v. Dulberg, 176 So.2d 583, 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
212. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(a), as amended, 1965 REVIsIoN, at 21.
213. 156 So.2d 694 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
214. 109 So.2d 187 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
215. The Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1133
(1965) state: "The last clause has been added . . . to overrule Scarfone v. Denby ....
The subcommittee believes the rule in Ramalgi Realty Co. v. Craver . . . is preferable." The
language was derived from 1950 Equity Rule 36.
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should be freely granted,218 and that "the trial courts should always
afford reasonable opportunity to amend a pleading if there is likelihood
that such may operate to cure prior defects." '217 Thus on a hearing of a
motion for summary judgment the court may pierce the curtain of the
paper issues made by the pleadings and examine the affidavits for the
purpose of determining whether there is any genuine issue of fact that
ought to be tried.218 "[W]here facts appear in affidavits upon motion for
a summary judgment which would justify an amendment of the pleadings,
such amendment should not be prevented by the entry of a final judg-
ment." The proper procedure is to grant the motion to enter the sum-
mary judgment with leave to amend.220 Similarly, "[w]hen issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by the express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings .... 11221 Thus, where the plaintiff sought recovery in a
negligence action alleging that he was a passenger for hire, and the court
announced its intention of directing a verdict against him at the con-
clusion of the plaintiff's case on the ground that the evidence was legally
insufficient to establish his status as a passenger for hire, the court,
nevertheless, properly permitted the plaintiff to amend his complaint in
order to include allegations of gross negligence, so as to conform to the
proof required by the guest statute.222 Amendments to conform the evi-
dence to the pleadings may be made at any time, even after judgment or
decree, and failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues.28 The evidence which went to the jury was the same under eithertheory upon which the plaintiff contended he was entitled to recover.224
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in an amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted
to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading.225
In Keel v. Brown,22 1 it appeared that the original complaint had
been filed within the requisite one-year period of the statute of limita-
216. McSwiggan v. Edson, 172 So.2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Davis v. Major Oil Co.,
164 So.2d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
217. Gates v. Utsey, 177 So.2d 486, 489 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
218. Curley v. Finest Homes, Inc., 167 So.2d 739, 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
219. 6 MooRa, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 56.10, at 2054 (2d ed. 1960).
220. Hart Properties, Inc. v. Slack, 159 So.2d 236, 240 (Fla. 1963); Curley v. Finest
Homes, Inc., supra note 218.
221. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(b); Reliance Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Booher, 166 So.2d 222 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1964).
222. F.A. STAT. § 320.59 (1963).
223. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(b).
224. Raggs v. Gouse, 156 So.2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) ; see also, Richardson v. Sams,
166 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
225. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(c). See McNayr v. Cranbrook Investments, Inc., 158 So.2d 129
(Fla. 1963).
226. 162 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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tions, 2 7 but that the amended complaint in the cause, which had been
transferred to the law side, had been filed after the twelve-month period.
In reversing the trial court, the district court held that the plaintiff's
amended complaint related back to the date of the filing of his original
complaint in chancery.
[T]he proper test of relation back of amendments is not
whether the cause of action stated in the amended pleading is
identical to that stated in the original (for in the strict sense
almost any amendment may be said to be a change of the orig-
inal cause of action), but whether the pleading as amended is
based upon the same specific conduct, transaction or occurrence
between the parties upon which the plaintiff tried to enforce
his original claim. If the amendment shows the same general
factual situation as that alleged in the original pleading, then
the amendment relates back-even though there is a change in
the precise legal description of the rights sought to be enforced,
or a change in the legal theory upon which the action is
brought.1
28
Once the period has passed during which a party has an absolute
right to amend, granting leave to amend is discretionary with the court.
The proper exercise of a court's discretion is measured by "the standard
of justice. 229 Such discretion is very broad, though not unlimited.230
Thus, it has been held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint in a malpractice
action to add three additional counts to the original complaint where the
motion to amend was filed only four days before a scheduled pre-trial
conference 2 l' and hearing on the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.23
2
A trilogy of cases during the survey period suggests the difficulties
that may arise concerning the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court,
the choice of the proper appellate route by which to challenge the pro-
priety of an order entered "with leave to amend," and the timeliness of
the means chosen. If an order dismissing a complaint, or entering a sum-
mary judgment or decree, "with leave to amend," is characterized as
interlocutory, then appeal is proper only if the suit is in equity.28 In
227. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(7) (1963).
228. Kell v. Brown, supra note 226, at 323.
229. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(a), (e).
230. Corbett v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 166 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
231. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.16.
232. Dunn v. Campbell, 166 So.2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). It is significant that the court
thought that the same evidence relating to the defendant's alleged negligence in his repre-
senting hospital costs would be admissable under the general allegations of negligence already
contained in the complaint, as would be admissable if the court had permitted the complaint
to be amended to include the additional counts. See also, Green v. Manley Const. Co., 159
So.2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
233. FaA. App. R., 1962 Revision, 4.2. Interlocutory appeals at law are appropriate only
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this area, the language in which such an order is couched may well be
controlling.
In Hancock v. Piper,234 for example, the defendants took an inter-
locutory appeal from an order denying their motion to dismiss a com-
plaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the parties and the cause.
The briefs and the appendix on appeal revealed that the defendants'
prior motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint had been
granted in the following language:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the said mo-
tion be and the same is hereby granted, and this cause be, and
the same hereby is dismissed, and it is further, ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED that the plaintiffs be granted
twenty (20) days within which to file their amended complaint
in the above styled cause.235
On the nineteenth day, the plaintiffs mailed their second amended
complaint to the defendants and to the clerk of the circuit court, but
this complaint was not filed until the twenty-first day after entry of the
order dismissing the prior complaint. The district court found that the
order was merely an interlocutory one dismissing the complaint, but not
the cause, and that the order "lacked the requisite finality to relieve the
court of further judicial labor in the case. '236 Finally, the court distin-
guished the case from Stevens v. Metropolitan Dade County, 37 cited and
relied on by the defendants, in which "the complaint was dismissed by
an order which provided that if an amended complaint were not filed
within fifteen days 'this cause shall stand dismissed with prejudice.' ))237a
H. Pre-Trial Conference
Rule 1.16 has been amended2 38 to enlarge the notice time for a pre-
trial conference from ten to twenty days. The purpose of a pre-trial con-
ference is to simplify the issues. If the conference progresses to the point
of eliminating all questions of fact, then the court may give judgment
according to the law on the facts before him.2 9 Thus, when noticed for a
pre-trial conference, counsel should recognize and prepare for the pos-
sibility that at the conference the issues of fact may be simplified to the
point of elimination.2 40 The notice period required to be given prior to
holding a pre-trial conference is the same as that required before holding
from orders relating to venue or jurisdiction over the person. An appeal may be taken from
any interlocutory appeal in equity.
234. 175 So.2d 207 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
235. Id. (Emphasis added.)
236. Id.
237. 164 So.2d 273 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
237a. Ibid.
238. 1965 REvIsION, at 21-22.
239. Hillsborough County v. Sutton, 150 Fla. 601, 603, 8 So.2d 401, 402 (1942).
240. Cook v. Navy Point, Inc., 88 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1956).
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a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.2 4' Thus, in Green v. Man-
ley Constr. Co.,242 the second district, in affirming a summary judgment
on oral motion made at the conclusion of the pre-trial conference, re-
marked that where sufficient notice has been given, the litigants are
charged with knowledge that the court may, of its own motion, enter a
summary judgment during a pre-trial conference.
In Stager v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co.,2 48 the plaintiff in an FELA
action appealed from a favorable judgment. Between the date of the in-
jury and the trial, the plaintiff underwent several operations by two doc-
tors and was examined by several other doctors of his own choosing and
by a court-appointed physician. Among the errors assigned on appeal
was an order of the trial court limiting to two the number of doctors
who could testify at the trial. 44 In sustaining the order, the district court
noted that
a trial judge is charged with the conduct of a trial and only
such conduct on the part of the trial judge as would result in
an abuse of discretion, depriving a party of due process of law,
would warrant an appellate court directing a trial judge as to
the manner of conducting his courtroom. 4
Conversely, where the trial court, over the defendant's objection,
permitted the testimony of a witness, whose name was not included on a
witness list filed by the plaintiff at the pre-trial conference, the appellate
court also sustained the trial court's action on the ground that the defen-
dant, this time, had failed to demonstrate an abuse of judicial discre-
tion.246 In this case, the witness whose testimony was allowed was a
physician who examined the plaintiff after the date of the pre-trial
conference.
I. Parties
1. NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
"Any person may at any time be made a party if his presence is
necessary or proper to a complete determination of the cause.1 247 Failure
to join an indispensable party constitutes grounds for dismissal, 48 and is
a nonwaiveable defense. 49 In determining whether a party is indispens-
able, it is necessary to decide whether the omitted party is jointly or
jointly and severally liable to the complainant. A party who is jointly and
241. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36, as amended, 1965 REVISIoN, at 26-27.
242. 159 So.2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
243. 163 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
244. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.16(4).
245. Stager v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., supra note 243, at 17.
246. Henningsen v. Smith, 174 So.2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
247. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.17(a).
248. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b) (7).
249. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(h) (1).
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severally liable with those who have been made defendants is not an in-
dispensable party to a pending cause of action; 0 a plaintiff has a right
to elect whom he will sue.
In an action against the estate of a truck driver for indemnity, it
was held on appeal 5' that the trial court had erroneously dismissed252 the
complaint for non-joinder of an allegedly indispensable party, the lessee
of the truck. The lessee, like the plaintiff lessor, was only vicariously liable
for the defendant's negligence, and, therefore jointly and severally liable
with the named defendant. The plaintiff had the option of suing either or
both.
So also, the executrix is not an indispensable party to an action by
the administrator de bonis non against the surety on her bond for dam-
ages resulting from the executrix' alleged mismanagement of the es-
tate.2"' Notwithstanding the use of the conjunctive in the statutes
providing for a devastavit action,2" the statute providing for the form
of the bond to be procured by the executor of an estate requires that
such bonds be joint and several.255 Similarly, the personal representative
and his surety are severally liable in a devastavit action because the
claim against the representative is for breach of duty in his office, and
the claim against the surety is on the bond contract.
In a suit to void a mortgage on corporation property, a corporation
was held not to be an indispensable party where all of the shareholders
were parties, either as plaintiffs or defendants, and the person who pro-
cured the mortgage was also a party, both individually and as trustee for
the corporation, in which capacity he acquired and held title to the real
property involved. 5 8 However, where an officer and the principal share-
holder of a corporation sues the defendants, individually and as trustees
of the corporation, for the alleged conversion of his stock, the defendants
could not counterclaim to recover for the alleged indebtedness of the
plaintiff to the corporation, where the corporation had not been made a
party to the suit pursuant to either Rule 1.17(a) or 1.18.257
In a case of first impression in Florida, the plaintiff in an action
250. Dixon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 174 So.2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
251. Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So.2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
252. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.18 provides that "[M]isjoinder of parties shall not be grounds for
dismissal of an action."
253. Dixon v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra note 250.
254. FLA. STAT. § 733.52-.53 (1963).
255. FLA. STAT. § 732.61 (1963).
256. Baum v. Corn, 167 So.2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
257. Goodrich v. Malowney, 157 So.2d 829 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). The second amended
counterclaim was stricken during the pre-trial phase of the litigation with leave to the cor-
poration or any one legally representing its rights to file such pleadings as it or they may be
advised within 20 days. No such pleadings were filed.
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against the three surviving joint obligors on a promissory note appealed
from an adverse judgment which had been entered apparently on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to timely join25 an indispensable
party, the estate of the deceased joint obligor. The district court
reversed.
259
The common law concept of a joint contract gave the obligee a
single cause of action against all of the obligors. Each joint
obligor was liable for the entire debt but was not bound by
himself alone; and yet, upon the death of a joint obligor only
the surviving obligors could be sued and the estate of the
deceased joint obligor was not liable. The estate of the last
surviving obligor, however, could be sued. 60
Although section 45.11 of the Florida Statutes26' has modified the
common law rule by providing for the survival of causes of action, it
does not follow that all who can be sued on a joint obligation, including
the estate of a deceased obligor, must be sued. The court concluded that
section 45.11 was merely intended to afford a creditor an additional rem-
edy that he did not have at common law, but that it was not designed
to affect the common law liability of surviving joint obligors. To hold
otherwise would impose burdens on a creditor which were not imposed by
the common law and
would wrongfully enable joint obligors to escape liability by
taking advantage of the passive inactivity of the creditor as
to the estate of a deceased joint obligor. The death of a joint
debtor should not place the creditor, as to the efficacy of his
remedy, in a worse position than if death had not occurred. It
would be a strange sense of justice if the unfortunate demise
of one obligor should contribute as a windfall to joint obligors
who are also presumptively liable for the entire joint debt which
may or may not yet be due.
2 62
The responsibility for protecting their right to contributions rests with
the other joint obligors. Under the broad provisions of the nonclaim
statute263 a surviving obligor can file his claim for contribution against
the estate of a deceased joint obligor even if the obligation is contingent
and unmatured.2 64
258. Pursuant to the provisions of Florida's Nonclaim Statute, FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1963).
259. Phillippi Creek Homes, Inc. v. Arnold, 174 So.2d 552 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
260. Id. at 554.
261. FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1963).
262. Phillippi Creek Homes, Inc. v. Arnold, supra note 259, at 555-56. This view com-
ports with the decisions of other state courts which have been squarely confronted with the
problem.
263. FrA. STAT. § 733.16 (1963).
264. Fillyau v. Laverty, 3 Fla. 72 (1850), cited in Phillippi Creek Homes, Inc. v. Arnold,
supra note 259, at 556.
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2. INTERVENTION AT LAW
Under Florida procedure, provision for the right to intervene is
included in that section of the rules governing the conduct of suits in
equity.
265
There is no special provision permitting intervention in law
cases, although it is arguable that the language of Fla. R. Civ.
P. 1.17 could be interpreted to be broad enough to allow an out-
side party to move for his being joined as a party in the cause
if the grounds stated in the rule were met. The Supreme Court
of Florida has rejected this view and held that intervention in
a lawsuit was not permissible without a statute or rule of court
expressly allowing it.266
Florida has created a right of statutory intervention in eminent
domain proceedings for persons not expressly made parties, but interested
in or having a lien upon the property described in the petition.267 The
statute has been construed to mean that only persons who will be direct-
ly damaged by condemnation of the particular property, and not those
who may only be consequentially damaged by its taking, have an absolute
right to intervene.26 8
... [n] o rigid definition of "consequential damage" has been at-
tempted; the inclusion or exclusion of particular cases has been
governed largely by the terminology used in the opinions. As a
very rough standard, the question whether the land owned by
those seeking to intervene was expressly included, by descrip-
tion, in the original petition for condemnation has been kept
in mind; if the land was not so included, it has been assumed
that the damage apprehended by the attempting intervenors was
consequential.2 60
Miller v. Townhouse Dev. Corp.,270 creates an exception to the gen-
eral rule that in Florida there is no right of intervention in actions at
law. In that case the appellate court reversed a trial court order denying
the appellant's petition to intervene in a replevin2 7' action on the ground
that it would result in a waste of judicial effort unless the appellant were
permitted to intervene as a party defendant as the plaintiff could have no
265. FLA. R. CIv. P. 3.4:
Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to
assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to,
and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered
by the court in its discretion.
266. Florida Bar's Manual, Florida Civil Practice Before Trial, Ch. 11, Joinder of Parties
and Actions (by the Honorable Paul E. Raymond, former Dean of Stetson University College
of Law), at 322.
267. FLA. STAT. § 73.05 (1963).
268. Lee County v. Charlotte County, 174 So.2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
269. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1292, 1293 (1956).
270. 178 So.2d 730 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
271. FLA. STAT. Ch. 78 (1963).
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relief as to the property in the petitioner's possession, unless she was a
party to the action, so that her rights in the property as against the plain-
tiff could be determined.
3. MISJOINDER OF PARTIES
Section 734.24,272 which deals with suit on the bond of a personal
representative of a decedent's estate, requires that suit for breach of
said bond be brought in the name of the governor of the state for the use
of the party damaged, and the statute requiring such a bond by a personal
representative 273 provides that the bond shall be made payable to the
governor. Where the plaintiff fails to comply with the statutory require-
ments by bringing suit in the governor's name for the use of the party
damaged, proper procedure requires not that the suit be dismissed, but
that the court permit the plaintiff to correct the misjoinder by amending
his complaint2 74 on such "just terms" as the trial court deems neces-
sary.2 7
5
4. DROPPING OR ADDING PARTIES
In an action to recover for personal injuries resulting from a gas
explosion alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence, the
plaintiff appealed from an order dismissing her complaint. Originally,
the complaint had been filed against four defendants, whose liability to
the plaintiff, if any, under the facts of the case would have been joint and
several. The district court reversed. 27 The mere fact that the plaintiff
elected to proceed severally and separately against the remaining defen-
dant did not justify dismissal of the entire cause. Rule 1.35 concerns dis-
missal of an entire cause and is inapplicable when it is sought to dismiss
individual parties or claims against one or more but less than all of the
defendants. Although Rule 1.18 permits dropping parties "[up]on such
terms as are just," "it would not appear to be a 'just term' to require as
a condition of permission to drop three of four defendants whose liability
is several, that the entire cause should be dismissed.
2 77
5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
Unlike Rule 1.18, permitting amendment to add or to drop parties,
"substitution is meant to cover only those cases where the proper parties
have been joined, but because of death, incompetency, etc., of a party,
another may be substituted. 278 Prior to the amendment of the federal
272. FiA. STAT. § 734.24 (1963).
273. FiA. STAT. § 732.61 (1963).
274. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.18.
275. Dixon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 174 So.2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
276. Salcedo v. Southeastern Natural Gas Co., 171 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
277. Salcedo v. Southeastern Natural Gas Co., supra note 276, at 399.
278. 4 Mooaa, FEDiL.AL PRACnCE, 25.02, at 512 (2d ed. 1963).
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rules in 1963, Federal Rule 25(a),279 which was identical to Florida
Rule 1.19(a) prior to the recent amendments, was severely criticized on
the ground that the Rule operated both as a statute of limitations upon
revivor, and as a mandate to the court to dismiss an action not revived
within the two-year period as required by the Rule. Moore described Rule
25 as "easily the poorest of all the federal rules." 8 0 It was questioned
whether a statute of limitations may validly be prescribed by rule of
court.28 '
As a result of the recent amendments subsection (a) (1) of the
Florida Rule has been amended to conform to the present Federal Rule
25 (a) by deleting the requirement that the order for substitution be made
within two years following the death of a party, and substituting a re-
quirement that the motion be made within ninety days after death is
suggested upon the record. As amended, Florida Rule 1.19(a)(1) now
reads:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion
for substitution may be made by any party or by the successors
or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the
notice of hearing, shall be served on all parties as provided in
Rule 1.4 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided
for the service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution
is made within 90 days after the death is suggested upon the
record by service of a statement of the fact of the death in the
manner provided for the service of the motion, the action shall
be dismissed as to the deceased party.
2 2
The advisory committee notes to amended Federal Rule 25 (a) state:
The amended rule establishes a time limit for the motion to
substitute based not upon the time of death, but rather upon
the time information of the death is provided by means of a
suggestion of death on the record. . . .The motion may not
be made later than 90 days after the service of the state-
ment unless the period is extended pursuant to rule 6(b),
as amended .... 283
A motion to substitute may be made by any party or by the
representative of the deceased party without awaiting the
suggestion of death. Indeed, the motion will usually be so made.
If a party or the representative of a deceased party desires to
limit the time within which another may make the motion, he
may do so by suggesting the death upon the record.
279. FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a).
280. 4 MOORE, FanaAL PRACTICE, 25.01(a), at 44 (Supp. 1965).
281. Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
282. 1965 REVisiON, at 22.
283. The time for filing such a motion could also be extended under Florida practice,
pursuant to FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.6(b), as amended, 1965 REvisiom, at 18.
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A motion to substitute made within the prescribed time will
ordinarily be granted, but under the permissive language of the
first sentence of the amended rule ("the court may order") it
may be denied by the court in the exercise of a sound discretion
if made long after death ...and circumstances have arisen
rendering it unfair to allow substitution. . . .Accordingly, a
party interested in securing substitution under the amended rule
should not assume that he can rest indefinitely awaiting the
suggestion of death before he makes his motion to substitute.8 4
Subsection (d) of Rule 1.19 has also been amended to conform to
Federal Rule 25 (d) and now reads:
(1) When a public officer is a party to an action in his official
capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise
ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and his successor
is automatically substituted as a party. Proceedings following
the substitution shall be in the name of the substituted party,
but any misnomer not affecting the substantial rights of the
parties shall be disregarded. An order of substitution may be
entered at any time, but the omission to enter such an order
shall not affect the substitution.
(2) When a public officer sues or is sued in his official capacity,
he may be described as a party by his official title rather than
by name; but the court may require his name to be added.285
As amended, "[s]ubsection (d)(1) automatically substitutes a
successor public officer without the necessity of an order. Subsection
(d)(2) provides for suit against public officers by title thus avoiding
substitution when vacancies occur and simplifying practice with public
officers as parties.
28 6
Notwithstanding that the amendment to Rule 1.19(a)(1) has been
amended since the decision of Field v. Newsom,28 7 by the third district
and Cloer v. Shawver,21s by the first district, the caveat sounded by these
cases to litigants who wish to substitute a personal representative for a
deceased party still rings loud and clear. In seeking to effect such a
substitution of parties, the litigant must be diligent not only to comply
with the requirements of Rule 1.19, but also to satisfy the requirements
of Florida probate law, with special regard for the provisions of section
733.18(2) .289
In the Field case an action was pending to recover a claimed real
estate commission at the time of the defendant's death. The plaintiff filed
284. Advisory Committee Notes on the Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 21, 1963.
285. 1965 REvisioz;, at 22.
286. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1134 (1965).
287. 170 So.2d 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
288. 177 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
289. Relating to the procedure for handling objections to claims asserted against an estate.
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a timely claim against the defendant's estate,29 and the executrices there-
after caused an objection to the claim to be served on the plaintiff pursuant
to section 733.18, the terms of which required a claimant to bring appro-
priate suit action or proceedings upon his claim within two months of the
date of service of the objections upon him. In affirming a summary judg-
ment for the defendant, the appellate court held that the plaintiff for-
feited his right to maintain a previously filed action when he did not
file his motion for substitution of parties or bring suit against the estate
within two months after the service.
In the Cloer case, the plaintiff filed his suggestion of the defendant's
death and motion to substitute the executrix of the defendant's estate in
his pending negligence action in the circuit court eight days after filing
his claim against the estate in the probate court. A copy of this motion
was served by mail upon the attorneys of record for the deceased de-
fendant, but the plaintiff did not at this time give notice to the executrix
of such substitution of parties. Eleven days after the plaintiff had filed
suggestion of death and motion for substitution in the circuit court, the
executrix filed her objections to the plaintiff's claim in the probate court.
The circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion for substitution, but sub-
sequently vacated the order of revival at the plaintiff's request to permit
service of the suggestion and motion for substitution on the executrix
more than two months after she had filed her objections to the plaintiff's
claim. Subsequently proceedings terminated in a summary judgment dis-
missing the complaint, on the mistaken premise that the suggestion of
death and motion for substitution were filed more than two months after
objections to the plaintiff's claim had been filed by the executrix. On
plaintiff's appeal, he obtained a reversal. A civil suit is deemed commenced
when the complaint is filed.2 91 By analogy where a suit is pending prior
to the defendant's death, "the filing of the suggestion and the motion for
substituting the representatives of the estate as party defendants is
equivalent to the filing of a complaint against the estate. 292 Where sub-
stitution proceedings are already pending against the estate at the
time objections to a claim are filed in the probate court, the two-month
provisions of section 733.18 are inapplicable, and the suit should not
be dismissed without determining the merits of the motion made pursuant
to Rule 1.19(a)(1).
J. Dismissal of Actions
1. "SPECIAL DEMURRER PRACTICE" REVIVED
2 93
Rule 1.11(b), under which a party may elect to present certain
enumerated defenses294 by motion prior to filing his answer, has been
290. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1963).
291. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.2(a).
292. Cloer v. Shawver, 177 So.2d 691, 694 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
293. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 507 (2d ed. 1947).
294. The enumerated defenses include:
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amended295 to require that the motion or responsive pleading in which
any of these defenses is asserted state with specificity the grounds upon
which the defense is based. The motion, or responsive pleading, should
also state specifically and with particularity the substantial matters of
law intended to be argued. "Any ground not so stated shall be deemed to
be waived except any ground showing that the court lacks jurisdiction
of the subject matter may be made at any time.;
296
2. EXPANSION OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO VOLUNTARILY DISMISS AN ACTION
As a result of the recent amendment of Rule 1.35(a) (1), s97 sub-
stantial changes have been effected in the plaintiff's right to voluntarily
dismiss the action he has begun. Rule 1.35 (a) (1) now reads:
Except in actions wherein property has been seized or is in the
custody of the court, an action may be dismissed by plaintiff
without order of court (i) by serving a notice of dismissal at any
time before a hearing on motion for summary judgment, or if
none is served, or if such motion is denied, before retirement of
the jury in a case tried before a jury or before submission of a
nonjury case to the court for decision, or (ii) by filing a stipula-
tion of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice or stipulation, the
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal
operates as an adjudication upon the merits when served by a
plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court an action based on
or including the same claim.
Under amended Rule 1.35 (a) (1), a plaintiff may now take a volun-
tary dismissal as of right at any time before hearing on a motion for
summary judgment, or if none is served or if the motion for summary
judgment is denied, before retirement of the jury in a jury case, or before
submission of a non-jury case to the court for decision. The new rule
represents a substantial departure from its federal counterpart and the
prior Florida rule by giving the plaintiff absolute control over the con-
1. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
2. lack of jurisdiction over the person
3. improper venue
4. insufficiency of process
5. insufficiency of service of process
6. failure to state a cause of action
7. failure to join indispensable parties.
295. 1965 REvIsioN, at 20.
296. Rule 1.11(b), as amended, supra note 295, conflicts with 1.11(h)(1). The Notes of
the Subcommittee, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1133 (1965), point out that the language of the amended
subsection was taken from rule 1.7(b) which details the requirements for a motion. The Notes
further indicate that the amendment to subsection (b) of rule 1.11 was intended to serve the
dual function of discouraging dilatory motions and of eliminating "shot gun" motions that
"do not enable counsel to properly prepare for hearings with consequent delays, memorandum
briefs and the like. . . .A motion reciting only the words of this subsection should receive
no consideration unless it appears that lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter is involved."
297. 1965 REvisiom, at 25-26.
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tinuation of the litigation up to either the hearing on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, the retirement of the jury, or the submission of a non-
jury case to the court for decision. This benefit inures notwithstanding any
possible inconvenience and expense to a defendant. Insofar as the plaintiff
is concerned, he may exercise this control whether his action at law is a
jury or a non-jury case, and the power also extends to suits in equity" 8
where the plaintiff's power is even broader under amended Rule 1.35 (a) -
(1) than it was at common law where he enjoyed the right of nonsuit.
Although the first voluntary dismissal is without prejudice to a plaintiff's
right to reinstitute the litigation at a more opportune time, voluntary
dismissal of the second suit operates as an adjudication on the merits
which bars a future action on the same claim.299 The "two dismissal rule"
is only applicable where the dismissal of the prior action was voluntarily
made by the plaintiff. Thus, institution of a third suit is not foreclosed
where one of the earlier dismissals was by order of the court."' There is
a question whether a notice dismissal followed by a dismissal by stipula-
tion would bar another action30 1
The amendment appears to have created a new ambiguity. It is no
longer clear whether the plaintiff may be absolutely entitled to dismiss
his action even though the defendant has filed a counterclaim which
would not be entitled to remain pending if the principal action was dis-
missed. Under prior practice the period of the plaintiff's absolute right
was so brief that it disappeared once an answer was filed, and as pre-
viously stated, under Rule 1.35(a)(2) which remains unchanged, the
court could not grant a voluntary dismissal over the defendant's
objections where a counterclaim had been filed unless the counterclaim
could remain pending. With respect to voluntary dismissals upon order
of the court, at least one Florida appellate court 02 has espoused the
federal view that granting such dismissals is discretionary with the court,
and the plaintiff has no absolute right to require the court to grant a
voluntary dismissal by setting such terms and conditions as it deems
proper.8
03
298. "The rules in Section I are applicable to both actions at law and suits in equity."
FLA. R. Civ. P. Because of the language of FLA. STAT., § 54.09 (1963), the right of a plain-
tiff to take a statutory nonsuit in Florida was held to be limited to actions at law without a
jury, and in classical equity practice the right of nonsuit was unknown. See Peaslee v. Michal-
ski, 167 So.2d 242, 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Note, 20 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 204, 212, nn. 41-42
and accompanying text.
299. Rule 1.35(a) (1), as amended, 1965 R vIsIoN, supra note 297.
300. Rowe v. Silver, 166 So.2d 238 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
301. For a discussion of this question in relation to the analogous federal rule, see Barns
& Mattis, 1962 Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv.
276, 282, n.20.
302. See the concurring opinion of Associate Judge Barns in Gregg v. Gray, 176 So.2d
520 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). This is also the clear implication of the decision by the Third District
Court of Appeal in Continental Aviation Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 173 So.2d
750 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), although the issue on appeal in that case was whether or not the
trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing an action without prejudice, rather than
whether a dismissal by the court was a discretionary or an absolute right.
303. For a case interpreting as absolute the plaintiff's right to require the court to grant
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3. STATUS OF THE NONSUIT
Presumably, the recent affirmance by the Florida Supreme Court °4
of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Dobson v.
Crews,1°5 has laid to rest the confusion that abounded in the area of the
nonsuit. That case held that the continued existence of a right to volun-
tary nonsuit was inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of Rule 1.35,
as it existed after the 1962 revision 06 of the Rule, which deleted from
subsection (b) the reference to the plaintiff's right to take a nonsuit
pursuant to any applicable statute."' Prior to that decision, the districts
were split not only as to the continued existence vel non of the nonsuit
under the rules, but also as to the essential nature,308 incidence0 9 and
proper method of judicially reviewing an order of nonsuit 10
a voluntary dismissal "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper," see Bolten
v. General Motors Corp., 180 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1950), subsequently overruled by Grivas v.
Parmalee Transp. Co., 207 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1964). See
also Barns & Mattis, supra note 301, at 283, n.22 and accompanying text; Note, 20 U. MIAMI
L. R v. 204, 206, n.18 and accompanying text.
304. Crews v. Dobson, 177 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1965) ; Note, 20 U. MIAMI L. REv. 204 (1965).
305. 164 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964), discussed in Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure,
18 U. MIrI L. Rav. 745, 774-76 (1964).
306. In re Fla. R. Civ. P., 1962 Revision, 139 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1962).
307. The Second District Court of Appeal has said in Gregg v. Gray, 176 So.2d 520 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1965) that FLA. STAT. § 54.09 only acts as a statute of limitations on the time during
which a plaintiff may take a nonsuit, and did not itself grant the right to a nonsuit, any more
than the provision deleted from 1.35(b) in 1962 conferred the right. The statute and the rule
alike merely recognized the existence of the right.
However, granting that the nonsuit was a common law procedural right, nevertheless in
Florida it could be considered a statutory right since FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1965) provides:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local
nature . . . down to the fourth day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this
state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the con-
stitution and laws of the United States, and the acts of the legislature of this state.
FLA. STAT. § 25.371 (1965) abrogates all statutes inconsistent with the rules. Therefore, if the
continued existence of a right of nonsuit is inconsistent with the express purpose of the rules
to achieve the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of every action, FLA. STAT. § 2.01
should be deemed abrogated to the extent that it purports to adopt into Florida law the com-
mon law right of nonsuit. (For an opinion reaching the contrary conclusion on the basis of
the same facts, see the dissent in Thoman v. Ashley, 170 So.2d 332 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), cert.
denied, 177 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1965).
308. The separate district courts have, for example, differently defined an involuntary
nonsuit so that cases from different districts both purportedly dealing with involuntary non-
suits may in fact be dealing with different concepts. In the Crews case, supra note 304, the
supreme court referred to a nonsuit taken by the plaintiff under the compulsion of an im-
minent adverse ruling as involuntary, but the Second District Court of Appeal considered
that only voluntary nonsuits existed under Florida law, and defined a voluntary nonsuit as
one affirmatively sought by the plaintiff, whereas it considered an involuntary nonsuit to be
one entered on plaintiff's default in a common law action. (Presumably, the function of a
common law involuntary nonsuit is now served by the rules permitting a default judgment,
FLA. R. Crv. P. 2.9, and a decree pro confesso, FIA. R. CIv. P. 3.9). See Gregg v. Gray, supra
note 307, at 521; Peaslee v. Michalski, 167 So.2d 242 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
309. That is, whether the plaintiff's right to a nonsuit in Florida existed as an absolute
right or only in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. Compare Thoman v. Ashley, supra
note 307 with Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) and Union Trust
Co. v. Fields, 176 So.2d 339 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
310. See, e.g., Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 177 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1965); Gregg v.
Gray, 176 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); Thoman v. Ashley, 170 So.2d 332 (Fla. 2d Dist.
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Twenty-one days after its decision in the Crews case, the Florida
Supreme Court adopted amended Rule 1.35(a). Although the amended
rule has liberalized the plaintiff's right under Florida law to a voluntary
dismissal, in comparison with his previous right to such a dismissal and,
with his right to do so in federal courts, the resemblance of the plaintiff's
new right to the old common law nonsuit is limited."' Further, under the
Crews decision, it appears that his right under the rule to seek a volun-
tary dismissal will be the sole remedy available to a plaintiff who wishes
for one or another reason to discontinue his action. 12
Since it is possible that cases may still reach the appellate courts in
which review is sought of the propriety of granting a nonsuit because the
cases were decided before the supreme court handed down its decision in
the Crews case, the authors feel compelled to re-register313 their objec-
tions to the disposition of the Dobson case in which the district court
remanded the case to the trial court with directions to vacate the judgment
of nonsuit and costs, and to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the
action with prejudice. Interpreting the language then used in Rule
1.35(b), and giving to it its ordinary meaning, dismissal for failure to
prosecute would ordinarily be without prejudice, and in view of the
confusion and disagreement surrounding the right of nonsuit at the time,
such a dismissal would appear to have been more equitable. In any
event, the court was not required to order the trial court to dismiss the
complaint with prejudice. 14
4. CHANGES IN THE PROVISIONS FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
Subsection (b) of Rule 1.35 has been amended 15 to conform to
Federal Rule 41(b) as amended in 1963,16 except that provision for
1964), cert. denied, 177 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1965); Bennett v. Fratus, 168 So.2d 792 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964), cert denied, 177 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1965), petition dismissed, 177 So.2d 702 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1965).
311. Supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
312. Supra notes 304-307 and accompanying text.
313. See Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, 18 U. MiAMI L. Rnv. 745, 776 (1964).
314. In St. Johns River Co. v. Pickett, 176 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965), the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal followed the same procedure that it had previously adopted in the
Dobson case. However, where the facts have permitted, the courts have showed a tendency
to avoid the harshness of the Dobson decision by basing their decision on a different premise.
In Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 167 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964), the same First
District Court of Appeal affirmed the action of the trial court in striking an affirmative de-
fense of res judicata on the ground that the defendant was estopped from challenging the
propriety of an order of nonsuit because it had neither objected to the plaintiff's motion in
the trial court nor moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 1.35(b).
In Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So.2d 523 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), the court circumvented the Dobson
decision by finding that the trial court's action in dismissing the jury prior to ruling on the
pending motions of the plaintiffs and defendants had resulted in a mistrial since it had not
left itself in a position where it could deny both motions and order the trial to continue.
315. 1965 REvIsioN, at 26.
316. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
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dismissal for failure to prosecute is omitted because this is the subject of
newly added subsection (e). 3 17 Florida Rule 1.35(b) now reads:
Any party may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against him for failure of an adverse party to comply with these
rules or any order of court. After a party seeking affirmative
relief in an action tried by the court without a jury has com-
pleted the presentation of his evidence, any other party may
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the party seeking affirmative relief has shown no right to
relief without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event
the motion is not granted. The court as trier of the facts may
then determine them and render judgment against the party
seeking affirmative relief or may decline to render any judgment
until the close of all the evidence. Unless the court in its order
for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivi-
sion and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than
a dismissal for lack of jurisdication or for improper venue or for
lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon
the merits.
Under amended Florida Rule 1.35(b), as in amended Federal Rule
41(b), a motion to dismiss at the close of the case of the party seeking
affirmative relief is now available only in non-jury trials, and is no longer
interchangeable with a motion for a directed verdict made at the con-
clusion of the adverse party's case in an action heard by a jury. "The
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and rendered (sic)
judgment against the party seeking affirmative relief. .... ,,318
The test for reviewing the propriety of an order granting an involun-
tary dismissal at the conclusion of the case of the party seeking affirma-
tive relief differs in a non-jury trial from the test for determining the
correctness of a trial court's order granting a motion for a directed verdict
at the close of the case of a party seeking affirmative relief. Where
appellate review is sought of an order granting a motion for a directed
verdict, the proper test of the correctness of the order is
• . .when the evidence, when considered in its entirety, and
the reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, failed
to prove the plaintiff's case under the issues made by the plead-
ings .... 319
In these circumstances it is the duty of the court
.. .to weigh the evidence, resolve the conflicts, and pass upon
the credibility of witnesses. If it finds that plaintiff's evidence is
317. See the Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1135
(1965).
318. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.35(b), as amended, 1965 Revision, supra note 315.
319. Gibson v. Gibson, 180 So.2d 388, 389-90 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
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insufficient to warrant a judgment or decree granting the relief
prayed, it may render judgment on the merits for the de-
fendant.
8 20
Where . . . the trial court, sitting without a jury, determines
the facts from the plaintiff's evidence and concludes that, upon
the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief,
its order dismissing a plaintiff's cause should be affirmed, unless
"clearly erroneous" . . . . Stated differently, the only question
properly before (an appellate court on appeal from an order
granting a motion for involuntary dismissal in a non-jury case)
... is whether the evidence supports the Chancellor's finding
821
The paragraphing of subsection (b) has been rearranged to conform
to the federal rule. The clause "any dismissal not provided for in this
rule" has been added to the sentence dealing with when involuntary dis-
missals are with prejudice. This amendment was added to conform to the
Flordia rule prior to the 1962 amendment to Rule 1.35(b)-when the
same phrase was deleted from the Rule.122 It was intended to overrule the
decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Hardee v. Gordon
Thompson Chevrolet, Inc., 3' in which the effect of a dismissal for failure
to state a cause of action depended upon whether the claimant had failed
to allege sufficient facts to entitle him to recover or whether there existed
no legal right to recovery under any view of the facts alleged. If the
former, the dismissal was ordinarily without prejudice, but in the latter
the dismissal was in effect an adjudication on the merits and with prej-
udice.824 Presumably dismissals pursuant to Florida Rule 1.11(b),
except the expressly excepted 28 dismissals for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, are now with prej-
udice unless the order of dismissal otherwise indicates. The subcommittee
notes 2' also indicate that the amendment was intended to restore the rule
of Hinchee v. Fisher . 27 In that case, the first action by the assignor of a
lease against the assignees had been dismissed because of the assignor's
failure to pay into the court registry a monetary sum as required by court
order. It was held that the second action based on the identical claim and
between the same parties was barred. Another consequence of the newly
included phrase is to require that a dismissal for failure to appear at a
duly noticed deposition hearing, or for failure to answer properly served
320. Id. at 391.
321. Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So.2d 711, 712 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1964).
322. In re Fla. R. Civ. P., 1962 Revision, 142 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1962). For a discussion of
the effect of the deletion, see Barns & Mattis, 1962 Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, 17 U. MxArs L. REV. 276, 284-287 (1963).
323. 154 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
324. See Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, 18 U. MiAmX L. REv. 745, 773 (1964).
325. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(b), as amended, 1965 Revision.
326. 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1135 (1965).
327. 93 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1957).
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interrogatories, 2 " be with prejudice unless the order of dismissal other-
wise specifies.
In Rashard v. Cappiali,29 the Third District Court of Appeal held
that the trial court erroneously dismissed a complaint with prejudice
after the plaintiff failed to answer interrogatories duly propounded more
than a year before entry of the order of dismissal appealed.
. . . [A] dismissal based upon a violation of the rules cannot
be upon the merits even though it might act as an adjudication
of the merits. We hold that . . . where dismissal is to be with
prejudice and thus act as an adjudication on the merits it must be
for a violation of an order of the court and not for a mere
failure to abide by a notice of a procedural step. We think
that it is important that in case an order of court is violated or
disregarded, the party moved against knows at the time of the
order that there has been judicial determination of the require-
ment he must observe. This is not to imply that a threat of dis-
missal or statement of penalty must be included in the order
but simply that it must be an order that is breached.8 0
In view of the fact that dismissals for failure to answer interroga-
tories are now presumptively with prejudice, the Rashard decision
appears to require a caveat to the Bench and Bar to include an express
provision in such orders that the dismissal be without prejudice if the
delay and expense of unnecessary appeals are to be avoided.
The last sentence of subsection (e), relating to the time within
which a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 1.35(a) could be made,
has been deleted because of the absolute right of dismissal, and the Rule
has been made applicable to third party claims as well as to complaints,
counterclaims and cross-claims.
Subsection (d) of Rule 1.35 now provides that costs shall be assessed
in any dismissed action and judgment therefor entered in that action. In
addition, until the party dismissing the first action has paid the costs so
assessed to the adverse party the court before which a second suit on the
same claim 'between the same parties is brought is required to stay the
proceedings in the later suit. The subcommittee notes 88' indicate that the
reason for requiring the judge in the original action to assess the costs
is because he is in a better position to do so.
5. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
Subsection (e), relating to dismissals for failure to prosecute, has
been added to Rule 1.35. This subsection substantially adopts the pro-
328. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.31(d).
329. 171 So.2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
330. Id. at 583.
331. 39 FA. B.J. 1132, 1135 (1965).
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visions of Florida Statute, section 45.19(1)332 in accordance with the
policy that all general procedure statutes should be incorporated into the
rules. This subsection also supplies the time for dismissal for failure to
prosecute, omitted in the equivalent Federal Rule 41(b). 8 Subsection
(e) provides:
All actions in which it does not affirmatively appear from some
action taken by filing of pleadings, order of court or otherwise
that the same is being prosecuted for a period of one year shall
be deemed abated for want of prosecution and shall be dis-
missed by the court upon its own motion or upon motion of any
interested person, whether a party to the action or not, after
notice to the parties; provided that actions so dismissed may be
reinstated on motion for good cause, such motion to be served
by any party within one month after such order of dismissal.
Dismissal is mandatory if it is demonstrated to the court that no action
towards prosecution has been taken within a year. 34 What constitutes
prosecution of a case is essentially a factual inquiry. For example asking
the clerk to set the cause on the trial docket has been held sufficient. 3 5
When the plaintiff's activities do not appear in the court records, a trial
judge may justify his denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of evi-
dence dehors the record.3 ' It would appear that the provisions of amended
Rule 1.35(b) now require that dismissals for failure to prosecute pur-
suant to Rule 1.35(e) be presumptively with prejudice. This is the fed-
eral view. 3 7 Such a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute may, how-
ever, only be granted after notice to the parties. 38
6. REINSTATEMENT OF DISMISSED ACTIONS FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN
It should be noted that dismissed actions may be reinstated on
motion for "good cause," and that the motion may be served by any
party within a month after the order of dismissal. What constitutes "good
cause" is a factual inquiry dependent upon the circumstances of each
case.
In the Adams Engineering Co. case339 it was held that an order
332. FA. STAT. § 45.19(1) (1965).
333. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
334. The Rule states that actions not prosecuted for a year shall be dismissed. For cases
interpreting the identical provision in FLA. STAT. § 45.19(1) (1965) see Little v. Sullivan, 173
So.2d 135 (Fla. 1965); Adams Eng'r Co. v. Construction Prod. Corp., 156 So.2d 497 (Fla.
1963).
335. Adams Eng'r Co. v. Construction Prod. Corp., 156 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1963), rev'd on
rehearing, 141 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Ferrara v. Coyle Beverages, Inc., 156 So.2d
907 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
336. Reilly v. Fuss, 170 So.2d 475 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
337. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1 41.11(2), at 1126 (2d ed. 1964).
338. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(e), 1965 Revision; Franklyn Acceptance Corp. v. Superior
Elec. Indus., Inc., 167 So.2d 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
339. Supra note 335. See also Reilly v. Fuss, supra note 336.
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granting or denying a motion for reinstatement of an action dismissed
for lack of prosecution-unlike an order granting a motion to dismiss
the action for the same reason-is a discretionary order, which will be
reversed on appeal only where the appellant meets the heavy burden of
showing an abuse of judicial discretion. The Florida Supreme Court found
such an abuse of discretion in the case of Little v. Sullivan.340 In that
case the trial court had reinstated a damage action dismissed pursuant to
Florida Statutes, section 45.18(1) for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff
predicated his motion to reinstate the cause on the fact that the attorney
originally representing the plaintiff had moved his practice to another
area of the state, and that the attorney who thereafter assumed the
responsibility of representing the plaintiff was a member of the Florida
legislature which had been in session from April, 1963, to the date the
motion to dismiss was granted on June 10, 1963. The plaintiff argued-
and the trial and district courts agreed-that under section 54.08 of the
Florida Statutes, 4' litigation is automatically continued for the duration
of the session when a party to an action is represented by a legislator-
attorney. On certified question the supreme court held that the district
court had erroneously upheld the trial court in the exercise of its discretion.
"Discretion is not available as a support for a conclusion in the face of
a positive rule of law to the contrary.114 2 Florida Statutes, section 54.08
is not self-executing, but requires the legislator-attorney to file a motion
to obtain the benefit of a continuance for pending litigation during the
period provided by the statute.
By Section 54.08, supra, the cause of action in which a lawyer-
legislator is engaged should be continued as a matter of law
when the lawyer-legislator files a motion requesting such con-
tinuance. In the absence of such a motion, however, the litiga-
tion remains active. .. .
The plaintiff in a wrongful death action appealed from an adverse
final judgment denying her timely petition to reinstate her cause which
had previously been dismissed for failure to prosecute. In response to
the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff had submitted her own and her Iowa
attorney's affidavit by which she sought to establish that she had been
actively engaged in prosecuting the case, but that she had encountered
difficulty in establishing the identity and location of the instructor of the
deceased student pilot of the plane involved. The trial court granted the
340. 173 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1965), reversing 166 So.2d 697 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
341. FLA. STAT. § 54.08 (1963) provided, (now FLA. STAT. § 11.111 (1965)):
All pending litigation before the courts of this state shall stand continued during any
session of the legislature and for a period of time fifteen days prior to any session
of the legislature, and fifteen days subsequent to the conclusion of any session of the
legislature where either attorneys representing the litigants are members of the leg-
islature, when motion to that effect is made by such member.
342. Little v. Sullivan, supra note 334, at 137.
343. Ibid.
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motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution, and later denied the motion
for reinstatement of the cause on the ground that the action of the
plaintiff and her counsel, as reflected in the exhibits, was not an affirma-
tive showing of such act as will stay the running of the one-year period
provided by Florida Statutes, section 45.19(1). Apparently, the trial
court believed that to warrant denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss,
it was necessary that the plaintiff's activities in prosecution of the cause
be reflected in the record. In the instant case, the plaintiff's activities had
not been recorded.
Florida Statutes, section 45.19(1) provides for abatement of actions
for lack of prosecution "in which there shall not affirmatively appear
from some action taken by filing of pleadings, order of court, or otherwise,
that the same is being prosecuted. . . ,,4 Although the district court
sustained the plaintiff's contention that the statutory language permitted
the introduction of evidence outside of the record to establish the fact of
timely action and to justify a decision denying a motion to dismiss for
lack of prosecution, it nevertheless concluded that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in finding that counsel's unrecorded activities did
not constitute "good cause" for reinstatement of the action and affirmed
the decision below.
In the light of the Adams Constr. Co.1 45 and Little346 cases, the dis-
trict court decision seems clearly incorrect and unduly harsh. The record
clearly reflected that the trial judge had reluctantly granted the
motion to dismiss and denied the motion for reinstatement. He did this
because he erroneously believed that Florida Statutes, section 45.19(1)
required timely action in prosecution of a cause to be recorded in the
court files before it could be considered either in opposition to granting
a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution, or as "good cause" for rein-
statement of an action previously dismissed for nonprosecution. 847 There-
344. FLA. STAT. § 45.19(1) (1965). These provisions are now contained in FLA. R. CrV. P.
1.35(e).
345. 156 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1963), rev'd on rehearing, 141 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
346. Supra note 340, and accompanying text.
347. The impreciseness of the trial court's understanding of the standards required by
the statute is further demonstrated by its statement:
That the "good cause" to be shown by the plaintiff which would justify the Court
in denying the motion to dismiss is the same as must be shown in order to have the
case reinstated as provided by the last clause of the aforesaid Statute. Gulf Appliance
Distributors, Inc. v. Long, (Fla. 1951), 53 So.2d 706, 707. Reilly v. Fuss, 170 So.2d
475, 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
As stated above, notes 334 and 339 supra, and accompanying text, orders of dismissals are
mandatory where it affirmatively appears that no action in prosecution of a cause has been
taken for a year, but orders granting or denying reinstatement are discretionary. What the
trial court apparently meant was that the same standards apply to determine whether any
timely action in prosecution has been taken upon consideration to dismiss for nonprosecution
as apply in determining whether a motion to dismiss was erroneously granted upon considera-
tion of a motion to reinstate the action for good cause shown. It seems that the district court
also failed to understand the difference between the two types of orders for it erroneously
observed at p. 478 "that a ruling involving the dismissal of actions for lack of prosecution or
[VOL.. XX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
fore, the order denying reinstatement was predicated not on the exercise
of a sound judicial discretion, but rather upon a misunderstanding of
material provisions of the applicable statute.
K. Depositions and Discovery
1. AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES RELATING TO DISCOVERY
Subsection (a) of Rule 1.21, relating to oral depositions pending
action, -has been amended 8' to require leave of court for taking a deposit
tion "if notice of the taking is served by the plaintiff within 20 days
after the service of process on the defendant" instead of "within 20
days after commencement of the action." The purpose of the amendment
is to preclude a plaintiff from waiting 20 days after filing the complaint
before service of process is attempted and then immediately serving a
notice for deposition. The subcommittee Notes"4 9 indicate that the
rationale behind the amendment is in accord with the federal cases con-
struing Federal Rule 26(a). 5 ° It is interesting to note, however, that
under the Federal Rule leave of court is required for taking a deposition
"if notice of the taking is served by the plaintiff within 20 days after
commencement of the action," and that this language is identical with
the wording of Rule 1.21 (a) prior to its amendment in 1965.
Subsection 1.21(f), relating to objections to the admissibility of a
deposition at the trial or final hearing, has been amended to include a
reference to newly added Rule 1.23(b)35x which provides for taking
depositions in foreign countries.
Florida Rule 1.22(b) formerly provided for the taking of a deposi-
tion pending an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court. That limita-
tion has now been removed " 2 and Rule 1.22 (b) is applicable to deposi-
tions taken pending, or prior to a timely appeal from the judgment of
any court.
Subsection (b) has been newly added 53 to Rule 1.23 to provide for
taking depositions in foreign countries. The Rule is substantially similar
to Federal Rule 28(b)854 from which it was taken. Former subsections (b)
and (c) of Florida Rule 1.23 have been relettered as (c) and (d)
respectively.
Florida Rule 1.24(d), relating to a motion to terminate or limit
their reinstatement are subject to attack only on the ground that it constitutes an abuse of
discretion."
348. 1965 REvisioi;, at 22.
349. 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1134 (1965).
350. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).




354. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
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examination under an oral deposition, has been reworded 55 to eliminate
an ambiguity concerning the court to which application for such termina-
tion or limitation should be made. Rule 1.24(d) formerly provided that the
order disposing of such a motion should be made by "the court in which the
action is pending or the court in the circuit where the deposition is pend-
ing." The Rule now specifies that such orders should be made by "the
court in which the action is pending or the circuit court where the deposi-
tion is being taken." Under the amended rule, only the circuit court has
jurisdiction to entertain motions to terminate or limit examination upon
oral deposition when the deposition is taken out of the jurisdiction of the
court in which the case is pending.
Rule 1.26356 concerns the effect of errors and irregularities in de-
positions. A clerical error contained in subsection (c)(3) has been cor-
rected so that that subsection now relates to objections to the form of
written interrogatories submitted under Rule 1.25357 rather than under
Rule 1.27,858 "which relates to interrogatories to parties and has its
own provisions for objections."35" 9
As in the case of the amendment to Rule 1.21(a)360 the amendment
to Rule 1.27,861 which provides for interrogatories to parties, is designed
to preclude a plaintiff from waiting 10 days after filing a complaint before
attempting to serve the defendant with process and then immediately
serving him with interrogatories. Whereas the prior Rule 1.27 required
the plaintiff to obtain leave of court for the service of interrogatories on
a party within 10 days after commencement of an action, 62 Rule 1.27
now requires the plaintiff to obtain the court's permission for serving
interrogatories on a party within 10 days after service of process on the
defendant. The time for answering interrogatories has also been enlarged
from 15 to 20 days, and the limitation requiring a copy of the answers
to be served only on the party submitting the interrogatories has been
deleted. 68
Rule 1.30(a),3 64 which provides for admissions of fact and of the
genuineness of documents, has also been changed 65 with the intention of
355. 1965 REVISION, at 23-24.
356. FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.26.
357. 1965 REVISION, at 24.
358. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.27, as amended, 1965 REVISION, at 24.
359. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1134 (1965).
360. Supra notes 348-350 and accompanying text.
361. 1965 REVISION, supra note 76.
362. Under Florida practice, a civil suit, except ancillary proceedings, "shall be deemed
as commenced when the complaint is filed." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.2.
363. The deletion is consistent with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.4(a), as amended, 1965 Revision,
at 17, which now requires that "every other paper filed in the action . . . shall be served on
each party."
364. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.30(a), as amended, 1965 REVISION, at 24-25.
365. See the discussion of the analogous amendments to FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.21(a) and 1.27,
supra notes 360-361, and notes 385-387 and accompanying text.
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precluding a plaintiff from waiting 10 days after filing a complaint before
attempting service of process upon a defendant and then immediately
serving requests for admissions. The plaintiff must now obtain leave of
court for serving such requests within 10 days after service of process upon
the defendant. The time for responding to such requests has been en-
larged from a minimum of 10 to a minimum of 20 days, and the former
limitation requiring that denials or objections be timely served on the
party requesting the admission has been deleted. 66
Rule 1.31(a) has been reworded1 7 for clarity. The Rule previously
provided that a person making discovery must give notice "to all persons
affected thereby" of his intention to seek a court order to require a person
who has previously refused to answer a question propounded either upon
oral or written depositions or upon interrogatories, to respond to the
question. The amended Rule requires notice to be given "to all parties
and the deponent."
The title of Rule 1.32868 has been changed to read "Depositions of
Expert Witnesses." For reasons of clarity the numbered subsections are
now designated by letters to make Rule 1.32 uniform with all others.869
The last sentence of Rule 1.3337 has been added to give the clerk
authority to place depositions or affidavits in the court file in courts
where it is desired to have all of the papers in the file.8 '
Subsection (c) of Rule 1.34 has been amended 72 to permit service
of a subpoena either 'by a person authorized by law to serve process, or
by any other person who is not a party and who is not less than 21 years
of age. Where service of the subpoena is not made by an officer authorized
by law to do so, "proof of such service shall be made by affidavit of the
person making service." Except for the age limit and the added require-
ment of proof of service, the added provision is identical with a similar
one contained in Federal Rule 45 (c) .3
7
3
2. DISCOVERY IN THE PROBATE COURT
The petitioner sought certiorari17 4 to review an order of the county
judge's court which had held that the discovery procedures provided for
in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure were not available to a petitioner
in a will contest filed and pending in a probate proceeding. In that pro-
366. See note 363 supra.
367. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.31(a), as amended, 1965 RlvlsioN.
368. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.32, as amended, 1965 REviSIoN, at 25.
369. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1134-1135
(1965).
370. 1965 R.EvisioN, at 25.
371. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, supra note 369, at 1135.
372. 1965 REvisioN.
373. F.D. R. Civ. P. 45(c).
374. In re Estes' Estate, 158 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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ceeding the petitioner had served the executors with requests for ad-
missions8 75 with interrogatories, 76 and with a motion for the production
of documents.877 They had also applied to the county judge for leave to
take discovery depositions.17s The district court granted certiorari and
quashed the order denying discovery. The rules, which are promulgated
by the supreme court pursuant to constitutional authority,37 9 provide80
that they ". . . are applicable to all suits of a civil nature and all special
statutory proceedings in the . . .County Judge's Courts. . . ." In
addition, the legislature has provided. 81 that the rules of civil procedure
shall be the rules of practice in the county judge's courts in all civil
matters. A will contest is a civil matter. As recognized by Florida
Statutes, section 732.04(4)(1963), the will contest "action" proceeds
separately and unrelated to the routine business of probate, and the
rules of civil procedure control its course. This includes the provisions
for discovery.
Such discovery under the rules in a probate court, however, is
limited to a civil suit or statutory proceeding such as was involved in the
Estes case. In Yarmark v. Botsikas,882 the Third District Court of Appeal
granted certiorari and quashed an order of the County Judge's Court
requiring the production of documents in the hands of the administratrix
relating to the assets and the affairs of the decedent. The basis for the
order had been that it was needed to properly and fully prepare a claim
against the estate. The district court held that the jurisdiction of the
county judge's court in probate matters does not encompass suits for dis-
covery such as may be brought in a court of equity. Since the person who
had applied for the production of documents was not shown to be either
a creditor who had filed a claim against the estate, or a person entitled to
share in the estate, neither production under the Decedents' Estate
Law, 8" nor production pursuant to Rule 1.28884 was proper.
3. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
Under Federal Rule 1.21(b) "the right of discovery ...is to be
liberally construed to the end that any matter not privileged and which is
375. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.30(a).
376. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.27.
377. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28.
378. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21(a).
379. FLA. CONSTR. art. V, § 3.
380. FLA. R. Civ. P.
381. FLA. STAT. § 36.09 (1965).
382. 158 So.2d 770 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
383. FLA. STAT. § 731.51 (1963) provides:
Upon the petition of any creditor, legatee, distributee, devisee or heir at law, or upon
his own motion if he deems it necessary for the proper administration of said estate,
the county judge may require any personal representative to produce satisfactory
evidence that the assets of the estate are in his possession or under his control and, if
necessary or proper, may order the production of such assets for the inspection of
such creditor, legatee, distributee, devisee or heir at law, or of said judge.
384. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28.
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relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action must be
disclosed.11 5 However, where the use of the discovery devices'"8 trans-
gresses the bounds of relevancy and needlessly harasses and imposes a
burden on the person interrogated a court will sustain the latter's objec-
tion to their use. This conclusion was upheld in Marine Investment Co.
v. Van Voorhis.
88 7
Privilege also constitutes a limitation on the permissible scope of
discovery. Where a party to whom interrogatories have been submitted
objects to answering them on the ground that the information called for
is privileged, the burden is on the party seeking disclosure to produce
evidence that the communication claimed to be privileged is in fact not
privileged. Therefore, where a claim had been made that the information
sought came within the purview of the attorney-client privilege, it was
error for the trial court to reject the plaintiff's proffered evidence by which
they sought to establish that the attorney-client communication sought to
be elicited by the interrogatory related to the future commission of a fraud
or crime in connection with the sale of securities. ". . . [I] t is not within
the duty of a legal advisor to assist in the planning of crime or fraud and
. . . a consultation with a view to such purpose would not be priv-
ileged." 88 This is true whether the alleged criminal or fraudulent conduct
is malum in se or malum prohibitum.
The question of whether or not the information sought to be elicited
is privileged may depend upon whether the plaintiff or defendant is
asserting the privilege. This is illustrated by a case where the plaintiff
sued for divorce on grounds of cruelty.38 Her husband denied the
allegations contained in the complaint and asserted as an affirmative
defense his wife's alleged adultery. Thereafter, the husband's attorney
sought from the plaintiff certain admissions relating to the husband's
affirmative defense. The plaintiff objected to the requests for admission
on the grounds that her answers thereto might tend to incriminate her
and were therefore privileged under section 12 of the Declaration of
Rights. From an order denying the defendant's motion to strike all of
the plaintiff's pleadings, to dismiss her complaint, and to deny her the
relief prayed for, the defendant appealed. Held: reversed. "Any admis-
sion made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the
pending action only and neither constitutes an admission by him for any
385. Marine Inv. Co. v. Van Voorhis, 162 So.2d 909, 910 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
386. These include: (1) oral depositions, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.24; (2) depositions upon
written interrogatories, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.25; (3) interrogatories to parties, FLA. R. CIV. P.
1.27; (4) motion for the production of documents and things for inspection, copying or
photographing, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28, 1.34(b) ; (5) physical and mental examination of parties
and examination of property, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.29; (6) admissions of facts and of the
genuineness of documents, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.30.
387. 162 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
388. Leithauser v. Harrison, 168 So.2d 95, 98 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
389. Stockham v. Stockham, 159 So.2d 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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other purpose nor may be used against him in any other proceeding."3 90
The court went on to say that "it would indeed be an anomaly if a
plaintiff could bring a divorce action and then refuse to answer requests
for admissions, based upon an affirmative defense, on the grounds that
her answers might tend to incriminate her."391 On the plaintiff's appeal
to the Supreme Court of Florida392 the decision of the Second District
Court of Appeal was affirmed. After reviewing the decisions of the other
state courts interpreting the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitu-
tion and analogous provisions of other state constitutions, the supreme
court noted that:
The distinction made in the cases is that the privilege against
self-incrimination operates as a protection against one being
required to incriminate himself in a criminal or other proceeding
which might degrade him, however, in civil litigation where it is
manifest the exercise of the privilege would operate to further
the action or claim of the party resorting to the privilege against
his adversary contrary to equity and good conscience, the party
asserting the privilege will not be permitted to proceed with his
claim or action.
393
The right to employ the discovery devices provided by the rules is
absolute, and a court may not properly deny a motion to dismiss a com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action and then refuse to permit
discovery upon relevant unprivileged matters consonant with the allega-
tions contained in a legally sufficient complaint.'94 However, a court in
the exercise of its inherent judicial power over pending litigation may
regulate the timing of discovery relevant to a particular case. Thus, in an
action to recover damages for an alleged breach of an agreement to pay
a commission on certain policies of insurance written by the plaintiff
and any renewals thereof, the Third District Court of Appeal held 9' that
the trial court had erroneously granted the plaintiff leave to depose the
defendant concerning the amount allegedly due to the plaintiff prior to a
determination of the issues upon which a right to an accounting would
depend. Discovery as to accounting is premature and improperly ordered
in advanced of a decision establishing the right to an accounting, and
could result in irreparable harm to the defendant since it may be shown
that no accounting is necessary.
4. THE WORK PRODUCT CONCEPT
The defendant in a personal injury action, who had employed a court
reporter to make a record of proceedings in the traffic court arising
390. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.30(b).
391. Stockham v. Stockham, supra note 389, at 482.
392. Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1964).
393. Id. at 322; Cf., WPIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW o' FEDERAL COURTS 343 (1963).
394. Boye v. Cash, 160 So.2d 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
395. Drucker v. Martin, 157 So.2d 435 (FIa. 3d Dist. 1963).
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from the same accident, appealed from an order of the trial court grant-
ing the plaintiff's motion for production of a copy of the transcript. In
quashing the order, the appellate court held that the transcript of the
proceedings made by a court reporter employed by the plaintiff consti-
tuted "work product" which was immune from discovery absent a
showing by the plaintiff of exceptional circumstances. 96
Whether a particular inquiry invades the work product doctrine is
a question of fact to be interpreted under the particular circumstances
of each case. For example, it was held in Coleman v. Imbruglia, 9 7 that
a question in the course of deposing an insurance investigator employed
by the defendant asking him whether he recalled meeting the plaintiff,
did not improperly invade the qualified work product privilege where
the purpose of the inquiry was to ascertain the circumstances surrounding
the witness' taking of a statement from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's
physical condition at the time it was taken.
5. DEPOSITION OF AN EXPERT WITNESS
In Cook v. Lichtblau,3 7 a the plaintiffs sought to introduce a phy-
sican's deposition into evidence in their malpractice case. The deposition
was taken by the defendant "for the purpose of discovery under the
applicable statutes and Rules of Court." At the deposition, the defen-
dant's attorney confined his questioning mainly to direct examination.
The plaintiffs did not indicate in advance of trial that they would seek
to introduce this deposition as evidence, although they did subpoena the
physican to appear as a witness at the trial.
On the Friday afternoon immediately preceding the scheduled trial
date, which was Monday, the plaintiffs' attorney learned unofficially that
the physican would be unable to appear at the trial. Definite notification
of the physican's inability to be at the trial was given to the plaintiffs'
attorney on Saturday and took the form of an affidavit from the phy-
sican's heart specialist which recited that a court appearance might
adversely affect his patient's health.
On Monday the plaintiffs' attorney proceeded with the trial under
the impression that the physican's deposition would be admissible in
evidence under Rule 1.21 (d), which provides:
At the trial . . . any part or all of a deposition, so far as admis-
sible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party
who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition
396. Steinhardt v. Greenbaum, 168 So.2d 200 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
397. 166 So.2d 780 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
397a. 176 So.2d 523 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). The Cook v. Lichtblau decision is rejected by
the last sentence of 1967 Revised Rule 1.390(b) which provides "a deposition taken under
this rule and any deposition taken of an expert witness under any other rule may be used in
any manner permitted by Rule 1.280(d)." In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1967 Re-
vision, 187 So.2d 598, 622 (Fla. 1966).
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or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of
the following provisions:
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party,
may be used by any party for any purpose if the court
finds . . . 3, that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or 4,
that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness ... "
In sustaining the defendants' objections to the admission of the
deposition, the trial judge stated that if the plaintiffs had notified him of
the affidavit from the heart specialist before the trial began he could
have tried to arrange for the physican's appearance, or granted a con-
tinuance. In affirming the propriety of the trial court's refusal to admit
the deposition, the district court held that the plaintiff had failed to avail
himself of the procedure prescribed in Rule 1.32 for taking the deposition
of an expert witness.
The district court affirmed the propriety of the trial court's refusal
to admit the deposition and impliedly rejected an argument advanced
by the defendant that "a deposition taken pursuant to Rule 1.21 for the
express purpose of discovery is not subject to use as evidence under any
circumstances.""B9 'h The court went on to hold that the plaintiffs had
failed to avail themselves of the procedure prescribed in Rule 1.32 for
taking the deposition of an expert witness.
A party seeking to offer an expert's testimony by deposition
under this procedure must give prior written notice of such
intention to his opponent, who may then seek an order disallow-
ing the taking on the ground that the personal appearance of the
witness is necessary to insure a fair and impartial trial. Where,
as here, a party knows in advance of trial that his expert will not
be available, he should make timely application to invoke this
special procedure instead of relying upon a deposition taken by
his adversary solely for the purpose of discovery. To hold other-
wise would result in depriving his opponent of the benefit of
cross examination even though a procedure and opportunity still
existed whereby that valuable right could be preserved 917c
6. OBJECTIONS TO DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS
Among the issues raised on the defendant's appeal 98 from an adverse
judgment in a negligence action arising out of the collision of an auto-
mobile with a motorcycle driven by the minor plaintiff, was the question
397b. Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So.2d 523, 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
397c. Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So.2d 523, 527 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). See generally The Use
of Discovery Against the Expert Witness, 40 F.R.D. 43 (1966).
398. Evans v. Perry, 161 So.2d 27 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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of whether the trial court had erred in sustaining the plaintiffs' objection
made only, and for the first time at the trial, to the introduction into
evidence of a deposition of a medical expert for the defendants because
it was not shown that the doctor was the treating physician, or that he
had personal knowledge of the notes and hospital records from which he
testified. In reversing the lower court, the court held that under Rule
1.26(c) (1)191 which is made applicable to objections to the admissibility
of depositions at trial both by its own terms and through Rule 1.21 (f),
40 0
objections to the competency of a witness, and to the competency,
relevancy and materiality of testimony taken on deposition, are waived
if not made before or during the taking of the deposition if the ground of
the objections is one which might have been corrected if made at that
time. In the instant case, the grounds for objection might easily have
been obviated had the plaintiffs timely interposed their objections in the
course of the trial.
Rule 1.27401 provides that within 10 days after the service of inter-
rogatories, a party may serve written objections thereto together with a
notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable time. Rule
1.30(a) 40 2 makes substantially the same provision for serving objections
to requests for admissions, except that the time limit is 20 days. The
burden of proving the validity of objections is upon the party asserting
them. In Carson v. City of Fort Lauderdale,40 3 the Second District Court
of Appeal looked to the cases and commentary interpreting the substan-
tially similar federal rules404 relating to interrogatories and to requests
for admissions to ascertain the extent of this burden, which had not been
developed in Florida case law, in order to determine whether the trial
court had properly sustained the defendant's objections to 205 written
interrogatories and 59 requests for admissions. In reversing the lower
court's order the appellate court found that the word "thereto" in the
provision relating to serving objections "refers to a particular interroga-
tory or class of interrogatories, not to the interrogatories in general."405
Objections to interrogatories must be sufficiently specific that
the court may, in considering such objections with interroga-
tories propounded, ascertain therefrom their claimed objection-
able character; general objections to interrogatories, as that
they will require the party served to make research and compile
data, or that they are unreasonably burdensome, oppressive and
vexatious, or that they seek information which is easily avail-
399. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.26(c)(1).
400. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21(f).
401. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.27.
402. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.30(a), as amended, 1965 RavIsozx, at 25.
403. 173 So.2d 743 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
404. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 and 36.
405. Carson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, supra note 173, at 745, quoting United States
v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 FRD. 159, 161 (ED.N.Y. 1960).
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able to the interrogating party as to the objecting party, or that
they would cause annoyance, expense, and oppression to the
objecting party without serving any relevant purpose to the
issue, are insufficient. 06
The blanket objections filed by the City did not sustain that burden
in the absence of a finding that the interrogatories and requests for ad-
missions were so inextricably interwined that they had to stand or fall
together, and the trial court therefore erred in rejecting them in their
entirety without specifically designating the applicability of the objections
to particular interrogatories or requests for admissions. Even though the
method of procedure is improper, the court may, in the interest of
expediting the litigation, select from among the propounded interroga-
tories or requests for admissions the particular questions to which the
general objections apply.
7. USE OF DEPOSITIONS
Where reversal is sought of an order permitting or denying the intro-
duction into evidence of the deposition of a party or a witness pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 1.21(d),4 °7 the party seeking reversal carries
the heavy burden of clearly demonstrating an abuse of judicial dis-
cretion.4"8 Such an abuse of discretion will be found if a trial judge
admits into evidence the deposition of a deceased party taken prior to
the joinder of the party against whom it is sought to be used. In Brown
v. Tanner,"°9 a case of first impression in Florida, the First District
Court of Appeal, after extensively reviewing state and federal decisions
interpreting analogous procedural rules and rules of evidence as well as
the leading treatises on evidence, concluded that a plain reading of Rule
1.21(d)41 ° required that a deposition so taken should be excluded. That
Rule permits ". . . any part or all of a deposition, so jar as admissible
under the rules of evidence . . . to be used against any party who was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due
notice thereof" where the person deposed has since died. By the great
weight of authority the deposition would be inadmissable under the rules
of evidence because the adverse parties had been deprived of their very
substantial right of cross examination, and because such a deposition
violates the hearsay rule. It would also be inadmissable under the terms
of the Rule itself since the persons against whom it was sought to be
introduced were neither present, represented, or duly notified of the
taking of the deposition as they were not parties at the time it was
406. 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1 33.27, at 2336 (2d ed. 1963).
407. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21(d).
408. See, e.g., Burgin v. Florida Gas Util. Co., 172 So.2d 267 (Fla. 3d'Dist. 1965) ; Dino
v. O'Dawe, 158 So.2d 562 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
409. 164 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
410. FIA. R. Civ. P. 1.21(d).
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taken. Nevertheless, the court found that the erroneous admission of the
deceased witness's deposition did not constitute a basis for appellate
reversal of the lower court's judgment since the testimony contained in
the deposition was to a great extent cumulative and could not be said
to have deprived them of a fair trial
n.4 1
8. DENIALS IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
Rule 1.30,412 which is patterned after Federal Rule 36 (a),418 provides
that
A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admis-
sion, and when good faith requires that a party deny only a part
or a qualification of a matter of which an admission is requested,
he shall specify so much of it as is true and deny only the re-
mainder.
The plaintiff in a slip and fall case appealed4 14 from an adverse
summary final judgment. Among the requested admissions sought by the
defendant was one to the effect that the plaintiff had seen a liquid puddle
on the floor while she was walking towards the piano. This the plaintiff
denied. The next request asked the plaintiff to admit "That after seeing
the liquid substance described in request for admission 2, you passed Mr.
Bill Hall, who asked you to dance."4 15 The plaintiff's answer admitted
her request. On the basis of the complaint, the answer thereto, and the
plaintiff's responses to the requests for admissions, the defendant moved
for summary judgment on the ground that there existed no genuine issue
of material fact as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence and that the
defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition
to this motion, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit by which she sought to
vary the effect of her prior admission by asserting that she had not seen
the puddle until after she began dancing and when it was too late to avert
her fall. The court noted, in granting a summary judgment, that the
411. The case contained a partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion by Judge
Wigginton. He concurred in the result reached by the majority, but vigorously opposed the
adoption of an ironclad rule which reflected a procedural philosophy "in keeping with the
horse and buggy vintage of the authorities on which they rely for support." (Brown v. Tan-
ner, supra note 409, at 855). Judge Wigginton thought that Professor Wigmore expressed the
better and more modern view in 5 WiGmORE, EvIDENcE, § 1390 (3d ed. 1940).
But, where the death or illness prevents cross-examination under such circumstances
that no responsibility of any sort can be attributed to either the witness or his party,
it seems harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained on the direct examina-
tion. Principle requires in strictness nothing less. But the true solution would be to
avoid any inflexible rule, and to leave it to the trial judge to admit the direct ex-
amination so far as the loss of cross-examination can be shown to him to be not in
that instance a material loss. Courts differ in their treatment of this difficult situa-
tion; except that, by general concession, a cross-examination begun but unfinished
suffices if its purposes have been substantially accomplished. (Emphasis added.)
412. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.30(a).
413. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
414. McKean v. Kloeppel Hotels, Inc., 171 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
415. Id. at 554.
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affidavit refuted the material factual situation developed by the plaintiff's
answers to the defendant's requests for admissions, but held that under
such circumstances the affidavit may not be considered to the extent
that it alters those admissions. In affirming the judgment of the lower
court, the district court cited Barron and Holtzoff's interpretation of the
analogous federal rule:
... [W] hen good faith requires that a party deny only partly
or with a qualification, a matter as to which an admission is re-
quested, he must specify and admit so much of it as is true and
deny only the remainder. The admissions or denials must be
forthright, specific and unqualified... 41 I
The court found that the plaintiff's denial of the second request was
not sufficient to qualify the general admission of the third request. Al-
though on a motion for a summary judgment, the pleadings and support-
ing proofs are construed strictly against the moving party, nevertheless,
the party opposing the motion "will not be permitted to alter his position
as occasion may indicate to be expedient in order to evade the conse-
quences of his previous pleadings, admissions, affidavits, depositions or
testimony.14 17 The court further stated that "it is necessary .. .that the
litigants by their pleadings be held to say what they mean and mean
what they say according to common usage of the English language."41
9. CONSEQENCES OF FAILING TO RESPOND TO INTERROGATORIES
Failure to serve timely answers to propounded interrogatories sub-
jects the defaulting party, on motion and notice, to the penalty of having
any part filed by him stricken, or to the dismissal of his action or pro-
ceeding or any part thereof, or to entry of a judgment by default against
him.
419
Although the court exercises a broad discretionary power in de-
termining the consequences of failure to serve timely answers to pro-
pounded interrogatories, dismissal of the complaint was found to be an
abuse of judicial discretion where both parties had been dilatory in
prosecuting the action and prosecution of the suit had been once postponed
at the request of one of the defendants. 20 It was also held to be an abuse
of judicial discretion to dismiss a complaint with prejudice for failure to
timely answer interrogatories in violation merely of the requirements of
the rules and not of a court order42" ' since "the law abhors the denial of
access to the courts for any reason other than a wilful abuse of the pro-
416. 2 BARRON AND HOLTZOrF, FEDzAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Rules Edition, 543-44
(1951).
417. McKean v. Kloeppel Hotels, Inc., supra note 414, at 556.
418. Ibid.
419. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.31(d).
420. State Road Dept. v. Hufford, 161 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
421. Rashard v. Cappiali, 171 So.2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). This case is more fully dis-
cussed in the section on involuntary dismissals note 315 supra and accompanying text.
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cesses of the court. Such a wilful disregard of the rules of court will not
ordinarily be shown by a record which does not show the violation of a
specific order of the court.1
422
In Hlyman v. Schwartz,42a the district court granted certiorari to re-
view a lower court order which struck the defendant's counterclaim in a
negligence action arising out of an automobile collision and entered
judgment by default against him on the question of liability. By his
counterclaim, the defendant sought to recover damage to his automobile.
The plaintiff submitted interrogatories to the defendant which were
objected to on the ground that many of them went to the question of the
defendant's health and medical condition, whereas the counterclaim
sought relief for only property damage. After the trial court had over-
ruled the defendant's objections to the interrogatories the defendant filed
timely answers, but designated all interrogatories which did not go to
the issue of property damage as "not applicable". Whereupon, on the
plaintiff's motion, the court entered the order which formed the basis of
the petition. In granting certiorari, the district court held that:
The action of a trial court in striking pleadings and entering a
default judgment for failure to properly reply to interrogatories
is a harsh remedy and should be cautiously applied.
It is our view that under the authority of Rule 1.31 (d), Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A. and under State Road De-
partment v. Hufford, supra, the defendant herein should have
been given a fixed time in which to more fully reply to the
interrogatories in question and that upon failure to do so, the
court could then properly strike the pleadings.2 4
In determining the consequences to follow the failure to serve timely
objections or answers to interrogatories a court is without power to assess
costs or attorney's fees against either the defaulting party or his attorneys
of record. The penalty provisions of Rule 1.31 (c)4 25 apply only to a
situation where a party has failed to comply with a request for the
admission of the genuineness of a document or of the truth of a matter
of fact. It has no bearing on the penalties available for failure to serve
answers to interrogatories. These are governed by Rule 1.31(d) which
contains no penalty relating to the assessment of costs and attorney's
fees.420
10. ADMISSIONS OF FACT AND OF THE GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS
The Florida rules relating to admissions provide that:
• . . Each of the matters of which an admission is requested
422. Id. at 583.
423. 177 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
424. Id. at 751-52.
425. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.31(c).
426. State Road Dept. v. Hufford, supra note 420.
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shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in
the request, not less than 20 days after service thereof or within
such shorter or longer time as the court may allow on motion
and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves
either (1) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of
which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters
or (2) written objections on the ground that some or all of the
requested admissions are privileged or irreleyant or that the
request is otherwise improper in whole or in part together with
a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable
time .... 427
Where the answers to the requested admissions were not sworn to
as expressly required, it was held in Bente v. Nelson,42 that the requests
were to be deemed admitted at the expiration of the designated time for
response.
In Southern Railway Company v. Wood,429 however, the plaintiff in
an F.E.L.A. action addressed certain requests for admissions to the
defendant railroad, including a request for an admission that the
plaintiff's decedent was employed by the defendant railroad at the time
of the accident which was alleged to have proximately resulted in his
death. The defendant filed a timely, but unverified, denial of this request
and objected to the other requests. The objections to the other requests
were overruled and the defendant thereafter served sworn denials to the
requests, including the request relating to the decedent's employment.
No further action was taken in regard to these requests and responses
until the second day of the trial sixteen months later. In the interim
the court entered a pretrial order pursuant to which the parties stipulated
that the question of the employment of the plaintiff's decedent by the
defendant was one of the issues to be tried. Prior to this stipulation, the
plaintiff had addressed an additional forty-one requests for admission
to the defendant to which she had received sworn responses, and which
she read to the jury at the commencement of the trial. On the second
day of the trial, the plaintiff's attorney somehow became alerted to the
fact that the defendant's original response to the requested admission
concerning the decedent's employment had not been sworn to, and
insisted that he was entitled to the benefit of the provision contained in
Rule 1.30 under which a request is deemed admitted where there has
been a failure to comply with the Rule. The trial court agreed and held
that by virtue of the admission imposed upon the defendant the only
issue necessary to be proved by the plaintiff was that of the defendant's
negligence. In reversing, the district court held that in light of the pre-
trial proceedings the defendant should either have been permitted to
427. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.30(a) as amended, 1965 REvISION, at 24. (Emphasis added.)
428. 156 So.2d 17 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
429. 171 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
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verify its response to the subject admission nunc pro tunc, or that the
plaintiff should be found to have waived her right to the benefit of the
Rule and should further be required to establish by adequate proof the
fact of her deceased husband's employment by the defendant at the
time which was material to her case. As the period had not yet expired
for applying to the trial court for relief from the erroneously entered
judgment,43 ° the district court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction of
the cause to the trial court for the purpose of receiving and disposing of
such a motion within 30 days. On remand, the trial court concluded
that it only had jurisdiction to entertain a motion by the plaintiff and
to pass upon "the sole question of whether the defendant's failure within
the period provided by Rule 1.30, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, to
verify its initial response to plaintiff-appellee's request No. 1 for admis-
sion. . . . should be deemed cured nunc pro tunc. . ,,.'1 under the
particular circumstances of the case, and it tossed the burden back to
the district court to determine whether or not the evidence adduced on
the question of employment was sufficient to sustain the verdict. The
district court then found that the effect of the imposed admission restricted
the jury's deliberatons exclusively to the issue of negligence. It vacated
the judgment, and granted a new trial on the question of liability only. 3'
11. MOTION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
V. SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
In a case of first impression in Florida the district court reversed33
a lower court order that had quashed a subpoena duces tecum"4 , on the
ground that "a subpoena duces tecum will not run to a party at time of
trial." In holding that a subpoena duces tecum could be issued to a party,
the district court adopted the construction given to Federal Rule 45 (b)43 5
by the majority of federal courts 30 and by the text writers43 7 interpreting
that Rule.
Both the district court and the Florida Supreme Court, when it
denied certiorari,3 7a left unanswered the question of whether a showing of
good cause is a prerequisite for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.
In this connection, Professor Wright indicates a distinction in the cases
430. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.38(b).
431. Southern Ry. Co. v. Wood, 175 So.2d 812, 813 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
432. Id. on rehearing, p. 814.
433. Franklyn's, Inc. v. Riesenbeck, 166 So.2d 831 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
434. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.34(b).
435. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b).
436. Crary v. Porter, 157 F.2d 410, 415 (8th Cir. 1946) ; United States v. E. I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 14 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Ill. 1953); Arcadia Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Princeton
Knitting Mills, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
437. 2 BARaOr & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1002 (Rules ed. 1961);
4 MOORE, FEDEaAL PRAaTCE, 34.02 (2d Rules ed. 1963).
437a. Grisillo v. Franklyn's, Inc., 173 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1965).
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interpreting the Federal Rule between the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to a party before trial and its issuance at trial.
... If it is sought merely to inspect documents under the
control of a party prior to trial, good cause must be shown and
an order of the court obtained under rule 34. On the other hand,
if a party desires the production of documents under the control
of a party or witness for use at the trial or the taking of a
deposition, he may obtain a subpoena duces tecum under Rule
45(b) without any showing of cause and without any order of
the court. Nevertheless it is repeatedly said that Rule 45 must
be read in pari materia with the discovery rules, notably Rule
26 and 34. Though there are some contrary decisions, the great
weight of authority, and clearly the only tolerable rule, is that
on a motion to quash a subpoena for production before trial, the
party seeking production must show good cause just as he would
have to do had he proceeded under Rule 34 :111b (Original foot-
notes, citing cases, omitted; emphasis added.)
The necessary implication of Professor Wright's statement is that
where a subpoena duces tecum, addressed to a party is returnable at the
time of trial, then no showing of good cause is required under Federal
Rule 45(b). Generally, Florida courts follow federal precedent in con-
struing substantially similar rules.437c Therefore, it should be unneces-
sary under Florida Rule 1.34(b) to show good cause for the issuance of
a subpoena duces tecum, addressed to a party and returnable at the time
of trial.
"Failure to obey a subpoena is punishable by contempt, not by dis-
missal of the complaint.488 However, where a defendant moves for the
production of documents,489 the complaint may be dismissed for failure
to comply with an order of the court.440 Nevertheless, it may be found
to be an abuse of discretion to dismiss a complaint where there is no
finding and the record does not conclusively reveal that the plaintiff's
failure to comply with the court's order on motion to produce was a
refusal to obey. In Metro Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Mutual Employees
Trademart, Inc.,'441 the district court reversed a final judgment of dis-
missal for failure to obey an order to produce where the record was
437b. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRas, § 87, at 338 (1963).
437c. See, e.g., Carson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 173 So.2d 743 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965);
Franklyn's, Inc. v. Riesenbeck, 166 So.2d 831 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Brown v. Tanner, 164
So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
438. Franklin Acceptance Corp. v. Superior Elec. Indus., 167 So.2d 116, 117 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964). The penalty of contempt for failure to obey a subpoena is expressly provided by
Rule 1.34(e).
439. FLA. R. CIrv. P. 1.28.
440. FLA. R. .Civ. P. 1.35(b) is made applicable to parties failing to comply with an order
for production both by its express terms and Rule 1.31 (b) (2) (iii).
441. 176 So.2d 578 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
[VOL. XX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
susceptible of the reasonable interpretation that failure to produce the
documents was occasioned by events beyond the plaintiff's control. The
plaintiff had produced some of the documents requested and had made
an offer to produce any documents that could be located. The document
which was not produced went only to the issue of damages and not to
the existence of the cause of action. Absent a finding that failure was
tantamount to refusal, the district court felt that the ends of justice would
be better served by reversing the judgment and remanding the cause
for further proceedings.
L. Evidence
1. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Subsections (c) and (d) have been added to Rule 1.37. They provide
for the filing and disposal of documentary evidence in a cause.
(c) Filing. When documentary evidence is introduced in an
action, the clerk or the judge shall endorse an identifying
number or symbol on it and when proffered or admitted in
evidence, it shall be filed by him and considered in the custody
of the court and not withdrawn except with written leave of
court.
(d) Disposal. The clerk shall retain exhibits introduced in
evidence or marked for identification; provided (1) that the
court may order any such exhibit returned to either party and
(2) the clerk may destroy or dispose of such exhibits under
order of court after notice to all parties or stipulation of the
parties.
M. Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment
1. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
"After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay
the trial any party may move for judgment or decree on the pleadings."
44 2
The pleadings are closed when the answer has been filed if it does not
contain a counterclaim, a cross-claim, or a third party complaint unless
the court has ordered a reply to an answer. If a counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third party complaint has been filed, an answer or, if the court has so
ordered, a reply to an answer must also be filed.44
... In considering . . .a motion [for judgment or decree on
the pleadings] all well-pleaded material allegations of the
opposing party's pleading are to be taken as true, and all allega-
tions of the moving party which have been denied are taken as
false. Conclusions of law are not deemed admitted. Judgment
442. FLA. R. Civ P. 1.11(c).
443. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.7(a), as amended, 1965 REvisioN, at 18-19.
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on the pleadings may be granted only if, on the facts as so
admitted, the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment.
Hence a defendant may not obtain a judgment on the pleadings
on the basis of the allegations in his answer where no reply is
required, since under Rule 1.8(e), Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, these allegations are deemed denied; nor may the defen-
dant move on the basis of an insufficient denial of the allegations
of his answer in plaintiff's reply where the reply was not
required or ordered by the court.44
However, where the parties stipulated at the hearing on the motion
that there was no dispute between them as to any of the material facts
alleged in the pleadings filed in the case, and that the pleadings contained
all of the facts material in the case, it was held445 that the plaintiff had
waived her right to insist on the strict enforcement of the above-stated
principles and that "the chancellor was justified in proceedings to con-
sider the merits of the complaint with a view of entering final decree on
the pleadings in favor of the defendants if the admitted facts revealed
that defendants were entitled to a final decree as a matter of law."44
With this limited exception, a trial judge at a hearing on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings may not properly consider matters outside of
the pleadings in determining whether or not to grant the motion. Rule
1.11(c), unlike its federal counterpart,44 is not interchangeable with a
motion for summary judgment.448
2. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
a. Amendments
Subsections (c) and (e) of Rule 1.36 have been amended to include
"answers to interrogatories" among the matters that may be considered
on motion for summary judgment and among the materials that may be
used to supplement or oppose affidavits.449 The subcommittee notes in-
dicate"' that the change was intended to correct an inadvertent omission.
In addition, the notice period required for a hearing on a motion
for summary judgment has been increased from a minimum of 10 to a
minimum of 20 days because "many attorneys are unable to obtain
opposing affidavits and documents within the shorter period."1451
444. Miller v. Eatmon, 177 So.2d 523, 524 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
445. Miller v. Eatmon, supra note 444.
446. Id. at 524-25.
447. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
448. Adams Eng'r Co. v. Construction Prod. Corp., 158 So.2d 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
449. 1965 Revision, at 26-27.






"A summary judgment is proper only when it is firmly established
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." '452
At the hearing on a motion for summary judgment a trial judge must
view the facts, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.453 This rule includes
giving any reasonable meaning to a deposition which will not conflict with
an affidavit subsequently filed by the same party, so that both may be
considered in evidence at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment.454
However, where the plaintiff sought to modify the clear and un-
ambiguous meaning of an earlier admission by an affidavit filed in opposi-
tion to the defendant's motion for a summary judgment, it was held455
on the plaintiff's appeal that the trial court had properly refused to con-
sider the affidavit to the extent that it altered the prior admission. In
affirming the lower court, the Second District Court of Appeal stated:
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the moving party for
summary judgment is held to a strict standard. The pleadings
and proofs supporting such motions are strictly construed
against the movant, while those opposing the motion are
leniently treated in determining whether the movant has satisfied
the burden required of 'him; that in determining whether there
exists a genuine issue of material fact, all reasonable inferences
of fact from the proofs and pleadings must be resolved in favor
of the party opposing the motion; and further, that the appellate
court will indulge all proper inferences in favor of the party
against whom a summary judgment or decree has been entered.
These principles do not contemplate, however, that the trial
court is compelled to give the same a strained construction
simply to keep alive an action which, parenthetically, should ex-
pire of its own weight. The purpose of all good pleading is to
develop material issues of law and/or fact upon which to resolve
the controversy. It is necessary, therefore, that the litigants by
their pleadings be held to say what they mean and mean what
they say according to common usage of the English language,
semantic refinements aside. This concept is vital to the judicial
process and to further relax that requirement would only add
confusion and render nugatory the guiding principles of orderly
pleading. Paralleling those rules of law which impose upon the
452. Matarese v. Leesburg Elks Club, 171 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
453. Michaiski v. Peaslee, 174 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); Davis v. Major Oil Co.,
164 So.2d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Purvis, 163 So.2d 38
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
454. Koflen v. Great AU. & Pac. Tea Co., 177 So.2d 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
455. McKean v. Kloeppel Hotels, Inc., 171 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
party moving for summary judgment the above mentioned
heavy burdens is the rule that the party opposing the motion
will not be permitted to alter his position as occasion may in-
dicate to be expedient in order to evade the consequences of his
previous pleadings, admissions, affidavits, depositions or testi-
mony.
456
Even where the evidence is uncontradicted, the movant will not be
entitled to a summary judgment if the evidence is susceptible of two or
more inferences of fact that lawfully could be drawn by a jury.5 7 For this
reason, a summary judgment should be cautiously granted in a negligence
action. Generally, questions of negligence, proximate cause, and contrib-
utory negligence are questions of fact to be determined by a jury, unless
the evidence before the court is susceptible of but a single inference
and one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."" "...
[W]hen the question of negligence or contributory negligence is ex-
tremely close, doubt should always be resolved in favor of a jury trial." '459
"In considering a motion for summary jidgment the trial judge
is not privileged to weigh the evidence or pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses."'4 60 The question before the court at a hearing on a motion for
summary judgment is purely one of law, and it is not the function of the
court on such a motion to resolve factual conflicts. The Third District Court
of Appeal therefore reversed46' a summary judgment for the defendants
in an action to recover upon a promissory note where the lower court
had erroneously ordered a hearing for the taking of testimony in regard
to the decision on the motion for summary judgment. In Bache v.
Lefcoe,462 it was held that the chancellor erroneously entered a summary
final decree in which he had made numerous findings of fact.
• . . It is not the function of a trial judge to make findings of
fact on a motion for summary judgment [cites omitted] ....
When the issues created by the pleadings are in conflict (which
conflict is supported by the record then before a trial judge), it
is erroneous to enter a summary judgment or decree and the
456. Id. at 555-56.
457. See, e.g., Koplen v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 177 So.2d 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965);
Benson v. Atwood, 177 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965); Wisner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 167 So.2d 254 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Beikirch v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 159 So.2d
898 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
458. Michalski v. Peaslee, 174 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Haynes v. Littleford, 173
So.2d 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Jenkins v. Brackin, 171 So.2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
459. Beikirch v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 159 So.2d 898, 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). See
also Robinson v. City of Miami, 177 So.2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
460. Benson v. Atwood, 177 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). See also, Harvey Bldg.,
Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1965); First Mortgage Corp. v. de Give, 177 So.2d 741,
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); John K. Brennan Co. v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 164 So.2d 525 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1964).
461. Franklin Acceptance Corp. v. Superior Elec. Indus., Inc., 167 So.2d 116 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964).
462. 162 So.2d 525 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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matter should proceed to a determination of the issues by the
trier of fact; either a jury, trial judge, or chancellor.
In Five Point Co. v. Neeley,6 4 the corporate defendant in an action
to recover upon certain loans allegedly made to it appealed from an
adverse summary judgment. It appeared from the defendant's affidavit
that the corporate records had been destroyed by fire so that the defen-
dant would be unable to present proof of any genuine issue of fact, or
to challenge the amount claimed by the plaintiff as properly due. In
affirming the summary judgment for the plaintiff, the district court held
that although the defendant's answer to the complaint raised an issue
of fact as to the existence of the debt, nevertheless, the affidavits in
support of the defense showed that the defendant was not in a position
to refute the plaintiff's claim. In this posture of the case, the trial of an
issue on which the defendant concededly could not produce evidence would
result in a waste of judicial labor. Since the defendant's affidavits did
not contradict or avoid the plaintiff's claim, nor support the defense
tendered by it in its answer, it must be presumed that the corporation
had gone as far as it could and summary judgment for the plaintiff was
properly entered.
On the plaintiff's appeal from an adverse summary judgment in a
contract action, it was held465 that the plaintiff was not precluded from
asserting that the trial court had erred in entering summary judgment
for the defendant on the ground that there existed genuine issues of
material fact because it had also moved for summary judgment. "The
fact that both parties moved for a summary decree does not require a
finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact, nor does it
follow that there is in fact no such issue merely because both parties so
contend."4 "
c. Summary Judgment Before Answer
A party may move for a summary judgment or decree at any time
after the expiration of twenty days from the commencement of the
action, or after the adverse party has moved for a summary judgment or
decree, whichever occurs first.4 7 Since the filing of a motion to dismiss
for one of the reasons enumerated in Rule 1.11(b) tolls the time for
filing an answer,4 68 a motion for summary judgment may be made before
the defendant has answered.46 Where the plaintiff moves for a summary
463. Id. at 526. See also, Tischler v. Tischler, 173 So.2d 769 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); Horner
v. State, 158 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
464. 157 So.2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
465. First Mortgage Corp. v. de Give, supra note 460.
466. Id. at 748.
467. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.36(a).
468. FrA. R. Crv. P. 1.11(a).
469. Robinson v. City of Miami, 177 So.2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Phillippi Creek
Homes, Inc. v. Arnold, 174 So.2d 552 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); Hunt v. Gerber, 166 So.2d 720
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judgment before the defendant has answered, the motion should not be
granted unless it is clear that an issue of material fact cannot be pre-
sented, and that under the applicable principles of substantive law he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.470 This burden rests upon the
movant regardless of whether he or his opponent would have the burden
of proof on the issue concerned at trial, and it rests upon the movant
whether he is required to show the existence or non-existence of facts.47'
In short the plaintiff must make it appear to a certainty that no answer
which the defendant might properly serve could present a genuine issue
of fact.
d. Notice and Hearing
Rule 1.36(c) 4 7 2 requires that a motion for a summary judgment
shall be served at least twenty days before the time fixed for the hearing.
Similarly, Rule 1.16111 requires the court to serve a copy of its order
setting a pre-trial conference on the attorneys for the parties not less
than 20 days prior to the conference. In Green v. Manly Constr. Co.,
474
the plaintiffs appealed from an adverse summary judgment in a negli-
gence action, and charged that the trial court had erroneously granted
the defendant's motion for a summary judgment made at pre-trial con-
ference because the plaintiffs had not received prior notice of the defen-
dant's motion. In affirming the lower court's judgment, the district court
noted that the litigants were charged with knowledge that the court may
of its own motion enter a summary judgment as a result of a pre-trial
conference, provided the requisite advance notice of the conference has
been given. "The purpose of a pretrial is to simplify the issue. If the
conference progresses to the point of eliminating all questions of fact,
then the court may give judgment according to the law on the facts be-
fore him.475
In a suit for the specific performance of an agreement to reconvey
real estate, or in the alternative for damages, the defendant-vendee filed
motions before answering to both dismiss the complaint and for a
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); John K. Brennan Co. v. Central Bank & Trust Company, 164 So.2d
525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Dean v. Gold Coast Theatres, Inc., 156 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1963).
470. Olin's, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 165 So.2d 427 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964);
Wallens v. Lichtenstein, 159 So.2d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Settecasi v. Board of Public
Instruction, 156 So.2d 652 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
471. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, §§ 56.07, 56.15(3) (2d ed. 1965).
472. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(c), as amended, 1965 REVISION, at 26. Failure to observe the
requisite notice requirement constitutes reversible error. Seven-up Bottling Co. v. George
Const. Corp., 166 So.2d 155 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (reversing a summary decree for the de-
fendant, heard 3 days after notice, in an independent action to set aside a decree of fore-
closure, which was allegedly obtained by a fraud upon the court).
473. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.16, as amended, 1965 REVISION, at 21.
474. 159 So.2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
475. Hillsborough County v. Sutton, 150 Fla. 601, 603, 8 So.2d 401, 402 (1942), cited in
Green v. Manly Constr, Co., supra note 474, at 885.
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summary judgment. The court denied the defendant's motions and
sua sponte entered an interlocutory summary decree on the issue of
liability in favor of the non-moving plaintiff-vendor, apparently because
the court found, as a matter of law, that the time within which the option
to re-purchase could be exercised had not expired at the time the plaintiff
informed the defendant of its intention to demand a reconveyance. On the
defendant's appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal held476 that the
trial court had erroneously entered a summary judgment for the non-
moving party before an answer had been filed in the absence of a ten-
day notice by the plaintiff of hearing of a motion for summary decree in
conformity with the provisions of Rule 1.36(c).
Like its federal counterpart, 77 Florida Rule 1.36 makes no specific
provision for a case in which the opposing party, and not the moving
party is entitled to summary judgment. 78 However, Florida Rule 1.36 is
substantially analogous to Federal Rule 56, and cases and treatises inter-
preting the Federal Rule are persuasive in resolving similar problems
under the Florida Rule. In Begnaud v. White,479 the Sixth Circuit noted:
The fact that both parties make motions for summary judg-
ment, and each contends in support of his respective motion that
no genuine issue of fact exists, does not require the court to
rule that no fact issue exists. Each, in support of his own motion,
may be willing to concede certain contentions of his opponent,
which concession, however, is only for the purpose of the pend-
ing motion. If the motion, is overruled, the concession is no
longer effective. Appellants' concession that no genuine issue of
fact existed was made in support of its own motion for summary
judgment. We do not think that the concession continues over
into the court's separate consideration of appellee's motion for
summary judgment in his behalf after appellants' motion was
overruled.
The rationale that limits an admission that the facts are undisputed
to the purposes of the party's own motion where both parties have moved
for a summary judgment is equally applicable to a situation where the
court, sua sponte is considering the propriety of entering such a judgment.
Although the court in disposing of a motion for summary judgment
or decree may sometimes enter the judgment or decree for the nonmoving
party,48 "[d] ue process requires that before a summary judgment is au-
thorized to be entered against a non-moving party, it must be shown that
476. John K. Brennan Co. v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 164 So.2d 525 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1964).
477. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
478. See 3 BARRON AND HoLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1239 (Rules ed.
1958).
479. 170 F.2d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 1948), cited in the principal case.
480. Carpineta v. Shields, 70 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1954).
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he has had a full and fair opportunity to meet the proposition that there
is no genuine issue of a material fact and that the party for whom the
summary judgment is rendered or ordered to be entered is entitled thereto
as a matter of law .... ,181 In the absence of other controlling factors
Florida Rule 1.36, like Federal Rule 56, requires that a summary judg-
ment be entered against a party only after an opportunity to be heard
on timely written notice of the application for the judgment.482 A person
who has filed notice of such a motion appears at the hearing on his motion
in support of his own motion, and not to meet a like but non-noticed
and unserved motion of his adversary or of the court. It was apparent
in the instant case that the order as to the liability of the defendant was
not after a full and fair opportunity to the defendant to meet the question
of its liability under the terms of the agreement between the parties.88
As intimated in the discussion of the Moreno case,484 and as ex-
pressly provided by Rule 1.36(c), ". . . The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits . ."485 Notwithstanding
the use of permissive language, Florida courts continue 486 to hold that
if opposing affidavits are filed at all, they must be filed before the sched-
uled date of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment or they
will not be considered by the court in determining whether or not to
enter the summary judgment sought.
In all but extraordinary circumstances, affidavits in support of
[a motion for summary judgment], if any there are, should be
filed [in sufficient time to allow an opponent] to controvert
481. John K. Brennan Co. v. Central Bank & Trust Co., supra note 476 at 530. See 6
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE, § 56.12, at 2243 (2d ed. 1965).
482. In City of Pinellas Park v. Cross-State Util. Co., 176 So.2d 384, (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965),
the court in reversing a summary judgment for the non-moving party noted that:
While there are circumstances under which the court may grant a summary judgment
to a non-moving party, it must always be borne in mind that this procedure is
contrary to Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.36, 30 F.SA. [Footnote citing the principal case
omitted], and that it is better practice to require a motion by the successful party.
[Footnote omitted.]
Id. at 386.
483. In Fernandez v. Moreno, 176 So.2d 587 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), the district court
relied on the Brennan Co. case in holding on an appeal by the defendant that the trial court
had erroneously entered a partial summary judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of liability.
In the Moreno case, the hearing on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was never
held pursuant to the original notice. Subsequently the plaintiff filed a further notice of hearing
and various orders were entered but none on the motion for summary judgment.
On the day of trial and immediately prior thereto, the plaintiff's attorney requested the
court to rule on the motion for summary judgment, although no hearing on this motion had
been scheduled for the day of trial nor any notice of hearing forwarded to the defendant.
The trial court thereupon granted the motion which the defendant assigned as error on appeal.
In sustaining the defendant's contentions, the district court noted that although the summary
judgment motions had been pending for many months, the notice provisions of Rule 1.36(c)
had not been complied with and the defendant was deprived of his opportunity to serve op-
posing affidavits prior to the day of the hearing.
484. Supra note 482.
485. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(c).
486. See Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, 18 U. MiAan L. Rv. 745, 785 (1964).
[VOL. XX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
them. . A motion for summary judgment is calculated to save
valuable time and thus to assist in securing speedy and inexpen-
sive justice, but one object of the . . . rules of procedure is to
prevent surprise, and this . . . objective should not be over-
looked.487
e. Competent Evidence
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissable in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein ... "I"
Allegations of ultimate fact which are to be proved or disproved by
evidentiary facts usually suffice for pleading purposes, but more is re-
quired of an affidavit to support a motion for a summary judgment or
decree. 8 9 Statements of ultimate fact in support of a motion for summary
decree are of no weight.490 As in the case of ultimate facts, a trial court
should disregard opinion testimony and legal conclusions contained in a
motion in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment,
and give consideration only to the competent and admissable portions.
Such opinion testimony and legal conclusions would, of course, not be
admissable in evidence.9 1
f. Unpleaded Defense
During the Survey period, the Florida Supreme Court granted
certiorari4 92 to review the decision of the Third District Court of Ap-
peal in Hart Properties, Inc. v. Slack,98 which had affirmed an order of
the trial court denying the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment in
a negligence action where the facts showed an issue not framed in the
pleadings. In their complaint the plaintiffs had alleged, and by their
answer the defendants had admitted, that the minor plaintiff was a
licensee on the defendant's property. However, the proofs adduced at the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment indicated that the minor
plaintiff might have been an invitee. In denying the defendant's motion,
the district court held that upon a motion for summary judgment "the
issues are made by the pleadings, the depositions and admissions on
file.",
49 4
The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the position it previously
487. Nielsen v. Carney Groves, Inc., 159 So.2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). See also, Settecasi
v. Board of Public Instruction, 156 So.2d 652 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
488. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(e), as amended, 1965 Revision, at 27.
489. Dean v. Gold Coast Theatres, Inc., 156 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
490. See 6 MooRE, FmDERAL PRACTICE, § 56.22 at 2808, n. 25 (2d ed. 1965).
491. First Mortgage Corp. v. de Give, 177 So.2d 741 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
492. Hart Properties, Inc. v. Slack, 159 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1963).
493. 145 So.2d 285 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
494. Id. at 286.
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adopted in the case of Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc.4 9 "The purpose of a
motion for summary judgment is to determine if there be sufficient
evidence to justify a trial upon the issues made by the pleadings."49'
"Parties litigant are bound by the allegations of their pleadings,"4 "
and admissions contained in the pleadings are accepted as facts as be-
tween the parties themselves without the necessity of supporting evidence.
In the instant case, the plaintiff was bound by his allegation that he was
a licensee, and the evidence adduced in support of, or in opposition to, a
motion could not create an issue on a point that was already settled.
In circumstances such as this where a summary judgment should
be entered, yet the matters presented indicate that the unsuc-
cessful party may have a cause of action or defense not pleaded,
or a better one than that pleaded, the proper procedure is to
[grant the motion to] enter the summary judgment with leave
to the party to amend ... 498
g. Requisite Evidentiary Showing
Another problem dealt with during the Survey period is that of the
evidentiary showing required by a movant for a summary judgment.
The second district court, in a recent slip and fall case, reversed a
summary judgment for the defendant and held411a that "a motion for sum-
mary judgment should not be granted if it could be inferred from the
evidence that the plaintiff could prove at trial that the defendant was
negligent. The defendant sought certiorari on the ground that the decision
was in conflict with the opinion of the Third District Court of Appeal in
Hardcastle v. Mobley, in which it was held that the party against whom
summary judgment is sought must come forward with facts contradicting
those submitted by the movant and demonstrate a real issue between
the parties.
On a consideration of the merits, the Florida Supreme Court found
that the district court had properly reversed the summary judgment for
the defendants but for the wrong reasons. The court held that once the
movant has tendered sufficient evidence to support his motion, the oppos-
495. 89 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1956).
496. Id. at 484. (Emphasis added.)
497. Carvell v. Kinsey, 87 So.2d 577, (Fla. 1956).
498. Hart Properties, Inc. v. Slack, supra note 228, at 240 (Fla. 1963). Accord: City of
Pinellas Park v. Cross State Uil. Co., 176 So.2d 384 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Curley v. Finest
Homes, Inc., 167 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
Rule 1.15(a), FLA. R. Civ. P., specifies that, when necessary, "leave [of court] shall be
freely given when justice so requires."
The decision in the principal case comports with the view of the cases and treatises which
construe the analogous FED. R. Civ. P. 56. See, e.g., Rossiter v. Vogel, 134 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.
1943). Cf. 6 MooRa, FEDERAL PRACTICE, U 56.10 (2d ed. 1965).
498a. Haley v. Harvey Building, Inc., 168 So.2d 330 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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ing party must come forward with counterevidence sufficient to reveal
a genuine issue of fact.
4 sb
h. Partial Summary Judgment
The provision in Rule 1.36(a)499 permitting a claimant to move with
or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment or decree in his
favor upon all or any part of his complaint should be read in pari materia
with the requirements of Rule 1.36(d) relating to the proper procedure
at a hearing on a summary judgment motion at which the court grants
a partial summary judgment only. That Rule specifies that:
[T]he court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating coun-
sel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy and what material facts are
actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of dam-
ages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial or
final hearing of the action, the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial or final hearing shall be conducted
accordingly."'
In an action upon an entertainment contract, the plaintiffs recovered
a partial summary judgment as to part of the damages sought, which
were found to be due without dispute and the court ordered execution.
The defendant appealed and superseded the judgment. In reversing the
lower court the Third District Court of Appeal held5 ' that under Florida
Rule 1.36, the trial court was without power to enter the challenged
partial summary final judgment. The terms of subsection (d) of Rule
1.36 contemplate that the final judgment, when entered, would incor-
porate the partial relief previously found due without dispute. The object
and function of Rule 1.36(d) is to expedite the litigation of a cause by
eliminating uncontested matters. The purpose of the Rule was not to
provide for the piecemeal litigation of a cause, but was simply to pre-
serve "as established and ready for inclusion in the final judgment, to
be entered after trial, the amounts of damages found to be undisputed
and owing .... . 5' 2 At that stage of the proceeding the court was without
authority to enter a judgment.
498b. Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 782-83 (Fla. 1965).
499. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(a).
500. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(d). (Emphasis added.)
501. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Young, 162 So.2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
502. Id. at 305. The court noted that its interpretation of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(a) and
(d) conformed to the interpretation given by the federal appellate courts to the identical
subsections (a) and (d) of FED. R. Civ. P. 56. Biggins v. Oltmer Iron Works, 154 F.2d 214
(7th Cir. 1946). See 6 MooRa, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ff 56.20(3) part 3 (2d ed. 1965).
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Interpreting the identical provisions contained in Federal Rule
56(d), Professor Moore states:
Rule 56(d) imposes a duty upon the court to sift the issues and
to specify which material facts are really in issue and which are
not, thereby facilitating and expediting the trial. This pre-
trial sifting of the issues upon a motion for summary judgment,
as provided in Rule 56(d), is quite similar to the pre-trial pro-
cedure provided in Rule 16, except that under Rule 56(d) it is
compulsory, while under Rule 16 it is discretionary with the
court. 03
"A case which seeks recovery of several elements of damage or relief
presents only a single 'claim,' if they grow out of one contract or cause
of action,"' 4 and a final judgment as to undisputed damages may not
properly be entered until all of the damages arising from the same claim
have been litigated.0 5 This construction of Federal Rule 56 had already
been established at the time that Florida incorporated the federal
practice under Rule 56 into its own procedural system. 50 6
Florida Rule 1.36(c) also provides for an interlocutory summary
503. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 3175 (lst ed. 1938).
504. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Young, supra note 501, at 307.
50. This point is significant in federal practice because the rules regulating procedure
in the federal courts contain, in addition to FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (which is analogous to FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.36), FED. R. Cirv. P. 54(b), for which there is no counterpart in the Florida rules.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) expressly authorizes the entry of judgment on "one or more but less
than all of the claims." Obviously, if final judgments for partial relief could be granted under
FED. R. Civ. P. 56, there would be no necessity for Rule 54(b).
506. The First District Court of Appeal in Berry v. Pyrofax Gas Corp., 121 So.2d 447
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1960), had previously voiced an opinion, by way of obiter dictum, to the
effect that the summary judgment rule authorizes partial final judgments. The principal cases
contained a dissent based upon the Berry dictum.
A few months later, the question of partial summary judgments was again before the
Third District Court of Appeals in the case of Wabash Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenberg, which was
an action by the beneficiaries to recover the face amount of a life insurance policy. In De-
cember, 1964, the plaintiffs were granted a partial summary judgment for the face amount
of the policy, and at the end of the following March, after hearing, judgment for interest
and attorney's fee was entered in the plaintiffs' favor. On defendant's timely appeal from the
latter order, the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal was denied in a brief per curiam
opinion.
The decision contains a concurring opinion which would have held the appeal untimely
as it related to the partial summary judgment for the principal amount of the policy. In
view of the Fontainebleau case, and of the express provision in the order awarding the plain-
tiffs the amount of the policy specifying that "(j)inal judgment shall be entered herein after
the termination of the matters of interest, attorney fees and costs" (emphasis added), this
conclusion seems patently erroneous. Neither the fact that the December order was in the
form of a judgment, nor the fact that the court erroneously stayed the execution on that
order sought by the plaintiffs should be dispositive of the defendant's right to challenge the
propriety of an order in an action at law, which, under the rules regulating procedure in




judgment or decree where no genuine material issue exists as to the
issue of liability, although the amount of damages is in dispute.
507
i. Attorney's Fees
On an appeal by the defendants in an action to recover under the
terms of an indemnity agreement, the district court reversed508 a sum-
mary judgment awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to a con-
clusive evidence clause contained in the agreement itself. The conclusive
evidence clause was void as being against public policy, and the record
on appeal contained no testimony as to the reasonableness of the attor-
ney's fees incurred, although it did contain affidavits as to the reasonable-
ness of the attorney's fees awarded. Generally, the reasonableness of
attorney's fees is a question of fact to be determined by a jury upon a
consideration of the evidence adduced at a final hearing.
j. Extension
Where more time is needed to prepare for an opponent's motion
for summary judgment, a motion for a continuance will not suffice. 509
Rule 1.36(f)51 ° requires that the opposing party's motion state the
reasons why he cannot present by affidavit the facts essential to justify
his opposition. When such a motion has been presented, "the court may
refuse the application for judgment or decree or may order a continuance
to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery
to be had or may make such other order as is just."
k. Appellate Review
It appears that the districts are not in accord as to the test to be
applied by an appellate court in determining whether a trial court has
erroneously denied a party's motion for a summary judgment or decree
where denial of such a motion is assigned as error on appeal.
In Well-Bilt Prod., Inc. v. Liechty,11 the appealing plaintiff assigned
as error the denial of his motion for a summary judgment. The Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed and stated that in denying a motion
for summary judgment, as opposed to granting a motion for summary
judgment," 2 discretion may play a part.
507. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(c). See, e.g., Florida State Turnpike Auth. v. Michael Baker,
Jr., Inc., 156 So.2d 198 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
508. Sork v. United Benefit Fire Ins. Co., 161 So.2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). See also,
Seven-up Bottling Co. of Miami v. George Constr. Corp., 166 So.2d 155 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
509. Raydel, Ltd. v. Medcalfe, 162 So.2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
510. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.36(f).
511. 167 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
512. In granting a motion for a summary judgment, like (sic) in granting a mo-
tion for a directed verdict at trial, the trial court determines that there are no
genuine issues of a material fact that ought to be tried and as a matter of law the
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Discretion plays no real role in the grant of summary judgment:
the grant of summary judgment must be proper under the above
principles or the grant is subject to reversal. The trial court
may, however, exercise a sound discretion in denying summary
judgment where, although the movant may have technically
shouldered his burden, the court is not reasonably certain that
there is no triable issue of fact; where a portion of an action
may be ripe for summary judgment but it is intertwined with
another claim(s) that must be tried; and in certain other
situations.5
13
However, the Third District Court of Appeal on an interlocutory
appeal by a defendant from a combined order denying its motion to
dismiss the complaint and its motion for summary judgment, stated514
in affirming the trial court's decision, that:
.. .to determine if the chancellor erred in the denial of the
motion for summary judgment [or decree], it is incumbent
upon the appellant to demonstrate that there were no issues of
material fact and that it was entitled to a summary judgment
[or decree] as a matter of law.515
The test applied by the court appears to be a mechanical one not requiring
the appellant to demonstrate that there has been an abuse of judicial
discretion, but merely to show the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, and his right to a judgment in his favor under the applicable sub-
stantive law.
N. Relief From Final Orders, Judgments, or Decrees
The interpretation of Rule 1.38(b), which was added to the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1962,51 has formed the basis of a number of
opinions emanating from the district courts during the survey period.
The Florida Rule is substantially analogous to Federal Rule 60(b)5 '
except for the omission of the omnibus clause contained in the latter,51
and, as might be expected, in interpreting its various provisions, Florida
courts have freely adverted to cases and texts construing similar pro-
visions of the Federal Rule.
The Rule provides five grounds upon which a party or his legal
matter is well founded; no discretion is involved. Id. at 85. See also, Dean v.
Goldcoast Theatres, Inc., 156 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
513. 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 56.15(8), at 2440-2441 (2d ed. 1965).
514. Dade County v. Ray, 166 So.2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
515. Ibid.
516. In re Fla. R. Civ. P., 139 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1962).
517. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
518. Federal Rule 60(a) (6) provides for relief by motion practice from a final judgment
for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." See Barns &




representative may, upon such terms as are just, move for relief from a
final order, judgment or decree:
(1) where the judgment has been entered as a result of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,
(2) where there is newly discovered evidence which by due dili-
gence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial or rehearing,
(3) where there has been fraud, misrepresentation or other mis-
conduct by an adverse party,
(4) where the judgment is void,
(5) where the judgment or decree has been satisfied, released
or discharged, or a prior judgment or decree upon which it
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the motion or decree should have pro-
spective application.
A motion under 1.38(b) should be made within a reasonable time,
and if on the basis of one of the first three grounds, not more than a
year after the judgment, decree, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
Thus, the Rule does not grant a year in which to seek relief under one of
the first three enumerated grounds, but requires that the motion be made
"within a reasonable period," and in specified instances defines a year
as the outside limit of what constitutes a reasonable period. In Odum v.
Morningstar,51 the defendant moved to set aside a decree pro confesso
on grounds of mistake or inadvertence within nine months of the entry of
a final decree, but stated no grounds for his delay. The district court
held that since the plaintiff made no showing of laches, and since the
proceedings against the defendant were ex parte, it was assumed that the
defendant acted with reasonable promptness.
Although Florida Rules 2.9520 and 3.952 provide for the entry of
default judgments and decrees pro confesso respectively, the Florida
rules contain no counterpart to Federal Rule 55(c)52 relating to the
setting aside of a default, nor has there been any statute for that purpose
since 1955 when section 50.-10 of the Florida Statutes was repealed.523 Now
the common law of the state as it had previously existed5 24 in relation
to the vacation of defaults has been revived. The revival does not apply
to those portions of the Waterson v. Seat,525 doctrine dealing with terms
519. 158 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
520. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.9.
521. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.9.
522. FED. R. Civ. P. 55 (c).
523. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29737.
524. Waterson v. Seat, 10 Fla. 326 (1863).
525. Ibid.
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of court as bearing on the time within which a motion to vacate a default
must be made, since this subject was dealt with expressly by Rule 1.6
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure."'8 The repeal of the statute relating
to the vacation of default judgments and the reversion to the common
law abrogated prior decisions holding that under the statute a showing
of "gross abuse" of the trial court's discretion was a prerequisite to
reversal of a ruling upon a motion to vacate.
The rules of procedure were liberalized by the adoption of 1.38(b).
Cases construing its federal counterpart have leaned toward liberality
based upon the objective of the rules to make legal procedure "...
the vehicle for determination of the issues upon their merits instead of
upon refinements of procedure, though limited to the extent that litigants
and counsel are not allowed with impunity to disregard the processes of
the court." '527
The purpose of the rule is to assure a party claiming in good faith
to have a good and substantial defense to an action.2 an opportunity to
be heard, and the trial courts should exercise the power vested in them
liberally in order to achieve this result.5 29
"Although it is well settled that default judgments may not be set
aside for a party guilty of gross negligence, the precise circumstances
constituting excusable neglect, mistake or inadvertence is not well defined,
but depends upon all the factors in a case."53 0 The federal cases give
strong consideration to whether the original cause has been litigated,
and often grant relief for inadvertence of counsel in failing to file an
answer under factual situations not warranting relief, and for inadver-
tence occurring after the trial of a cause. Factors commonly considered
526. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.6(c).
The period of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding
shall not be affected or limited by the continued existence or expiration of a term of
court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the
power of a court to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which is
and has been pending before it.
See North Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1962) ; Evans v. Hydeman, 168
So.2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
527. Florida Inv. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., 160 So.2d 733, 736 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1964). (Emphasis original.)
528. A party who moves to vacate a judgment or decree entered against him by default
must show in addition to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, that he has a meritorious
defense to the claim asserted against him.
[T]he power and discretion of the court to grant such relief [pursuant to 1.38(b)] is
not unbridled and cannot be invoked as a matter of right, but is to be exercised
within the limits of judicial discretion. The power thus granted may properly be
used to prevent manifest injustices, but a prerequisite is a showing of the existence
of grounds justifying its exercise.
Butler v. Butler, 172 So.2d 899, 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Florida Inv. Enterprises, Inc. v.
Kentucky Co., 160 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). See 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 60.19,
p. 223 (2d ed. 1955).
529. See e.g., Evans v. Hydeman, 168 So.2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), and the state and
federal cases cited therein.
530. Florida Inv. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., supra note 527, at 737.
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are the size of the judgment, the length of time after being in default
before judgment is applied for and entered, and the diligence of the de-
faulting party in moving to set aside judgment."'
As indicated, what constitutes such a mistake, inadvertence or ex-
cusable neglect as to warrant the vacation of a default judgment or decree
is essentially a factual inquiry dependent upon the peculiar circumstances
of each particular case. On appeal, an order granting a motion to vacate
a decree pro confesso was affirmed 82 where the record revealed that the
defendant had filed a timely motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint
later in the same day on which the clerk had erroneously entered a decree
pro confesso. It is clear that to enter a final decree against a defendant
on the mistaken idea that he is in default for failure to defend is a
mistake, and squarely within the purview of the relief afforded by
Rule 1.38(b)(1).
Similarly an order vacating a judgment of dismissal was affirmed58 on
the defendant's appeal from an adverse judgment entered on a jury
verdict. The affidavit supporting the motion recited that the plaintiff's
attorney had been out of town on several occasions after the suit was
filed because of a death in his family, that he had been occupied with
these affairs and had neglected to ask for an extension of time within
which to file an amended complaint. The affidavit further asserted that
the cause would be forthwith prosecuted. The district court held that
the defendant had failed to demonstrate the gross abuse 34 of judicial
discretion required for an appellate court to reverse the trial court's
granting of a motion to open a default judgment.
An order denying a motion for relief under 1.38(b) was affirmed
on appeal where it was apparent "that the matters attempted to be
brought to the attention of the trial judge in the common law action could
have been available to the movant during the trial proceedings. '53 5
531. Ibid.
532. Odum v. Morningstar, 158 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
533. Houston Corp. v. Hofmann, 161 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
534. But see Florida Inv. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., supra note 527, which held
that the abrogation of FLA. STAT. § 50.10 (1953) in 1955 likewise repealed prior decisions
holding that under the statute a showing of gross abuse of the trial court's discretion was a
prerequisite to reversal of a ruling upon a motion to vacate. Since "the discretion of the court
in setting aside should be liberally exercised toward the result that parties claiming a sub-
stantial defense to the action may have an opportunity to have the cause determined upon
its merits rather than upon procedural technicalities," (Id. at 738) it appears that a party
appealing from an order granting such a motion will have substantially more difficulty in
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion than one appealing from an order
denying a motion under 1.38(b). In the Florida Investment Enterprises case, the district
court had erroneously denied a motion to vacate a default and final judgment where the record
affirmatively showed that the defendant had been in default only 7 days when the adverse
final judgment was entered, that the judgment was for a substantial sum, that the defen-
dant's attorneys had been active in the case (although the trial judge was not so advised),
and that the plaintiff's attorney did not notify defense counsel of his application for default
and final judgments although all of the attorneys involved practiced in the same city.
535. Shongut v. Malnik, 173 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the adminis-
trator of the estate of a deceased co-pilot of an aircraft piloted by the
plaintiff's deceased. When the administrator failed to answer or plead
to the complaint a default judgment was entered against him. In June
the cause was set for trial on September 21. In August, the plaintiff
served the administrator with a copy of the notice of the taking of a
deposition of a witness. Four days before the scheduled date of the trial,
the co-pilot's widow moved for the court to remove the cause from the
trial calendar. She alleged that she had not been notified of the pending
suit, had just recently learned of the administrator's failure to answer
the complaint, and had petitioned the county judge's court for the removal
of the administrator and for her appointment as personal representative.
The widow's motion was denied and the cause was reset for trial in
December. In October, certain attorneys who allegedly represented the
widow in her capacity as administratrix cum testamento annexo de bonis
non of her deceased husband's estate filed a "notice of appearance" in
the cause. Subsequently, the administratrix' motion to set aside the de-
fault judgment was granted by the trial court. On appeal, 86 the district
court sustained the plaintiff's contention that in vacating the default the
trial court had grossly abused its discretion. If a party is guilty of gross
neglect, a default will not be opened. While it was true that the neglect
was by the defendant's predecessor, and that the defendant moved
promptly upon succeeding to the position of personal representative of
the estate, the plaintiffs were not responsible for the default and gross
negligence. The widow's remedy, if any, was against the prior adminis-
trator and the sureties on his bond, if any.537
Under the fifth provision of Rule 1.38(b), relief may be had from
decrees where ". . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment or
decree should have prospective application." Federal courts construing
the identical provision of Federal Rule 60(b) have generally applied
this portion of the Rule, or permitted its use, in injunctive proceedings
where changed circumstances would render it inequitable to permit the
injunctive decree to have prospective application.5 31 When relief is sought
pursuant to this provision there is an implied admission of the validity of
the original decree from which relief is sought, and the basis of the motion
is that changed circumstances have arisen since the decree that would
make it inequitable to force it, or to give it, prospective application.3 9
The purpose of the rule was to allow "motion procedure" in
lieu of a bill of review as known to the classical equity practice,
and the rule may be more liberal than the classical bill; such
motion does not affect the finality of the final decree or suspend
536. Sugar v. Blek, 172 So.2d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
.537. See 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE, § 60.26(4) (2d ed. 1955).
538. Tepley v. Key, 158 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
539. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, and bills in the nature of a bill of review,
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its operation as does a timely motion for a rehearing under Rule
3.16 . . . A denial of the motion is appealable as a final de-
cree, but such appeal will not bring up for review the final
decree sought to be vacated; if the motion is granted, the order
is an interlocutory order, which when in equity, is appealable as
such ... unless the court's action on granting of motion meets
the test of finality, in which event it is appealable as a final
judgment or decree. 7 Moore's Fed. Practice, 2d ed., § 60.30.
540
Nevertheless, this Rule does permit an independent action to set
aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.
541
A trial court has control over its judgments and decrees until
they become final . . . .But the power and discretion of the
court to grant such relief is not unbridled and cannot be invoked
as a matter of right, but is to be exercised within the limits of
judicial discretion.542
When a judgment has been appealed and reversed or affirmed, the
subsequent judgment is that of the appellate court, and the permission
of that court must be obtained before the filing of an independent action
to review the same because of alleged fraud or a similar ground.543
Prior to the amendment of Rule 1.38 in 1962 to include subsection (b),
it was also necessary to secure the permission of the appellate court
whose judgment was sought to be reviewed before filing a bill in the
nature of a bill of review.5 44 A recent case decided under the analogous
Federal Rule 60(b) held that trial courts do not have jurisdiction to
entertain either an independent action, or a motion to review a judgment
which has been affirmed on appeal without leave having first been
obtained from the appellate court.545
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment or decree
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38(b); Shongut v. Malnik, 173 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Irving v.
Irving, 157 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) ; State v. Anderson, 157 So.2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
540. Odum v. Morningstar, 158 So.2d 776, 778 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). See also FLA. R. Crv.
P. 1.38(b); Shongut v. Malnik, supra note 539.
541. Southern Ry. Co. v. Wood, 171 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965), was an FELA action
in which it appeared that the trial court had mistakenly withdrawn from the jury's considera-
tion the question of the decedent's employment, and that consequently judgment for the
plaintiff on a jury verdict might have been erroneously entered. Since the time for filing a
motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38(b) had not yet expired,
the district court on its own motion temporarily relinquished jurisdiction of the cause to the
trial court for the purpose of receiving and disposing of such a motion, if any. "The ends of
justice under the law dictate that an opportunity be afforded in the trial court to cure the
error, if any resulting under the circumstances. . . " Id. at 617.
542. Butler v. Butler, 172 So.2d 899, 901-02 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
543. State v. Anderson, 157 So.2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
544. Alford v. Nunez, III So.2d 425 (Fla. 1959).
545. Geuder, Paeschke & Frey Co. v. Clark, 280 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1961).
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0. Transfers of Actions
1. AMENDMENTS
Subsection (b) of Rule 1.39 has been amended 46 to refer to Rule
1.13(j) instead of Rule 1.39(a) to established a uniform practice on
transfers between courts within a county,5 47 as compared with transfers
between the law and equity sides of the same court which is the subject
matter of Florida Rule 1.39(a). Subsection (b) now reads:
If it should appear at any time that an action is pending in the
wrong court of any county it may be transferred to the proper
court within said county by the same method as provided in
Rule 1.13(j).
In accordance with the policy that all general procedure statutes
should be incorporated in the rules, 548 subsection (c), which has been
added to Rule 1.39, transfers to that rule much of section 53.17"'9 of the
Florida Statutes. Subsection (c) provides:
When any action is filed laying venue in the wrong county or
district, the court may transfer the action to the proper court
in any county or district where it might have been brought in
accordance with the venue statutes in the same manner as pro-
vided in Rule 1.13(j). When the venue might have been laid
under the venue statutes in two or more counties or districts,
the person bringing such action may select the county or district
to which the action is transferred; but if no such selection is
made, the matter shall be determined by the court.
2. LAW V. EQUITY
When a chancellor determines that a plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law, the express provisions of Rule 1.39(a) 5 ° require that the
cause "shall be forthwith transferred to the proper side [of the court]
and proceeded with without interruption." In such cases dismissal of the
complaint, with or without prejudice, is procedurally improper.
55'
The plaintiff filed suit in chancery alleging the existence of a part-
nership between the parties, and praying for dissolution and an account-
ing. On final hearing the chancellor determined that no partnership had
existed between the parties, and upon further consideration, entered an
order to the effect that the plaintiff had not proved a cause of action in
546. 1965 REvisioN, at 27.
547. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1135 (1965).
548. See the nn. to Rule 1.35, Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39
FLA. B.J. 1132, 1135 (1965).
549. FLA. STAT. § 53.17 (1965).
550. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.39(a); Giovannielli v. Lacedonia, 117 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965).
551. Olkap Realty -Corp. v. Dade Meat Packing Corp., 158 So.2d 768 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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equity. The court thereupon transferred the cause to the law side of the
court with leave to the plaintiff to there file an amended complaint.
The amended complaint at law alleged substantially the same
ultimate facts alleged in the prior complaint in equity, and then alleged
facts upon which the plaintiff sought damages for the reasonable value
of his services to the defendant. From a final judgment holding that his
claim was barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiff appealed. It
appeared that the original complaint in equity had been filed within the
applicable one-year statute of limitations,552 but that the amended com-
plaint had been filed in the law action after the one-year period had run.
The district court held that under the provisions of Rule 1.15(c),55
the amended complaint in the action at law related back to the date upon
which the plaintiff filed his original complaint in chancery.
[T]he proper test of relation back of amendments is not
whether the cause of action stated in the amended pleading is
identical to that stated in the original (for in the strict sense
almost any amendment may be said to be a change of the original
cause of action), but whether the pleading as amended is based
upon the same specific conduct, transaction, or occurrence be-
tween the parties upon which the plaintiff tried to enforce his
original claim. If the amendment shows the same general factual
situation as that alleged in the original pleading, then the
amendment relates back-even though there is a change in the
precise legal description of the rights sought to be enforced, or a
change in the legal theory upon which the action is brought.
54
An interesting question, not in terms answered by Rule 1.39(a), is
presented when the claim for equitable relief in a suit properly com-
menced in chancery either is later abandoned by the plaintiff, or it is
found impracticable to award the equitable relief sought, but the plaintiff
is found entitled to recover damages in lieu thereof. Should the chancellor
transfer the cause to the law side of the court, or, following the traditional
maxim in that "equity does not do justice by halves," should he take
testimony and award damages? Rule 1.39(a) requires transfer only "if
at any time it appears that an action has been commenced either in equity
or at law when it should have been brought on the opposite side of the
court."
In McSwiggan v. Edson,"" the defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint and to transfer the cause to the law side of the court "upon
the ground that the same does not state a ground for relief in equity."
The motion to dismiss was granted with leave to amend. The defendants
552. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(7) (1965).
553. Kell v. Brown, 162 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
554. Id. at 323.
555. 172 So.2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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again moved to dismiss and to transfer to the law side of the court an
amended complaint which the plaintiff had filed in response to the original
order. The latter motions were denied and the plaintiff thereafter moved
for leave to file a second amended complaint and to have the cause trans-
ferred to the law side of the court. On an interlocutory appeal from an
order granting the plaintiff's motions the defendants argued inter alia
that the trial court had erroneously transferred the cause to the law side
on the theory that "where suit is properly commenced in equity it may
not be transferred to the law side under rule 1.39(a) F.R.C.P. even
though thereafter it is stripped of its equities leaving only matters cog-
nizable at law."55 Without regarding the merits, the district court held
that the defendants were estopped from objecting to the transfer for the
reason that they had twice sought, and had induced, the trial court's
complained-of action by arguing at the outset that the cause was not
properly in equity.
In Sangster v. Boca Raton Sun & Surf, Inc.,557 suit was brought al-
ternatively for specific performance or rescission of certain contracts, or
for damages for their breach. At the beginning of the trial, the plaintiffs
abandoned their prayer for equitable relief and elected to proceed on the
basis of a breach of contract and claim for damages. Nevertheless, a
lengthy hearing was held in the equity court which resulted in dismissal
of the complaint because the plaintiffs created an untenable situation by
retaining their deeds pending a decision on the merits. On appeal, the
district court reversed and held that the trial court, which had not ruled
on the question of liability, should transfer the cause to the law side of
the court and proceed to determine if there was a breach of the contracts
constituting injury to the plaintiffs for which the defendants would be
liable, and if so, to determine the damages.
West Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Hurley,"' involved a suit by a
subcontractor to foreclose an alleged lien on the defendant's real property.
By order of the court, the general contractor was joined as a party de-
fendant.559 Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint in
which it alleged, in part, that in another cause pending before the court
the general contractor had posted a bond "in substitution of the lien
herein sought to be foreclosed." The real property owner moved for a
summary decree and the general contractor moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on the grounds, among others, that it affirmatively appeared that
the plaintiff had failed to bring proceedings to foreclose the alleged lien
within a period of one year from the date of the filing of said lien as re-
556. Id. at 491.
557. 167 So.2d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
558. 168 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
559. Pursuant to the provisions of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.18.
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quired by the applicable statute.560 The chancellor granted the summary
final decree and dismissed the suit as to the general contractor "without
prejudice however to any right which the plaintiff may have against the
said defendant or the bond filed for transfer of plaintiff's lien to bond in
substitution of the real property." On the plaintiff's appeal, the district
court held on rehearing that the record indicated that the plaintiff's suit
to foreclose the lien had in fact been timely instituted, and that when
the surety bond was posted the equitable lien against the real estate be-
came substituted with the obligation of the principal and surety on the
bond so that any default which would support a suit to foreclose the
lien would, by operation of law, be converted to a cause of action against
the obligors on the bond. Therefore, proceedings against the general con-
tractor could properly lie on the law side of the court, and the trial court
should have given consideration to such transfer as is provided in Rule
1.39(a).
3. TRANSFERS BETWEEN COURTS
Rule 1.39(b) 5"' provides for the transfer of a cause to the court in
the same county in which it should have been brought if at any time it
appears that a suit is pending in the wrong court of that county. Where
transfer is based on the jurisdictional amount, a court is bound by the
good faith claim of a litigant. 62 In Rocco v. Coffey,56 a physician mis-
takenly diagnosed a foetus as a tumor, for the removal of which he per-
formed an operation upon the plaintiff-wife. In a subsequent malpractice
suit against the doctor the trial judge at pre-trial conference announced
that he had examined the depositions of the plaintiffs and the answers to
interrogatories in the court file, and was of the opinion that the plaintiffs'
good faith claim could not reasonably amount to $10,000.00 or more so
as to bring the case within the circuit court's jurisdiction. He therefore
dismissed the complaint and transferred the cause to the court of record.
The plaintiffs sought certiorari to review this order on the ground that it
constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law. In grant-
ing the writ, the district court held that "the jurisdiction of. . . [the]
Circuit Court depends not upon the amount of damages which is actually
recoverable as a matter of law, but rather by the sum in good faith de-
manded or actually put in controversy."5 " The court concluded that
based on the facts in the record the amount actually recoverable was a
jury question, and that a jury might well find that plaintiffs' damages
exceeded the minimum required to invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit
court.
560. FLA. STAT. § 84.221(1) (1965).
561. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.39(b), as amended, 1965 Revision, at 27.
562. Miami Athletic Club v. Morency, 158 So.2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
563. 163 So.2d 21 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
564. Id. at 23.
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II. ACTIONS AT LAW ONLY
A. Jury Trials
1. WAIVER
The absolute right to a jury trial exists only in those cases for which
it has been declared by the Florida Constitution or by statute. "65 In other
cases jury trials are permissive, not mandatory.66 Even when an absolute
right to a jury trial exists, it may be waived by failure to make a timely
demand.56 7 After such a waiver, the right to a jury trial is discretionary
with the court.5 68 Where an appeal is taken from an order either granting
or denying a tardy demand for a jury trial, the appellant carries the
heavy burden of having to demonstrate an abuse of judicial discretion.
In affirming 69 the denial of such a motion made by the defendants more
than two months after they had answered the complaint, the district court
noted, inter alia, that the case had already been docketed for trial, and
that granting the motion would have resulted in a postponement of the
trial date with possible inconvenience to both the plaintiff and the court.
The right to a trial by jury is a deeply cherished and
jealously guarded fundamental precept. It will not be taken
away when injustice would be the result. However, our rules
do require of a litigant to have this right that he make a simple,
unsophisticated, short written demand for it either in his plead-
ing, or separately, within ten days after service of the last plead-
ing. If he doesn't ask for it then, the court and his opponent
may deem it waived and arrange their affairs accordingly.
When this almost effortless prerequisite is not met, the tardy
litigant must demonstrate that the award of a jury trial will not
only be an accommodation of his desires but also will impose
no injustice on his adversary and further will not unreasonably
inconvenience the court in the performance of its duties. 7 °
The defendant in an action for damages arising out of a rear-end
collision appealed from an adverse judgment and assigned as error the
denial of his motion for a new trial. In their complaint, the plaintiffs had
565. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.1(a).
566. Brownstone, Inc. v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 165 So.2d 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). Among
the errors assigned on the defendant's appeal from an adverse judgment in proceedings sup-
plementary to execution was the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for a jury trial.
The district court based its affirmance of the propriety of the order denying the jury trial on
two grounds: (1) the right to institute the proceedings was based upon the enactment of a
special statute which did not require a jury trial, and (2) the defendant's request came so
late in the proceedings (about six months after the commissioner had finished taking testi-
mony) that its refusal by the trial judge did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
567. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.1(b), (d); Wertman v. Tipping, 166 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1964); Brownstone, Inc. v. Miami Nat'l Bank, supra note 566.
568. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Goddard, 177 So.2d 555 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Wert-
man v. Tipping, supra note 567.
569. Wertman v. Tipping, supra note 567.
570. Id. at 667-68 (Footnote omitted).
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demanded a jury trial. After personal service of the complaint and sum-
mons upon the defendant, a default "for failure to answer or otherwise
plead" was entered against the defendant. Thereafter, a hearing on the
issue of damages was had before the court sitting without a jury and re-
sulted in the judgment appealed. The district court reversed.571 As this
was a case of first impression, the court noted that other states' courts
construing rules or statutes analogous to Rule 2.1(d), which provides
that "a demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be
withdrawn without the consent of the parties," have been divided on the
qpestion of whether the defendant's default amounts to either a waiver
of his right to a jury trial or an implied consent to a non-jury trial. Fed-
eral courts interpreting the analogous federal rule172 have likewise been
split, but the majority of the federal courts have adopted the view that
it is the better, if not actually compulsory practive, to submit the issue as
to damages following the entry of a default judgment to a jury when a
jury trial has previously been demanded by a party. It was therefore con-
cluded that:
Since the right to a trial by jury is constitutionally pro-
tected and guaranteed, we think it more reasonable to conclude
that if . . . [the defendant] is to be precluded a jury trial on
the question of damages, it should be upon an affirmative show-
ing that he has either consented to . . . [the plaintiffs'] with-
drawal of their demand for jury trial, or that his conduct in law
constitutes a waiver. By this statement, we do not infer that a
person who might otherwise be protected in his constitutional
rights to a trial by jury cannot effectively waive such rights as
he could other constitutional rights which he possesses. We do
say, however, that waiver by implication in these circumstances
must be more than a mere failure to appear and contest the
issues of the case. 78
In Olin's, Inc. v. Rader,574 one of two defendants appealed from an
adverse judgment. It appeared that none of the parties had initially re-
quested a jury trial, but that counsel had subsequently orally moved the
court for a severance of the cause and for a jury trial. The motion for
severance was denied, but the jury trial was granted. However, before
the cause was tried, another judge entered an order directing that the
cause proceed as a non-jury case.
The district court held that the second judge had abused his dis-
cretion in setting aside a prior order by another judge of the same court
which had granted a jury trial. The record did not indicate the basis
for the later order. Although a successor or interim judge can overrule
571. Loiselle v. Gladfelter, 160 So.2d 740 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
572. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
573. Loiselle v. Gladfelter, supra note 571, at 742.
574. 161 So.2d 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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or modify prior orders of another judge of equal jurisdiction, this is
permitted only upon the basis that different or special conditions or cir-
cumstances exist which warrant a modification or reversal. The record
in the case at bar did not indicate such special circumstances and it was,
therefore, an abuse of discretion.
The plaintiff filed suit for rescission of a stock purchase agreement
with the defendant, or in the alternative, for damages for the defendant's
alleged breach of the agreement. The defendant answered and counter-
claimed, inter alia, for the imposition of an equitable lien in his favor
upon the stock. Upon the defendant's appeal from an order denying her
alternative motion either to dismiss the complaint, or to transfer the
cause from the equity to the law side of the court for failure to state a
claim for relief cognizable in equity, the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed 7 5 the lower court's action for the nebulous-and, it is submitted,
erroneous-reason that
the jurisdiction of equity may not be divested by the party
seeking its assistance.
The defendant, in her counterclaim, sought to invoke the
equitable jurisdiction of the court. . . . By so doing, she
waived her right to object to the jurisdiction of the equity court
to assess the plaintiff's damages." 6
Florida procedure 7 7 requires a defendant to assert any claim, legal or
equitable, that he may have against the plaintiff arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence, or to thereafter forfeit his right to prosecute
such claim. It is therefore submitted that a defendant ought not to be
found to have waived his right to assert that the plaintiff's only right to
relief, if any, is by an action at law, in which the defendant could demand
a jury trial merely because his answer contains a compulsory counter-
claim that is equitable in nature. To so hold defeats the object of the
rules which is to release justice from the chains of form, and leaves the
defendant in the untenable position of having to elect between his right
to assert a compulsory counterclaim and his constitutionally protected
right to a jury trial. Not only is such an illiberal decision inconsistent
with the doctrine enunciated by the Florida Supreme Court in Hightower
v. Bigoney,57 8 but such a construction of Rule 1.13(1) probably renders
it an unconstitutional abridgement of a protected right.
2. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES OF JURORS
On the trial of any civil cause in any court each party [is]
entitled to three peremptory challenges of jurors; provided, that
575. Fink v. Bluestein, 169 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
576. Id. at 336. (Footnotes omitted.)
577. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.13(a)




where the number of parties on opposite sides . . . are unequal,
[each side shall have] the same aggregate number of peremptory
challenges [to be divided as provided by the statute]."'
On the defendants' appeal from an adverse judgment in a negligence
action arising out of an automobile accident, the district court held
580
that the trial court had properly ruled that each side was entitled to six
peremptory challenges instead of three.
The quantity of peremptory challenges is determined by
the number and status of the parties on a side, and on consider-
ation of the issues as to them at the time of trial. . . . Dif-
ferent or additional issues applicable to two or more parties on
one side entitle them to the benefit of three challenges each as
provided for in the statute. Antagonistic or hostile positions
of two or more parties on one side will do likewise, but their
right to such challenges does not depend upon the presence of
hostility or antagonism. It is sufficient if their positions are dif-
ferent, or depend on different issues. The intent of the clearly
worded statute to accord three peremptory challenges to each
party on a side should be given effect unless it is made to appear,
at the time of trial, that their interests are common and their
positions in the cause the same."'
The trial court's erroneous statement that each of the parties was
entitled to three peremptory challenges of prospective jurors, when in
fact they were entitled to six, was not preserved for appellate review
where no objection was made to the statement. 82 Rule 2.6(a) provides:
(a) Adverse Ruling. For appellate purposes, no exception
shall be necessary to any adverse ruling, order, instruction or
thing whatsover said or done at the trial or prior thereto or
after verdict, which thing was said or done after objection made
and considered by the trial court, and which affected the sub-
stantial rights of the party complaining and which is assigned
as error.
583
The purpose of the rule is to give the trial judge a fair opportunity to
consider and rule upon the correctness of his statement.
B. Setting Cases for Trial
Former Rules 2.2, 2.3 and 3.12 have been repealed, 8 4 and replaced
by the following rule:
579. FLA. STAT. § 54.11 (1965).
580. Owen v. Bennett, 164 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
581. Id. at 545.
582. Rubin v. Gonzalez, 166 So.2d 167 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
583. FiA. R. Crv. P. 2.6(a). (Emphasis added.)
584. 1965 RmrvSION, at 17.
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Rule 2.2 Setting Cases for Trial
(a) When at Issue. An action is at issue after any
motions directed to the last pleading served have been disposed
of or, if no such motions are served, 20 days after service of the
last pleading.
(b) Notice that Cause is at Issue. Thereafter any party
may file and serve a motion that the action be tried and there-
upon the clerk shall notify the court and the action shall be set
for trial as provided in subdivision (c) of this rule.
(c) When Set. When the motion that the action be tried
is filed, the court shall set the action for trial and notify all
parties in writing of the trial date; provided no trial date shall
be less than thirty days from the service of notice of the trial
date unless all parties agree to a shorter time. An action shall
not be set for trial if the parties so stipulate, with the approval
of the court. By giving the same notice, the court may set a case
for trial of its own motion." 5
The new rule substitutes motion practice for the cumbersome docket
sounding procedure. Since it applies to cases both at law and in equity," 6
it would seem that it might have been more properly included among the
1.- rules. The new rule is designed to permit flexibility. "A judge who
wishes a hearing to set the action for trial may hold one, while the judge
who prefers to do it ex parte may do so. It protects the parties by the
30-day notice and clarifies the time when a case is ready for trial.
'5 8 7
C. Documentary Evidence
The provisions of Rule 2.5, relating to filing and marking documen-
tary evidence, have logically been transferred"' to Rule 1.37(e), the
general rule relating to matters of evidence.
D. Adverse Rulings
The defendant in a negligence action arising out of an automobile
collision appealed from an adverse final judgment and among other things,
assigned as error the denial of his motion for a mistrial based upon re-
marks concerning insurance made by counsel for the plaintiffs during the
voir dire examination of the jury. The district court held" 9 that objec-
585. Id. at 28.
586. Although the Committee Note to Rule 2.2, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1136 (1965), has been
deleted (1965 REVISION, supra note 584, at 17), it would appear from the language of the
rule-as well as from the former FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.12, relating to evidence and trial of suits
in equity-that it was intended to apply to the trial of claims generally.
587. Excerpt from the deleted Committee Note to Rule 2.2, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1136
(1965).
588. 1965 REvisioN, at 27, 28.
589. Alvarez v. Mauney, 175 So.2d 57 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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tions to the questions concerning insurance had been waived either by
the defendant's failure to object during the voir dire examination, 90 or
by the failure to move for a mistrial until after the jury was accepted.
E. Jury Instructions
On appeal from an adverse judgment in the second trial of a negli-
gence action the plaintiff challenged the propriety of certain instructions to
the jury relating to a certain Florida traffic law. The plaintiff contended
that the statute was inapplicable, and the defendants argued that the
questions sought to be raised in the instant appeal 'had been decided
adversely to the plaintiff on a prior appeal 91 from the decision in the
first trial of the same cause, and that the prior decision became the "law
of the case," which thereby precluded the plaintiff from relitigating the
same issues.
592
In sustaining the plaintiff's contention that an insufficient evidentiary
basis was established at the trial to warrant the objected-to instruction,
the district court rejected593 the defendants' argument as to the binding
effect of the law of the case. Although reversal of the lower court's judg-
ment was grounded on the fact that the circumstances presented on the
second appeal were materially different from those which had been pre-
sented on the first appeal, the court concluded that "Even if we now
should find that we were in error on that point of the case, we have power
to correct it, 594 and that they were not foreclosed from such reconsidera-
tion by the supreme court's decision 95 since the questions presented in the
instant appeal were not then presented or determined." 6
The defendants sought certiorari 97 to review the district court de-
cision on the basis of apparent conflicting supreme court decisions which
590. As previously noted, note 583 supra and accompanying text, FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(a),
dispenses with the necessity of excepting to an alleged erroneous statement or procedure in
the trial court only where the "thing was said or done after objection made and considered
by the trial court. . . ." In Miami Athletic Club v. Morency, 158 So.2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963), the defendant was precluded from obtaining appellate review of an alleged erroneous
interruption of the jury's deliberations by the trial court to admonish the jury that they must
shortly return a verdict or be discharged. The defendant had failed either to enter an objec-
tion at the time of the occurrence or to move for a new trial pursuant to FLA. R. CIv. P. 2.8.
591. Hendrick v. Strazzula, 125 So.2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960), quashed on cert. to the
Florida Supreme Court, 135 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1961).
592. The giving of the antipass instructions under the statute had been assigned as
error on the first appeal. However, on that appeal the appellate court without dis-
cussion declined to sustain the assignment, stating merely that "The remaining assign-
ment has been examined and we find no error."
Hendrick v. Strazzula, supra 125 So.2d, at 591. Strazzula v. Hendrick, 177 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.
1965).
593. Hendrick v. Strazzula, 168 So.2d 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
594. Id. at 161.
595. Supra note 593.
596. The giving of the anti-pass instructions was not reviewed in the certiorari proceed-
ings following the decision of the district court in the first appeal.
597. Strazzula v. Hendrick, 177 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1965).
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generated confusion and uncertainty. Although the supreme court con-
cluded that there were two distinct lines of cases relating to the doctrine
of the law of the case which conflicted sufficiently to invoke its direct
conflict jurisdiction, it discharged the defendants' petition for certiorari
since it reaffirmed, as the better view, its prior decision in Beverly Beach
Properties v. Nelson,"5' relied on by the second district in the instant
case, and receded from its view in Family Loan Co. v. Smetal 9 9 and the,
line of cases following it insofar as they might be construed as holding
that an appellate court is wholly without authority to reconsider and
reverse a previous ruling that was "the law of the case." As the court had
put it in the Beverly Beach Properties case,
We may change "the law of the case" at any time before we
lose jurisdiction of a cause and will never hesitate to do so if we
become convinced, as we are in this instance, that our original
pronouncement of the law was erroneous and such ruling re-
sulted in manifest injustice. In such a situation a court of justice
should never adopt a pertinacious attitude. 00
In espousing the doctrine of the Beverly Beach Properties case, the
Florida Supreme Court noted that it followed what appeared to be
the trend in other jurisdictions by recognizing that adminstration of jus-
tice requires some flexibility in the rules, but emphasized that
an appellate court should reconsider a point of law previously
decided on a former appeal only as a matter of grace, and not as
a matter of right; and an exception to the general rule binding
the parties to "the law of the case" at retrial and at all sub-
sequent proceedings should not be made except in unusual cir-
cumstances and for the most cogent reasons-and always, of
course, only where "manifest injustice" will result from a strict
and rigid adherence to the rule....
But the exception to the rule should never be allowed when
it would amount to nothing more than a second appeal on the
question determined on the first appeal.6"'
In the instant case the only question sought to be reviewed by certiorari
was the district court's power to reconsider the propriety of a challenged
598. 68 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1953).
599. 123 Fla. 900, 169 So. 48 (1936).
600. 68 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1953).
601. Strazzula v. Hendrick, 177 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965). Given as examples of "unusual
circumstances" justifying such reconsideration are: (a) Considerations of public policy, in
order to give effect to the law of a sister state as required under the full faith and credit clause
of the federal Constitution; (b) An intervening decision by a higher court contrary to the
decision reached on the former appeal, the correction of the error making unnecessary an ap-
peal to the higher court; and (c) A clear conviction of error (as opposed to mere doubt) on
a point of law that is certain to recur.
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jury instruction. The question of whether that power, if it existed, was
properly exercised under the facts of th case was not raised, so the
supreme court discharged the petition for the writ.
In spite of the unequivocal mandate of Rule 2.6(b)60 2 that
• ..No party may assign as error the giving of any charge un-
less he objects thereto at [the conference to settle the charges
to be given] ....
counsel for the litigants continue to waive their clients' right to challenge
on appeal the propriety of charges given to the jury by their failure to
make timely objections to the allegedly offensive charges.0 3
The failure of the trial court to properly instruct the jury may not
be initially raised in a motion for a new trial. Nor will a general objection
to the charges as given suffice to preserve for review, either on motion for
a new trial or for appeal, instructions which are alleged to be erroneous
for particular reasons.60 4 Similarly, if a party objects to an alleged erro-
neous instruction on one specific ground, he may not in his appeal assert
that the challenged instruction was incorrect for a reason other than that
previously asserted. In Henningsen v. Smith,6 0 5 the defendant objected
to certain jury instructions on the ground that insufficient evidence had
been adduced at the trial to support the charge. On appeal from an
adverse judgment entered on a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant
alleged that the same instructions incorrectly stated the law. The district
court found that the evidence at the trial raised issues justifying the
charges given, and also held that the defendant was precluded from
challenging the instructions for reasons not previously asserted in the
trial court.
Rule 2.6(b) F.R.C.P., 31 F.S.A., requires proper objection to
a charge given by the court where opportunity for such objec-
tion is afforded as a prerequisite to assigning the giving of such
charge as error on appeal. An objection which fails to state dis-
tinctly the portion or omission or failure to instruct to which
objection is made and the specific ground of such objection is




Where sufficient objections to particular instructions to the jury have
not been made during the trial, "the findings of the jury which have
602. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(b).
603. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Belle Isle Apartment Corp., 177 So.2d 884 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1965) ; Henningsen v. Smith, 174 So.2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Eicholz v. Frey, 173
So.2d 771 (Fla. 1965) ; Wofford Beach Hotel v. Glass, 170 So.2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Park
v. Belford Trucking Co., 165 So.2d 819 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
604. Park v. Belford Trucking Co., 165 So.2d 819 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
605. 174 So.2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
606. Id. at 86.
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been reviewed by the trial judge on motion for a new trial will not be
disturbed on appeal when there is substantial evidence to support the
verdict unless error of the trial judge in the instructions to the jury ap-
pears to have resulted in a miscarriage of justice."6 7
A limited exception to the necessity of objecting to an alleged erro-
neous jury instruction as a prerequisite to appellate review has de-
veloped where the challenged instruction is one given independently or
inadvertently by the court to the jury without prior notice to the objec-
tion of party. In Wofford Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Glass,6°8 the court mis-
takenly admitted into evidence an ordinance which, on its face, was in-
applicable to the facts of the case. It then inadvertently charged the jury
-after indicating that the instruction would not be granted-that viola-
tion of the ordinance would be evidence of negligence. Objection to this
instruction was not preserved in the record. On appeal from an adverse
judgment entered on a jury verdict for the defendant, the district court
nevertheless held: ". . . that an erroneously given instruction based
upon the introduction of an inapplicable ordinance was such fundamental
error that a fair trial could not have resulted and a new trial must be
granted.)
60 9
The rules require that before the failure to give a particular instruc-
tion can be assigned as error on appeal, the objecting party must have
filed a written request therefor in the trial court.610 However, even where
there may have been a request for an alleged erroneously omitted charge,
appellate review will still normally 'be precluded if the objecting party
fails to include in the record on appeal the requested charges that were
tendered to the trial judge.611
F. Exceptions Unnecessary to Orders on New Trial,
Directed Verdict, etc.
Rule 2.6(c) has been amended to omit the reference to nonsuits
because of the change in Rule 1.35 and now reads:
2.6(c) Orders on New Trial, Directed Verdicts, etc. It shall
not be necessary to object or except to any order granting or
denying motions for new trials, directed verdicts or judg-
ments non obstante verdicto, or in arrest of judgment to entitle
the party against whom such ruling is made to have the same
reviewed by an appellate court.
607. Rivers Body Orlando, Inc. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 167 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1964).
608. 170 So.2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
609. Id. at 64.
610. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(b); Rodriguez v. Haller, 177 So.2d 519 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965);
Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., 156 So.2d 543 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).





The last sentence has been added to Rule 2.7(a) "... to permit
the judge to direct a verdict without the useless formality of submitting
it to the jury. ' 612 That section now reads:
2.7(a) Effect. A party who moves for a directed verdict at
the close of the evidence offered by the adverse party may offer
evidence in the event the motion is denied without having re-
served the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion
had not been made. The denial of a motion for a directed verdict
shall not operate to discharge the jury. A motion for a directed
verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The order
directing a verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
2. IN GENERAL
A verdict should be directed only where all the facts are undisputed
and only one reasonable deduction may be made, or where the evidence
is legally insufficient to support the movant's case. Where there is a con-
flict in the evidence as to the facts, or when the undisputed facts are of
such a nature that reasonable men might draw different conclusions then
a jury question is presented. 1 "A case should not be withdrawn from
the jury's consideration unless as a matter of law no proper view of the
evidence could possibly sustain the position of the party against whom
the verdict is directed."614 In determining a motion for a directed verdict,
all inferences are resolved in favor of the party moved against.6 15 "The
party moving for a directed verdict admits not only the facts established
by the evidence, but also every conclusion favorable to the adverse party
that a jury might reasonably infer from the evidence... 1616
A verdict may properly be directed for a plaintiff where the proof
fully establishes his claim and where there is no evidence on which a
verdict for the defendant may lawfully be found.1 In order to support
612. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1136 (1965).
613. Isenberg v. Ortona Park Recreational Center, Inc., 160 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1964).
614. E.M.G. Leather Arts, Inc. v. Central Truck Lines, Inc., 165 So.2d 203, 204 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1964). Accord, Stanek v. Houston, 165 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Graham v.
Camp, 162 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
615. See, e.g., Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. McCahon, 168 So.2d 707 (Fla. 3 Dist.
1964); Hott v. Funk, 165 So.2d 792 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
Houston, supra note 62. This is the same test applied by an appellate court where the grant-
ing or denial of a motion for a directed verdict has been assigned as error on appeal. Security
Underwriting Consultants, Inc. v. Collins, Tuttle Inv. Corp., 173 So.2d 752 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965) ; Purdue v. Vogelsang, 166 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
616. Pahucki v. Armster, 161 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) quoting Cash v. Gates, 151
So.2d 838, at 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). Cf. Black v. Heininger, 163 So.2d 3 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1964); Hott v. Funk, 165 So.2d 792 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
617. Dade County Dairies, Inc. v. Projected Planning Co., 158 So.2d 565 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
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a directed verdict for the defendant, entered at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence, it should be clear that there is no evidence whatsoever that
could in law support a verdict for the plaintiff.618 Even if the facts as
outlined by the defendant are capable of belief, they are the defendant's
version and the plaintiff's version is the one that must be considered as
true for the purpose of deciding a defendant's motion for a directed
verdict.6
19
3. PRESUMPTIONS, INFERENCES AND EXPLANATIONS
The defendants sought certiorari 20 to review a decision of the
Third District Court of Appeal, which had reversed62' the trial judge
for submitting to the jury, for its determination as a matter of fact, the
question of whether the defendant's explanation as to how a rear-end col-
lision occurred was sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of
negligence. The defendant had testified that she had decelerated her
car, that when she was about two car lengths away from the car in front
she jammed on her brakes but that there must have been something in
the road, or else the brakes locked, so that she was unable to stop the
car in time. The defendant had also testified that she was prevented
from turning her car either into the left or right lanes by oncoming traffic
on the one side, and by a sidewalk on the other. The district court held
that the defendant's explanation of the accident was legally insufficient
to overcome the statutory presumption of negligence. In Pensacola
Transit Co. v. Denton,622 the first district had reversed the trial judge
because he directed a verdict and refused to submit the same question to
the jury for its determination. In granting certiorari and adopting the
position of the first district, the supreme court said:
It is not for appellate court judges-who are furnished only
with a cold typewritten or printed transcript of the testimony
and who are not privileged as is the trial judge and as are the
jurors to sit in the milieu of the nisi prius court-to determine
as a matter of law whether the explanation as to how an accident
occurred is sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence
when, as here, the defendant testifies positively that, in "taking
precaution" to avoid the collision, she decelerated and, in due
time, . . .623
The court further quoted from Judge D. Carroll's opinion in the Pen-
sacola Transit Co. case:
618. Security Underwriting Consultants, Inc. v. Collins, Tuttle Inv. Corp., 173 So.2d
752 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
619. Theriault v. Rogers, 166 So.2d 820 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
620. Stark v. Vasquez, 168 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1964).
621. Vasquez v. Stark, 155 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
622. 119 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
623. Supra note 620, at 142.
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We do not think a judge, with his limited powers in the field of
the determination of facts, can determine this question without
'climbing into the jury box,' so to speak, and encroaching upon
the exclusive domain of the jury." 4
In this connection one should note the effect of an explanation of the
accident by a defendant upon the presumption of negligence created 25
in a rear-end collision case.
Once the defendant explains what transpired or produces evi-
dence which "fairly and reasonably tends to show that the real
fact is not as presumed," the presumption dissipates and the
"jury must decide the case on the conflicting theories or facts,"
. . . unless, of course, the evidence is such that the jury could
not lawfully find for the defendant. If the defendant's explana-
tion is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence, as a
matter of law, the case should not be presented to the jury and
upon the plaintiff's motion a verdict should be directed for the
plaintiff. If, however, the evidence is such that reasonable men
could arrive at different conclusions the question of negligence
and contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury....
"When the matter goes to the jury in this posture it must be
without the aid of the presumption." Gulle v. Boggs, Fla. 1965,
174 So.2d 26.626
Since the presumption is dissipated by the explanation, and the case is
submitted to the jury upon conflicting theories or facts, it is improper
to instruct the jury on the presumption of negligence.
627
It is also interesting to compare presumptions with inferences. Take
for example the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Essentially, that doctrine is a rule of evidence. . . . Res ipsa
is sometimes said to raise a refutable presumption of
negligence, but under the law of this state and of some other
jurisdictions, it merely establishes a permissible inference which
may be rejected by the jury. Mr. Justice Thornal in Thomason
v. Miami Transit Company, Fla., 100 So.2d 620 said: "The
creation of a presumption would have the effect of making a
prima facie case without more. The creation of an inference
merely enables the jury to draw the inference and weigh it in
the balance with all of the other evidence." An inference is a
deduction from facts which reason dictates, but a presumption
is an arbitrary conclusion which the law directs to be made
from certain facts. . . . The application of the res ipsa doc-
624. Id. at 143 quoting Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton, supra note 623, at 297. Accord,
Guile v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1965), reversing Boggs v. Guile, 162 So.2d 286 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964).
625. McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
626. Baker v. Deeks, 176 So.2d 108, 110 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
627. Ibid.
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trine is not necessarily removed where an explanation is ob-




A party may not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict on appeal unless he has first moved for a directed verdict in
the trial court.6 29 As a general rule, a party who has moved for a directed
verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case will be precluded from
assigning the denial of the motion as error unless the motion has been
renewed at the conclusion of all of the evidence. There exists, however,
a recognized limitation to the general rule. Where the insufficiency of the
evidence constitutes plain error apparent on the face of the record which
if not noticed would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, an appellate
court may reverse a judgment entered on a jury verdict notwithstanding
the fact that no motion for a directed verdict was made at the conclusion
of all of the evidence.630
A defendant may not assign as error on appeal a verdict directed for
a co-defendant. Although the principle may first have been recognized
in regard to joint tortfeasors, it is not now limited to such situations.631
5. ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS FOR A RESERVED DIRECTED VERDICT
(JUDGMENT N.O.V.) AND FOR A NEW TRIAL
Where a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all of
the evidence is denied, the court is deemed to have submitted the action
to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal question raised
by the motion. Within ten days after the verdict has been received, or
within ten days after the jury has been discharged if no verdict was re-
turned, a party who has so moved for a directed verdict may move to
have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside, and to have
judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict.3 2
Such a motion may be joined with a motion for a new trial, or a new
trial may be prayed for in the alternative.633
Motions for judgment n.o.v., like motions for directed verdict,
628. Stark v. Houston, 165 So.2d 825, 827 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
629. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.7(a), (b); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Sellers, 161 So.2d 251 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1964).
630. Pickard v. Maritime Holdings Corp., 161 So.2d 239 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). See 2
BARRON & HoLTzoFr, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 1081 (1961).
631. Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Watson-David Ins. Co., 167 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964); Nutt v. James City, Inc., 162 So.2d 700 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Milks v. Wright, 161
So.2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
632. FLA. R. Crv. P. 2.7(b); City of Miami Beach v. O'Hara, 166 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964).
633. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.7(c) ; Flex v. Blair, 173 So.2d 518 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Gelfo v.
General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Co., 167 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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should be resolved with extreme caution, since the granting
thereof holds that one side of the case is essentially devoid of
probative evidence. . .. [Citations omitted.] The movant
admits all material facts as attested by his adversary and also
admits all inferences of fact favorable to the adversary that
reasonably might be drawn from the evidence as a whole. If
there is room for difference among reasonable men as to the
existence of a material fact sought to be established, or as to a
material inference which might reasonably be drawn from
established facts, the case should be submitted to the jury ... "'
"Unless the evidence as a whole points to only one possible con-
clusion, the trial judge is not warranted in setting aside a jury determina-
tion based on conflicting evidence." 35 However, "[i] t is a well established
rule that the trial court may direct a verdict upon a mixed question of law
and fact whenever the facts, as presented to the jury, upon their most
favorable interpretation to the party moved against are susceptible to
only one reasonable conclusion. '
H. New Trial
1. AMENDMENTS
There have been no substantive changes in the rules relating to new
trials. However, subsections (a), (b), and (f) have been more succinctly
and accurately restated. In subsections (a) and (b) the express reference
to summary judgments has been omitted and, presumably, these are now
included in the comprehensive phrase "matters heard without a jury."
The last sentence has been added to permit timely amendment of a
motion for a new trial. Subsection (f), relating to orders granting new
trials, now omits the reference to "actions tried by a jury" since new
trials are properly granted only in jury cases. In non-jury cases the
equivalent procedure is a rehearing. The reworded subsections read as
follows:
(a) Jury and Non-Jury Cases. A new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or a part of the issues. On
a motion for a rehearing of matters heard without a jury, the
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take ad-
ditional testimony and enter a new judgment.
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial, or a motion
for rehearing in matters heard without a jury or rehearing of
any motion for judgment provided for by these rules, shall be
634. Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms, Inc., 160 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
635. Beason v. Evans, 173 So.2d 516, 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). See also Gelfo v. General
Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Co., supra note 633.
636. Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 173 So,2d 492, 495 (Fla, 3d Dist.
1965).
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
served not later than 10 days after the rendition of verdict or
the entry of such judgment. A timely motion may at the discre-
tion of the court be amended to state new grounds at any time
before it is disposed of.
(f) Order Granting to Specify Grounds. All orders granting
a new trial shall specify the particular and specific grounds
therefor.
2. IN GENERAL
New trials should be cautiously granted. A "lower court should
generally grant a new trial only when the verdict was against the manifest
weight of the evidence and when '. . . the jury has been deceived as to
the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by con-
siderations outside the record. . . .' "61 A verdict should not be set
aside, thereby necessitating the retrial of a case, unless error sufficiently
grave as to appear prejudicial is disclosed. 88 However, as has frequently
been recognized by Florida cases, 6 9 trial courts are allowed a broad and
liberal discretion in granting a new trial, and an order granting one reaches
the appellate courts with a presumption of its correctness. Although an
appealing party must demonstrate an abuse of judicial discretion to re-
verse an order either granting or denying"4" a motion for a new trial, a
stronger showing is required to demonstrate an abuse of judicial discre-
tion sufficient to justify overturning an order granting a new trial than
is required to upset an order denying a motion.6 41 Nevertheless, it is well
established 642 that a trial court's judicial discretion is subject to appellate
review, and that an order entered in the exercise of such discretion will
be subject to reversal if an abuse thereof is shown. In Bell v. Tarwin,48
it was held that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new
trial in a negligence action that arose out of an automobile collision where
the verdict found ample support in the record, no illegal evidence was
shown to have gone to the jury, and all that could be accomplished was
to have another jury try the case.
Since, however, an order granting a new trial reaches the appellate
637. Love Realty Corp. v. O'Brien, 162 So.2d 532, 533, (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) quoting in
part, from the leading Florida case, relating to new trial motions, of Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d
669, 673 (Fla. 1959). See also Beason v. Evans, 173 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
638. FLA. STAT. § 54.23 (1965) ; Seaboard Airlines R.R. Co. v. McCutcheon, 158 So.2d 577
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
639. See, e.g., Ford v. Nathan, 166 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; Olsen v. Allied Fla.
Corp., 163 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Dupree v. Pitts, 159 So.2d 904 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
640. Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v. MacLaughlin, 171 So.2d 22 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
641. Billo v. Augella, 171 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Bell v. Tarvin, 163 So.2d 300
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; City of Clearwater v. McClury, 157 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
642. See, e.g., Bell v. Tarvin, 163 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964); Olsen v. Allied Fla.
Corp., supra note 3; Gager v. General Hosp. of Greater Miami, Inc., 160 So.2d 749 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964) ; State Road Dept. v. Falcon, Inc., 157 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
643. Supra note 642.
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court with a presumption of correctness, and represents an exercise of
judicial discretion, the burden is upon the appealing party to make the
reversible error clearly appear.644 Where the trial court bases its order
on only one of several grounds presented by the movant as a basis for a
new trial, the court's ruling does not inferentially overrule the others.
Rather, the court's action merely indicates that they are not considered
as controlling.645 By express statutory provision,64 6 however, an appel-
late court in considering the propriety of an order granting a new trial may
consider only those reasons stated by the trial court as a basis for its
order granting the new trial. If the trial court's ruling is sustainable on
any of the grounds so stated, it will not be overturned on appeal.
Ford v. Nathan,4 ' is an interesting case in which the plaintiff in an
automobile negligence action appealed from an order vacating a jury
verdict in his favor and granting the defendant's motion for a new trial.
Among the six grounds stated for the order was one to the effect that the
trial court had erred by failing to further instruct the jury, as requested
by the jury foreman, as to the verdict it should return in the event that it
found that the plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence. It
appeared that the jury had returned from its deliberations to ask for
additional information. At this time the jury foreman commented that
they had found both parties to blame, but they did not want to see the
plaintiff go without any compensation, and he therefore wanted to know
what form they should fill out. The court concluded that its prior instruc-
tions had been adequate and refused to further advise the jury. In affirm-
ing the order appealed, the district court found that the jury foreman's
extraordinary statement had afforded the trial court an almost unique
opportunity
to determine positively upon the trial record itself that a jury,
whose deliberations have traditionally been veiled in utmost
secrecy, is laboring under such a misunderstanding of the law
given it by the trial court, that one of the parties will likely be
deprived of their right to justice under the law.648
644. Erwin v. Chaney, 160 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964); City of Clearwater v. Mc-
Clury, supra note 641.
645. Ibid.
646. FLA. STAT. § 59.07(4) (1965), provides in part:
[U]pon appeal from any such order [granting a new trial] if taken under the statutes
providing for appeal from orders granting new trials, no other grounds than those
specified by the trial judge, as a basis for the order granting the new trial, shall be
considered as arguable upon said appeal.
See also, Miami Int'l Hatcheries, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 168 So.2d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964);
Gelfo v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 167 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
647. 166 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
648. Id. at 189. For a case dealing with timely objections to hearsay evidence see Miami
Int'l Hatcheries, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., supra note 646. See also Dean v. State Road
Dept., 165 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) in which the district court reversed a lower court
order granting the plaintiff a new trial. The plaintiff-road department had failed to object to
the evidence proffered by the defendant in an eminent domain proceeding as to the amount
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In innumerable cases a trial court's granting of a new trial has been
upheld on appeal upon the basis of the said court's inference from the
proceedings at the trial that the jury had been subjected to and affected
by some prejudicial influence.
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties, and on all
or a part of the issues. 649 In Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms, Inc.,65
it was held that although erroneously admitted testimony concerning
the plaintiff's earnings related directly only to the issue of damages, never-
theless the trial court had properly granted a complete new trial on the
issue of liability as well as on the issue of damages since the inadmissable
testimony had broadly tended to prejudice the defendants.
Where the alleged fundamental and prejudicial error relates only to
the issue of liability, a new trial may be granted on the question of
liability alone if the issue of liability is distinct and separable from the
issue of damages. Rule 2.8(a)
makes no distinction between the re-submission of the
damage question to a new jury following the granting of a
new trial and resubmission of the liability question. Indeed,
even in the absence of such authorizing rule or statute, the
majority rule is that a new trial may be limited to the question
of liability when it is clear that the course can be pursued with-
out confusion inconvenience or prejudice to the rights of any
party .... 51
The Florida Supreme Court followed the rule of the Larrabee case in
Purvis v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co.6 2 The district court reversed a
judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the trial court had im-
properly granted the plaintiff a partial summary judgment on the issue
of liability and remanded the case for a new trial upon the issues of liabil-
ity and damages.653 On plaintiff's petition for certiorari, the Florida Su-
preme Court quashed the district court decision insofar as the new trial
order included the damage issue. It concluded that on the re-trial the
judge could protect the defendant from being prejudiced by the separa-
tion of the liability and damage issues by proper instructions to the jury,
supervision of the trial process, and for that matter, by precluding any ref-
erence to the award of damages in the new trial.6"4
of severance damages or to the court's instruction to the jury that such damages were allow-
able, and the amount ultimately awarded by the jury was within the range and limits of
the testimony adduced.
649. FLA. R. CIV. P. 2.8(a). See Tolin Mfg. Corp. v. Roy Feiner Handbags, Inc., 173
So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
650. 160 So.2d 543 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
651. Larrabee v. Capeletti Bros., 158 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
652. 173 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1965).
653. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Purvis, 163 So.2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
654. There was also an opinion concurring in the result for the reason that the question
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3. NEW TRIAL ORDER MUST STATE GROUNDS
By the express provisions of section 59.07 (4) of the Florida Statutes
and Rule 2.8(f), an order granting a new trial "shall specify the partic-
ular and specific grounds therefor." The language both of the rule and
of the statute is mandatory, and Florida cases construing it so hold.655
Failure to state the grounds in an order granting a new trial constitutes
reversible error on an appeal from such an order.
In an action to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the
plaintiff's alleged wrongful eviction from his place of -business and for
alleged conversion of his merchandise, the district court held 5 that the
trial court had properly entered an amended order pursuant to Rule
1.38(a), stating the grounds on which it had granted the new trial eleven
days after the original order granting the defendants' motion for a new
trial. The original order was defective because it failed to specify the
ground or grounds upon which the order was based. The district court
found that Rule 1.38(a) provided for the correction of "clerical mistakes
in judgments, decrees or other parts of the record, and [that] errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court
at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after
such notice, if any, as the court orders." 7 The supreme court disagreed
as to the applicability of Rule 1.38(a). It held658 that the omission of
the ground for new trial was a judicial error-not a mere clerical ex-
pression-which could not be supplied after expiration of the time for the
trial court to act. Therefore the court felt such an omission could only be
corrected by one of the methods authorized under Rule 2.8.
4. THE NEED FOR SPECIAL VERDICTS
The Florida Supreme Court in Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc.,659
declared
that in all cases tried after the effective date of this opinion, and
in which the element of punitive damages against joint tort-
feasors is an issue for determination, a special or separate
verdict shall be used for the assessment of punitive damages
against each tortfeasor. Verdicts for compensatory damages
shall continue as at present to be joint and several .... 660
of damages had not properly been introduced by assignment of error or argued in the briefs,
but the concurring judge thought that ordinarily the ends of justice would be best served by
having the same jury determine both liability and damages.
655. See, e.g., Annis v. Gang, 160 So.2d 171 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
656. Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
657. Id. at 734.
658. Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So.2d 402 (Fla. 1965).
659. 182 So.2d 402 (Fla. 1965).
660. Id. at 403-404.
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5. INABILITY TO PERFECT RECORD FOR APPEAL
AS GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL
The plaintiffs appealed from a favorable judgment assigning nu-
merous errors relating to the inadequacy of the damages. However, they
were unable to complete their record on appeal because the deputy official
court reporter who attended the trial certified that he had inadvertently
destroyed a substantial portion of his notes which were material to the
errors assigned by the plaintiffs on their appeal. At the hearing on the
plaintiffs' motion for an order by the trial court it was established that
the loss of the reporter's notes was not caused by any lack of due diligence
on the part of any of the parties, and it further appeared that the parties
were unable to agree on a stipulated statement. 6 ' The plaintiff's attorneys
submitted a summarized statement representing the plaintiffs' recollec-
tion of the trial proceedings. 62 However, certain complex technical
testimony could not be reconstructed nor summarized in a narrative
statement to complete the record on appeal. The plaintiffs then moved
for an order either remanding the cause to the trial court with directions
to enter an order granting a new trial, or relinquishing jurisdiction to
the trial court to permit that court to hear the plaintiffs' extraordinary
motion for a new trial because of the court's inability to perfect the
record-on-appeal.
Since the particular problem presented appeared to be one of first
impression in Florida, the district court reviewed the decisions of other
jurisdictions, but concluded that the cases were irreconcilable. It held 63
that since it had acquired jurisdiction of the action on appeal it had in-
herent authority to award a new trial as an incident to its power to re-
quire that it be furnished a complete and accurate record on appeal,
where essential records had been destroyed by an official of the lower
court through no fault of the appellant. The court further held that such
power should be exercised where the loss was not discovered until after
appellate jurisdiction had attached and the record unequivocally estab-
lished the appellant's right to relief. Under the particular facts of the
case, it was therefore unnecessary to decide whether there might also
exist alternative procedures for obtaining relief in the same or similar
circumstances.
6. QUOTIENT VERDICTS
Florida does not recognize quotient verdicts. Technically, a quotient
verdict is a binding agreement among the jurors to be subsequently bound
661. FLA. App. R. 3.6(h) (1962 Revision).
662. This was the procedure prescribed by the Second District Court of Appeal in Thomas
v. State, 160 So.2d 119 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), where the notes of the deputy court reporter
assigned to the trial were illegible and the deputy reporter was no longer available. The ap-
pellant in that case moved to remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to grant a
new trial.
663. Van Scoyoc v. York, 173 So.2d 483 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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by the sum of the damages suggested by each juror divided by the number
of jurors. The prohibition in Florida appears to be broader. In Malone v.
Marks Bros. Paving Co.,6 4 it was held that the trial court had properly
found that the verdict had been arrived at in an illegal manner and had
properly granted the defendant's motion for a new trial. Attached to the
defendant's motion for a new trial were the affidavits of two jurors and
an insurance adjuster which stated that the jurors had agreed to be bound
before an average was reached. Upon subsequent polling, however, the
jurors stated that there was no such agreement before the figures were
submitted, but they all agreed that the verdict was the result of all of the
figures divided by the number six.
In sustaining the lower court's order, the district court held that any
such irregular method of arriving at a verdict as aggregating or averag-
ing was improper "for the reason that such verdicts do not represent
the independent opinion of each juror and this undermines and circum-
vents the deliberative process underlying the jury system.)"
6 5
7. EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE DAMAGES
AS A GROUND FOR A NEW TRIAL
One of the most frequently enunciated grounds in support of a
motion for a new trial is that the damages awarded by the verdict are
either excessive or inadequate--depending of course upon who is the
appellant.
Under the old common law, a motion for a new trial for inadequacy
of damages should not be granted,
. . . but the general rule now seems to be that a verdict for
grossly inadequate damages stands on the same ground as a
verdict for excessive or extravagant damages and that a new
trial may as readily be granted in the one case as in the other.
Such verdicts will not be set aside for the mere reason that they
are less than the Court thinks they should be. It must be shown
that the verdict was induced by prejudice or passion, some mis-
conception of the law or the evidence or it must be shown that
the jury did not consider all of the elements of damage involved,
missed a consideration of the issues submitted or failed to dis-
charge their duty as given them by the Court's charge.666
Absent a showing of vitiating circumstances it is assumed that the jury
considered all elements of damage.
6 7
664. 168 So.2d 753 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
665. Id. at 756.
666. Radiant Oil v. Herring, 146 Fla. 154, 200 So. 376 (1941), cited by the court in Shaw
v. Puleo, 159 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1964). Accord, Roberts v. Bushore, 182 So.2d 401 (Fla.
1966), reversing 172 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
667. City of Miami v. Smith, 165 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1964), reversing Smith v. City of
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Even though it is apparent that the verdict might have ex-
ceeded that awarded by the jury, this conclusion alone does not
warrant the granting of a new trial. Generally, in order to be
entitled to a new trial, it is incumbent upon an appellant [par-
ticularly when he received a favorable verdict in the trial court]
to demonstrate error on the part of the trial judge, but for which
he would have received an increased verdict from the jury.
668
However, neither the trial court nor the district court is precluded from
disturbing a verdict which has awarded such grossly inadequate damages
that it shocks the conscience of the court. 69
An appellate court may, of course, find that the damages awarded
either by a jury, or by a court sitting without a jury, were excessive,
where under the applicable rule of damages the record is lacking in
evidence to prompt or support the damages allowed. In Standard Oil Co.
v. Dunagan,670 the defendant in a negligence action to recover property
damages resulting from a defective gas tank installed on the plaintiff's
property appealed from an adverse judgment awarding the plaintiff
sixty-five thousand dollars. The case had been tried by the court sitting
without a jury. The district court held that the damages awarded were
not adequately supported by the record and reversed and remanded the
cause for a new trial on the issue of damages. In an action to recover
for permanent property damage, the measure of the damages recoverable is
the difference between the value of the property before the injury occurred
and the value afterwards. Evidence had been submitted to support an
award of twenty thousand dollars for permanent damage to the land,
but there was nothing in the record from which to determine the pecu-




It is well established in Florida that a trial judge may condition
an order granting a new trial on the ground of the excessiveness of the
damages awarded by the jury upon the non-acceptance by the plaintiff
of a remittitur in the amount awarded.672
Miami, 153 So.2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). Accord, Hayes v. Hatchell, 166 So.2d 146 (Fla.
1964), reversing Hatchell v. Hayes, 157 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
668. Stager v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 163 So.2d 15, 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
669. Roberts v. Bushore, 182 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1966), reversing 172 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1965). See Note, 20 U. MIAmi L. REV. 465 (1965).
670. 171 So.2d 622 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
671. There was a dissenting opinion which would have affirmed the award on the ground
that the trial on damages was fairly conducted, and the damages assessed ought not to shock
the conscience of the appellate court.
672. See, e.g., Gresham v. Courson, 177 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) ; Kight v. Wilson,




In an action against a landlord for malicious prosecution, the defen-
dant appealed from an adverse judgment entered on a jury verdict award-
ing the plaintiff four hundred fifty dollars compensatory and two thou-
sand dollars punitive damages. In the lower court, the defendant's motion
for a new trial had been denied on condition that the plaintiff agree to
a five hundred dollar remittitur of the punitive damages award. The
plaintiff agreed and the court entered an order that such compliance
"shall not be deemed to be a waiver or estoppel on her part insofar as
her right to cross-assign as error (in any subsequent appeal) that portion
of the order . . . which directed the plaintiff to enter the said remit-
titur." The district court disagreed.6 78 By electing to remit as an alter-
native to the granting of a new trial, the plaintiff cannot subsequently com-
plain of the trial court's action in requiring the remittitur. She was bound
by her action and could not conditionally accept the remittitur. The trial
judge could not confer upon her the right to appeal from the remittitur
order which she had voluntarily accepted.
The plaintiff sued to recover its pro rata share of a misappropriated
brokerage commission from the defendant, a former employee of the
plaintiff. During the trial, the testimony for the plaintiff clearly showed
that it was entitled to but eight hundred of the two thousand dollar com-
mission earned for the sale of a certain piece of real property, but the
jury, nevertheless, returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the full two
thousand. Thereupon, the lower court granted the defendant's motion
for a new trial on the ground, inter alia, that the verdict was excessive. On
plaintiff's appeal, the court reversed. Although the trial court was abso-
lutely correct in finding the verdict to be excessive, it erred in granting
a new trial instead of "ordering" a remittitur.114 The granting of a remit-
titur as an alternative for new trial, on the ground that the verdict was
so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience of the trial judge "involves
his consideration of the entire record . . .and on appeal from an order
granting a new trial for excessiveness, it is necessary to look to the record
to determine whether excessiveness, is disclosed.1675 Therefore, unless the
record presented is complete, appellate review of an order of remittitur
will be precluded.
The plaintiff brought two negligence actions against the defendants
to recover for the death of his infant son, while he was in the care of a
day nursery operated by the defendants. The plaintiff brought one action
as administrator of his deceased son's estate, and in another action the
plaintiff proceeded individually to recover for his son's wrongful death.
In the first action the plaintiff recovered a jury verdict for twenty-five
thousand dollars, but the plaintiff consented to a twenty thousand dollar
673. Darges v. Maguire, 156 So.2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
674. Love Realty Corp. v. O'Brien, 162 So.2d 532 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
675. Kight v. Wilson, 167 So.2d 906, 907 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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remittitur in lieu of a new trial. In the second suit, the jury returned a
verdict of one hundred thousand dollars for the plaintiff, and the trial
court denied the defendants' motions to vacate the judgment, for a remit-
titur and for a new trial. On appeal, the defendants asserted, among other
things, that the second verdict was excessive. The district court agreed.
676
It concluded that absent a contrary showing in the record the value to
the father of any services that the child might be expected to render
during his minority would be more than offset by expenses incurred by
his father in raising him. Although the couple had been unsuccessful in
their efforts to have other natural children, and although they had been
married six years before their son was born, the district court noted that
a few months after their little boy's death, they adopted a child, and that
with the adoption of the new baby, the record indicated that the wife
returned to her normal self.
In cases where damages for mental pain and suffering are
allowed, it must bear some reasonable relation to the facts, the
status of the 1iarties, the amount allowed as compensatory
damages, and the philosophy and general trend of decisions
affecting such cases.1
77
The court concluded that viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff, it was nevertheless legally insufficient to support the
verdict for the plaintiff. It noted that the damages awarded in the
instant case were twice as much as had ever been awarded previously
in a parent's action to recover for the wrongful death of his child,678 and
cynically surmised that the fact that the plaintiff consented to a sub-
stantial remittitur in his action brought as administrator was to some
extent persuasive of the fact that the verdict of one hundred thousand
dollars in the father's individual suit was induced by passion, prejudice,
bias, or some other improper motive.
We are fortified in this conclusion by the fact, as appears by
the record, that in each case here reviewed the jury verdict was
in the exact amount suggested by counsel for plaintiff in the
course of oral argument to the jury and does not appear else-
where in the trial proceedings. A verdict is not per se excessive
because the jury awards the full amount of damages suggested
by counsel for the prevailing party, but we would be exceed-
ingly naive should we fail to recognize that as a matter of
676. Gresham v. Courson, 177 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
677. Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 161 So. 85 (1935), cited by the court in
Gresham v. Courson, supra note 676, at 37-38.
678. In Holland Paving Co. v. Dann, 169 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), cert. denied
without opinion, 173 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1965), the Third District Court of Appeal reversed an
order granting a new trial in the father's suit as administrator of his deceased son's estate in
which the trial court had held a verdict of ten thousand dollars excessive, and affirmed a




practice the advocate usually suggests to the jury a figure for
damages substantially in excess of the amount that is clearly
supportable by the evidence and likewise in excess of the
amount which he deems to be supportable in point of law should
the jury happen to return a verdict approaching the amount
suggested.
679
The court affirmed the five thousand dollar judgment in the
administrator's action and decided that in view of the evidence produced
at the trial and prior decisions of Florida courts in analogous actions,
fifty thousand dollars was the maximum amount to which the plaintiff
was entitled. It therefore affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff in his
individual suit conditionally upon his consent to a remittitur for the
balance. Otherwise the cause was remanded for a new trial on the issue
of damages. 8 0
9. CORRECTION OF A VERDICT
In an action for false imprisonment, unlawful detention, unauthorized
search, and assault and battery, the defendants appealed from an adverse
judgment entered on a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, but to no avail.
Where the verdicts for the sum of no dollars compensatory damages and
five thousand dollars punitive damages for the minor plaintiff, and
679. Gresham v. Courson, supra note 676, at 39. The quoted remarks should be com-
pared with those of the Third District Court of Appeal in Direct Transp. Co. v. Rakaskas,
167 So.2d 623, 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). That court, in affirming a judgment entered on a
jury verdict that awarded the plaintiff $102.61 more in damages than the amount for which
his counsel had asked, interpreted Braddock v. Seaboard Airline R.R. Co., 80 So.2d 662 (Fla.
1955),
to be authority for the proposition that when a jury awards a verdict in the exact
amount requested by the plaintiff's counsel there is an assumption that the aggregate
verdict constitutes an award of each particular item of damage as contended by
plaintiff's counsel, affording a proper basis for an analysis of the verdict.
Since the question involved in the Rakaskas case was whether or not the verdict was grossly
excessive because the jury had failed to reduce to present value the damages awarded for
loss of future earnings, the inconsistency is in the spirit of the remarks made by the two
courts rather than in the exposition of a point of law.
680. The case contained a vigorous dissenting opinion by judge Wigginton, who was
unable to agree that the one hundred thousand dollar verdict awarded was so grossly ex-
cessive as to subject the judgment to reversal unless the plaintiff consented to a remittitur.
He stated that the majority opinion had erroneously held that the jury was not justified in
awarding damages for the loss of the child's future services when the plaintiff failed to intro-
duce evidence supporting the premise that they would have derived a pecuniary benefit from
the services of their deceased child. As in the case of damages awarded for pain and suffer-
ing, damages awarded for lost services are necessarily speculative and peculiarly within the
province and function of the jury in this type of claim.
Appellate courts are not at liberty to play a numbers game with verdicts rendered
by juries in personal injury actions, especially when the verdict has been approved
by the judge who tried the case. . . . [T]he majority, has reached the arbitrary
conclusion that because the verdict in this case exceeds verdicts in lesser amounts
awarded in other cases, that the verdict here is illegal and must be stricken. Before
such position may be taken in an appellate court, the record must disclose with
reasonable certainty the event or events which infected the jury's consideration of
the case and rendered its verdict illegal. Such has not been done in this case.
Gresham v. .Courson, supra note 676, at 41 (Dissent).
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fifteen hundred dollars compensatory damages for her father on his
derivative claim were not in accordance with the jury instructions given,
and indicated an obvious misunderstanding by the jury of those instruc-
tions, the court properly reinstructed the jury to retire and further
consider the compensatory award to the minor plaintiff without further
considering the punitive damages awarded to her, or the compensatory
award to her father. 681
10. REHEARING
The plaintiffs appealed 82 from a summary judgment in favor of the
four defendants in a malpractice suit. In opposition to the defendants'
motion for a summary judgment, the plaintiffs had submitted the affidavit
of a New York surgeon. This affidavit was stricken as legally insufficient,
in that it failed to connect the alleged negligent acts to the resulting
injury. The court further granted the defendants' motions for a sum-
mary judgment. Thereafter, the plaintiffs moved for a rehearing,6 8 3 so
as to open the judgment for the submission of additional affidavits. The
petition did not point out in what manner defects in the original affi-
davit would be corrected, but in effect requested the court to exercise
its discretion and grant a rehearing without indicating in any way on
what basis the court should so act. At the hearing on the motion, the
plaintiffs tendered a second affidavit of the same New York physician
which the plaintiffs proposed to submit in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment in the event that a new hearing was granted. The
trial court declined to permit the affidavit to be filed, and the district
court affirmed. Rule 2.8(a) requires that an affidavit in support of a
motion for a rehearing be filed with the motion. A motion for a rehearing
is directed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, and the record
on appeal had failed to establish an abuse of that discretion.
The plaintiff in a personal injury action against his employer peti-
tioned for a rehearing of an order dismissing his complaint with prejudice
and requested that he either (1) be granted leave to amend, or that (2)
the prejudicial dismissal be set aside. The court granted the second relief
asked but subsequently re-dismissed the complaint, this time for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, without prejudice to the plaintiff
to seek such other remedies as might be available to him. On an appeal
by the plaintiff in which he contended first, that a state court of general
jurisdiction did have jurisdiction of the subject matter of a maritime
tort, and second, that the trial court had erroneously denied him the
right of an opportunity to amend, the defendant argued that the second
681. Stevens Mkts, Inc. v. Markantonatos, 177 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). Ordinarily
in Florida, a verdict of no dollars is a good verdict, but in the instant case, the record indi-
cated that such a verdict involved a misinterpretation of the court's instructions and that
the verdict was therefore defective.
682. Holl v. Talcott, 171 So.2d 411 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
683. FLA. R. CiV. P. 2.8(a).
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judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice was not appealable
because it was entered pursuant to the plaintiff's own motion. The district
court disagreed and held that the appeal was properly before the court.68 4
The plaintiff did not appeal from that portion of the order which was
changed on his motion. "It would be straining the office of a petition for
rehearing to say that because some relief was gained under it, the moving
party thereby is precluded from appealing that portion to which he did
not agree in the first instance but which was not changed on the
petition." 6 5
I. Garnishment
The defendant in a garnishment proceeding appealed from an
adverse summary judgment and assigned as error the court's failure to
enter judgment for it, contending that the garnishor had traversed
its answer more than ten days after the answer had been filed. 86 The
district court disagreed.68
7
The courts of this state have within recent years leaned toward
the view that in dealing with the progress of a cause in the trial
court, the trial judge has a reasonable discretion to allow the
remedying of defaults in order to reach an issue upon the merits
of litigation. . . .This is especially true where the default in
pleading has not in any way precluded a fair trial upon the
merits.
We know of no reason why the rule should be different in
garnishment .... 6
The trial judge's refusal to enter judgment for the garnishee because of
the late traverse by the garnishor was in furtherance of justice. The
purpose of the proceeding was not departed from or materially affected.
However, the summary judgment for the garnishor was reversed
because the judgment out of which the garnishment proceedings had
arisen, and upon which the summary judgment for the plaintiff in the
garnishment proceedings was based, had been appealed and superseded
at the time of the summary final judgment.
684. Preston v. Grant Advertising, Inc., 166 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
685. Id. at 221.
686. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.12(a) provides:
(a) Time for Traverse. When any garnishee answers at the time required by law and
the plaintiff is not satisfied with the answer of any such garnishee, he shall within
10 days thereafter file a statement traversing the allegations of the garnishee in such
particulars as he desires, whereupon the cause shall proceed as provided by law. Upon
failure of the plaintiff to file such traverse such answer shall be taken as true and
upon proper disposition of the assets, if any disclosed thereby, the garnishee shall
be entitled as of course to an order discharging him from further liability under the
writ. (Emphasis added.)
687. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 174 So.2d 417
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
688. Id. at 419.
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A supersedeas has the effect to suspend all further proceedings
in relation to a judgment superseded, but it does not, like a
reversal, annul it. The supersedeas, being preventive in nature,
does not set aside what the trial court has adjudicated, but stays
further proceeding in relation to the judgment until the appellate
court acts thereon.689
The lower court should have stayed the garnishment proceedings until
the disposition of the appealed judgment had become final. Since that
judgment was reversed, 90 the plaintiff in the garnishment proceedings
was no longer entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the case was
remanded for a trial on the issues made by the answer and the traverse.
Where a defendant in a garnishment proceeding fails to appear or
answer as required, the rules provide"9' that a judgment by default shall
be entered against him for the amount of the plaintiff's claim plus interest.
After entry of a default "a scire facias shall issue against such garnishee
returnable within ten days . . ." If the garnishee fails to sufficiently
answer the scire facias, "a final judgment shall be entered against the
said garnishee provided, however, that no final judgment against a
garnishee shall be entered before the entry of the final judgment against
the original defendant together with interest and costs." Defenses avail-
able in answer to the original writ of garnishment may not be asserted
in answer to the writ of scire facias. The purpose of this latter writ is to
give the party against whom execution is about to issue notice so that
he may urge defenses which have arisen after creation of the original
record in the garnishment proceedings.692
J. Executions
2.13 Executions and Final Process.
(a) Issuance. Executions on judgments shall issue on the request
of the party entitled thereto or his attorney. No execution or
other final process shall issue until the judgment on which it is
based has been recorded nor within the time for serving a
motion for new trial and if a motion for new trial is timely
served, until the motion is determined; provided it may be
issued on special order of the court.
(b) Stay. The court before which an execution or other process
based on a final judgment is returnable may stay such execution
or other process and suspend proceedings thereon for good
cause on motion and notice to all adverse parties.
689. Id. at 418.
690. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Traister, 173 So.2d
193 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
691. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.12 (b).
692. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc. v. J. N. Rawleigh Co., 156 So.2d 180 (Fla.




Subsection (a) is [former] RCP 2.13 after deleting "his
agent" as unnecessary and substituting "execution" for "writ
of fieri facias" and including other final process within the rule
so it is applicable to law and equity.693 The requirement for
recording is taken from 62.16 Florida Statutes which should
be repealed.
Subsection (b) is 55.38 Florida Statutes which should be
repealed.6 94
K. Prohibition
The term "petition" has been substituted for "suggestion" in sub-
sections (a) and (b) of Rule 2.18 to conform to the amendment to Rule
1.7(a) to include petitions, as the initial pleadings in special statutory
proceedings, among the pleadings required or allowed by the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The defendants in a negligence action arising out of an automobile
collision petitioned the district court for a writ of prohibition to restrain
the trial court from proceeding further on the ground that it lacked
jurisdiction of the action. The plaintiffs had previously brought an action
based on the same claim against the petitioners, but had taken a nonsuit.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a second action. The defendants an-
swered alleging the prior action, and its termination by judgment of
nonsuit as a defense of res judicata, and thereafter moved for summary
judgment based on this defense. Their motion was denied, and proceed-
ings for a writ of prohibition were filed. In discharging the rule nisi and
dismissing the petition,695 the district court held:
... The writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior
court prevents an inferior court from exceeding its jurisdiction
or usurping a jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by
law. It issues only when the party seeking it is without other
adequate means of redress. The writ should not become a
vehicle for the determination of questions involving the correct
or incorrect decision of another court in matters in which that
court has jurisdiction to act. Prohibition does not lie to correct
errors of a court which is acting within its jurisdiction although
it is proceeding improperly in the exercise of that jurisdiction. 696
Where two actions have been instituted involving the same parties and
the same subject matter, a judgment in the first action does not, of itself,
deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed in the second action. The
693. [Authors' footnote.] If the rule is now applicable to law and equity, shouldn't it
be relocated and included among the 1.-rules?
694. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1136
(1965).
695. State v. White, 162 So.2d 697 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
696. Id. at 699.
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proper remedy is either by appeal, or perhaps in a case such as this one,
where the court may have departed from the essential requirements of
law, and an interlocutory appeal from the order denying the defendants'
motion for summary judgment is unavailable, by petition for a writ of
certiorari.
L. Quo Warranto
Subsection (a) of Rule 2.20 has been amended by deleting from
that subsection the requirement that proceedings in quo warranto be
instituted in the circuit court, and by deleting the term "information"
as descriptive of the initial pleading in such proceedings. The latter
change is consistent with the amendment to Rule 1.7 (a), which includes
petitions among the pleadings required or allowed as the initial pleadings
in statutory proceedings. The term "information" has similarly been
stricken from subsection (c) of Rule 2.20 for the same reasons. These
subsections now read:
(a) By Whom Instituted. Proceedings in quo warranto including
informations in the nature of quo warranto may be instituted
by petition in the name of the State by the Attorney General,
or by any person claiming title to the office or franchise on the
refusal of the Attorney General.
(c) Judgment of Ouster. When any petition is well founded, a
judgment of ouster may issue without further amendments to
the extent that the petition is well founded. Committee Note:
Common Law Rule 58.
M. Review
Newly added Rule 2.23 transfers the provisions of section 54.16 to
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with the policy that
all general procedure statutes should be incorporated in the rules.697
III. SUITS IN EQUITY ONLY
A. Trustees May Represent Beneficiaries
The defendant-trustee in an action for the specific performance of
an agreement to sell certain real property took an interlocutory appeal
from an order denying his motion to dismiss the plaintiff-vendee's com-
plaint on the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiff had failed to join the
beneficiaries of the collateral trust agreement as indispensable parties.
The district court affirmed the decision of the lower court.698
Although as a general rule, beneficiaries should be made parties to
a suit brought for specific performance of a contract made by a trustee
697. See Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, supra note 694, at 1135
(Comments on Rule 1.35, final paragraph).
698. Grammer v. Roman, 174 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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in behalf of a trust, the deed to the defendant-trustee in the instant case
was in the form of an Illinois Land Trust Deed. The purpose of such a
deed is to permit a trustee thereunder to convey freely without joinder
of spouses or beneficiaries. By the express terms of the deed the interest
of each beneficiary under the trust is declared to be only in the earnings
and avails of the property. The interest of the beneficiaries is stated to
be personal property carrying no legal or equitable title to the trust
realty. The court concluded that the deed involved came within the
terms of section 689.071, which was enacted in 1963 and which provides
"that a deed, in trust, regardless of any reference to an unrecorded trust
agreement which does not name the beneficiaries of such trust, shall be
effective to vest in such trustee full rights of ownership with full power
and authority as provided for in the deed." ' Although the deed and
contract in question were executed prior to the passage of this act, the
statute provides that it is remedial in nature, that its application is to be
liberally construed, and that it applies to every deed "heretofore or
hereafter made." Since the trustee had authority to convey the realty,
under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, he could represent the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries without their joinder. Rule 3.3 provides:
Rule 3.3. Trustees May Represent Beneficiaries.
In all suits concerning property which is vested in trustees, where
such trustees are competent to sell and give discharges for the
proceeds of the sale, or the rents, income or profits of the estate,
all, or any of such trustees, shall represent the persons benefi-
cially interested in the estate or the proceeds, or the rents, in-
come or profits, and in such cases it shall not be necessary to
make the persons beneficially interested in such property, or
rents, income or profits, parties to the suit; but the court may,
upon consideration of the matter on the hearing, if it shall so
think fit, order such persons beneficially interested to be made
parties.
B. Intervention v. Interpleader
When her ex-husband became delinquent for the second time in
his alimony payments, the plaintiff instituted the instant proceedings
by which she sought a judgment for the alimony arrearages and the im-
position of a lien upon her ex-husband's sole asset in Florida, a promissory
note secured by a purchase money mortgage on real and personal property
in the sum of one hundred thousand dollars. The divorce had been
obtained in Florida, and the mortgaged property on which the plaintiff
sought to impose a lien was located there, but at the time of the instant
proceedings the defendant and his second wife were residents of Missis-
sippi. The mortgagor filed a petition for interpleader alleging that it was
in the possession of checks in the amount of fifty thousand dollars, the
proceeds of certain fire insurance policies payable to it and to the
699. Id. at 446.
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defendant; that pursuant to the terms of the mortgage the defendant
had exercised his option to receive the money and apply it on the in-
debtedness; and that during the period when the mortgagor and the
defendant were negotiating for a complete settlement on the note and
mortgage, the mortgagor received notice of lis pendens. The mortgagor
sought to tender the checks together with outstanding interest into the
registry of the court and to receive credit therefor on the principal and
interest due on the mortgage. From a post-decretal order favorable to
the wife, and directing the clerk of the court to deposit the sums received
from the mortgagor in secured savings accounts to insure future alimony
payments to the plaintiff, the defendant took an interlocutory appeal.
Among other things, the defendant on appeal questioned the chancellor's
jurisdiction to proceed upon the "Petition for Interpleader" on the
ground that such a suit contemplated the institution of a new action
which necessitated the service of process before the court acquired juris-
diction of the parties and the subject matter. In affirming the lower
court's order, the district court held 0 ° that, labels notwithstanding, the
mortgagor's petition should be treated as one for intervention pursuant
to Rule 3.4. °O It further stated that this conclusion was buttressed by
the essential facts existing at the time of the filing of the petition by the
mortgagor. The wife had upon reasonable notice sought to impose a
lien against the indebtedness owing to her ex-husband by the mortgagor.
This indebtedness constituted the res. As the obligor, the mortgagor,
whose interest was subordinate to the main proceedings, could properly
intervene. Its petition for relief brought the proceedings into such a
position that the rights of all parties interested in the subject matter
could be resolved in the pending equitable proceeding. 0 2
C. Class Suits
In an action against the county tax collector, the plaintiffs appealed
from an adverse decree. In their complaint they had alleged that (1) "In
the preparation and certification of the 1961 tax assessment roll, like
property similarly situated [even adjoining property] did not receive
like treatment as to valuation," and (2) "Agreeable to Rule 3.6, plaintiffs
bring this suit on their own behalf and on behalf of other persons
similarly situated." Among other things, the plaintiffs assigned as error
on appeal that part of the decree which held that the action could not be
maintained as a class suit. In sustaining this portion of the challenged
700. Carter v. Carter, 164 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
701. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.4 provides:
Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to
assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and
in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by
the court in its discretion.
702. Professor James defines intervention as "[A] device which enables one who was not
originally a party to an action to become such a party on his own initiative." JAWEs, CIvIL
PROCEDURE, § 10.19 at 501 (1965).
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decree, the supreme court held70 3 that although the complaint tracked
the wording of the statute, it was too broad.
An allegation that the plaintiff brought suit on his own behalf
and in behalf of all others similarly situated does not, of itself,
determine the character of the proceeding as a class suit, and
does not establish such community of interest as would enable
the plaintiff to represent the other persons interested in the sub-
ject matter ... and; in class suits it is important to plead and
describe the class with certainty whether the class by plaintiffs
or defendants and if they are considered so numerous as to
make it impractical to bring them before the court it too should
be plead and proved with a fair degree of certainty. More is
required than the mere pleading the language of the statute.0 4
D. Default: Decree Pro Confesso
Rule 3.9. Default: Decree Pro Confesso.
If the defendant shall fail to serve his answer or other defense
to the complaint, within the time prescribed, or within such
other time as shall have been fixed by the court, then the plain-
tiff may at his election take an order to be entered by the clerk
or the judge, as of course, that the complaint be taken pro
confesso; and thereupon the cause shall proceed ex parte, and
the matter or the complaint may be decreed by the court ac-
cordingly if the same can be done without an answer and is
proper to be decreed. A party may plead at any time until such
decree pro confesso be entered.
If the cross-defendant shall fail to serve his reply or other
defense to an answer asserting a counterclaim and specially
praying relief at the time prescribed, or within such other time as
shall have been fixed by the court, a decree pro confesso may be
taken and like proceedings had thereon as in case of failure
of the defendant to serve defensive pleadings to the complaint.
The final sentence has been added to the first paragraph of Rule 3.9
to expressly provide that "a party may plead at any time until such
decree pro confesso be entered." Otherwise, the Rule remains unchanged.
After the entry of a decree pro confesso, the chancellor is authorized
to proceed ex parte.7 °0 At that point a defendant is not entitled to notice
of further proceedings in the cause, so long as those proceedings are
commensurate with the relief prayed for in the complaint served upon
him. However, if after entry of a decree pro confesso, a plaintiff so
amends his complaint as to seek different or additional relief from that
703. Peters v. Meeks, 163 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1964).
704. City of Lakeland v. Chase Nat'l Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1947), cited
by the court in Peters v. Meeks, supra note 703, at 757-58.
705. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.9.
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originally prayed for, "even the most minimal standards of due process
would require that notice be given to a party who had suffered a default
or decree pro confesso where the complaint had been amended in a matter
of substance after the entry of such default .... MOO
Where an action is brought against a defendant who does not answer,
a judgment by default is conclusive upon him only in the character in
which he is sued. In Baum v. Pines Realty Co.,'07 a real estate broker
brought suit against other brokers and the owners of certain realty for
an accounting, for a declaratory decree, and for payment of his share
of the brokers' commission which the defendant-brokers had recovered
in a prior action against the plaintiff and the owners of the realty. Be-
cause the plaintiff was unwilling to join in the earlier action, the other
brokers joined him as a party defendant to their suit. He subsequently
permitted a decree pro confesso to be entered against him in that suit,
and the court entered an opinion and order in which it found the existence
of a valid contract, performance by the brokers and that the defendant
property owners owed the full commission. Based upon that opinion and
order, a summary final decree and judgment were entered for the plaintiffs
and against the property owners, and the decree pro confesso against
the present plaintiff was confirmed and ratified. On the basis of the
judgment in the first suit summary decrees were entered in favor of the
defendants in the instant suit, and the plaintiff appealed.
The district court reversed. The plaintiff's right to participate in the
brokerage commission was not adversely determined in the broker's
suit, since the complaint in that suit admitted his interest. In determining
what was decided by a money judgment by default, where the adjudicating
part of the judgment is not entirely clear on its face, one must advert to
the pleadings to determine those matters without the allegations of which
it would not have been possible for plaintiff to obtain judgment by de-
fault. Only those matters and no others should be regarded as res judicata.
The plaintiff's portion of the commission was neither in issue nor
litigated in the first suit; and he was therefore not precluded from
maintaining the instant action to determine that share. Where, as in the
706. Kitchens v. Kitchens, 162 So.2d 539, 541 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). In the Kitchens case,
the district court reversed that portion of the final decree which had granted the plaintiff a
divorce, and which ordered the husband's interest in the parties' jointly owned property
transferred to the plaintiff as satisfaction for necessities found to be due the plaintiff from her
husband. In her original complaint, the wife had sought separate maintenance and other relief
unconnected with divorce, pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 65.09 (1965), on grounds, which, if proven,
were also legally sufficient to entitle her to a divorce under FLA. STAT. § 65.04 (1965). The
husband did not answer, and a decree pro confesso was entered against him. At the subsequent
hearing, the plaintiff presented testimony in support of the allegations in her complaint. On
the following day, the plaintiff filed a motion for entry of a final decree of divorce. On the
husband's appeal, the district court held that the chancellor had erroneously granted this mo-
tion where the record indicated that the husband was neither served nor notified of the plain-
tiff's motion for different and additional relief.
707. 167 So.2d 517 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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instant case, the causes of action are different 708 in two suits, the prior
judgment is not res judicata as to those matters which were not litigated,
but which could have been, but the first judgment is res judicata only as
to those matters or issues common to both actions which were either
expressly or by necessary implication adjudged in the first action.
E. Evidence
Rule 3.12 has been repealed, and the sole rule governing evidentiary
matters in suits of equity, as well as in actions at law, is now Rule 1.37,
as amended.
F. Attorneys' Fees in Interpleader Suits
To avoid double or multiple liability, the Florida rules provide for
interpleader-both strict interpleader and a bill in the nature of inter-
pleader.
709
Even though an interpleader action may be maintained under
this rule, it does not necessarily follow that in every such ac-
tion the court must award costs and attorney's fees to the inter-
pleading plaintiff [or defendant]. In order to be entitled to such
an award the plaintiff must prove his total disinterest in the
stake he holds other than that of bringing it into court so that
conflicting claims thereto can be judicially determined. The
plaintiff must also show that he did nothing to cause the con-
flicting claims or give rise to the peril of double vexation .... 1
A few days prior to his death, the insured of a group life insurance
policy sent a notice of change of beneficiary, requesting that the benefi-
ciary of the policy be changed from his first wife to his second wife, to
the insurer's agent.71' Three days later, the insured met an accidental
death, and two days after that the agent filled in and dated a rider to
the group insurance certificate noting such change of beneficiary. Nine
days thereafter, the agent forwarded the notice of change of beneficiary
to the insurer's Chicago group claims office. The insurer's principal
office was in New York City. Both the former wife and the widow of the
insured claimed the right to the proceeds of the group policy. The insurer
notified the divorced wife that the change of beneficiary had been ac-
complished, and also advised her that until she relinquished her claim
under the group policy, it would withhold payment to her of the proceeds
on a certain other policy issued by the insurer on the decedent's life, to
which she was the acknowledged beneficiary.
Subsequently, the divorced wife brought the instant suit against the
708. The brokers' suit was to recover a commission, and the instant suit was to determine
the plaintiff's share of the commission so recovered.
709. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.13.
710. Ellison v. Riddle, 166 So.2d 840, 841 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
711. Kurz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 168 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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widow and the insurer for a decree declaring her to be the beneficiary of
the group policy, and an order entitling her to the proceeds thereof and
the payment of reasonable attorney's fees by the insurer. The widow
denied the plaintiff's right to the proceeds of the policy and counter-
claimed for a decree that she was the beneficiary of the policy. She also
cross-claimed against the defendant-insurer demanding judgment for the
proceeds, together with interest, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee.
In answer to the cross-claim the insurer alleged that the question of
entitlement to the proceeds of the group policy was a matter properly to
be settled between the plaintiff and the widow, and not between either
of them and the company. The court noted that this allegation was
clearly a conclusion of law. The insurer also filed a cross-claim and
counterclaim for interpleader and declaratory relief alleging that by
reason of the conflicting claims of the plaintiff and the widow, it was in
great doubt as to which of the claimants was entitled to payment of the
proceeds. It paid the amount of the policy into the court's registry, asked
that the claimants be required to interplead between themselves, that
the insurer be discharged from further liability and dismissed with its
taxable costs and reasonable attorney's fees. The plaintiff denied that
the insurer was in doubt as to which of the claimants was entitled to the
proceeds and further contended that the insurer had at all times stead-
fastly maintained that the widow was the proper beneficiary. (The
court commented that this allegation of the plaintiff was unequivocally
supported by the record.)
The trial court found that the change of beneficiary had been ac-
complished, and accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, granted
the widow's motion for summary judgment on her counterclaim and
cross-claim except as to attorney's fees, and denied the insurer's motion,
except as it related to the issue of the award of attorney's fees to the
widow, as to which it was granted. From the final decree all parties ap-
pealed and cross-appealed.
The district court concurred with the trial court that the change of
beneficiary had been accomplished, and found that the trial court had
properly dismissed the plaintiff's complaint and also had properly denied
the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees. However, the district court held
that the lower court had erroneously denied the widow's claim for
attorney's fees.
The insurer had steadfastly maintained that the widow was ex-
clusively entitled to the proceeds of the policy, and the district court
found that the record revealed no lawful basis for the insurer's failure
to promptly pay the proceeds to the party it recognized as being entitled
thereto. Instead, it had withheld payment for approximately six months
after it had received the requisite proof of death and unwarrantedly
imposed a requirement as a condition precedent to payment that the
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spurious claimant should first execute a waiver and release of any claim
she might have to the proceeds. This unwarranted requirement was at
least partly responsible for the instant suit, which subjected the widow
to litigation and to the necessity of employing attorneys to protect her
interest, and to assert her claim against the insurer.
The fact that there are conflicting claims to the proceeds of an
insurance policy, the terms and conditions of which are clear,
will not operate to relieve the insurer from prompt performance
of its obligation to pay the proceeds to the recognized rightful
beneficiary, nor will it be permitted to relieve that obligation
and be awarded a fee for the services of its attorney by resorting
to interpleader on the theory that it may be put to vexatious
suits by contesting claimants when, as in this case, it has wrong-
fully delayed payment. It is a normal consequence of engaging
in business that the parties to an unambiguous contractual rela-
tionship accept the risk of performing according to the clear
terms and conditions of their undertaking. 12
G. Masters
The word "or" has been substituted for "of" as the third word from
the end of Rule 3.14(i) to correct a clerical error.713
H. Rehearings
The plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition to compel the district
court to dismiss a pending appeal on the ground that the finality of the
decree contemplated by appellate Rule 1.3 was destroyed by a timely
petition for a rehearing and application for leave to amend. The court
entered a rule absolute.7 14 The Florida Supreme Court noted that ap-
712. Id. at 568. The case contained a strong dissent to that portion of the majority
opinion which held that the trial court had erroneously denied the widow's claim for reason-
able attorney's fees. The dissenting judge noted that "this case was one of first impression in
the United States, as no other appellate court has by a reported decision placed a construction
upon the change in beneficiary clause of the life insurance policy under consideration. .. ."
(Id. at 569). The conclusion in the instant case is contrary to the result reached by the
Florida Supreme Court in other cases which appear to be, but which, after careful analysis,
are found not to be, factually similar. The insurer was, therefore, understandably unwilling to
select between the two conflicting claimants until the change of beneficiary provision had been
judicially construed. Consequently, the insurer did not wrongfully withhold payment of the
proceeds of the policy, and absent a wrongful refusal to pay by the insurer, the widow was not
entitled to recover attorney's fees. The trial court properly granted the insurer's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of the widow's right to recover attorney's fees.
However, the dissenting judge concluded, in the event the insurer was not entitled to
summary judgment, the mere fact that he and the trial judge arrived at an opposite conclusion
from the majority of the court on the basis of the same evidence would seem to indicate that
the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom were in conflict, thus pre-
cluding a summary judgment for the widow on the question of her right to attorney's fees.
713. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, 39 FLA. B.J. 1132, 1136
(1965).
714. State v. Pearson, 156 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1963).
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pellate Rule 1.3 clearly and specifically provides that a final decree shall
not be deemed to have been rendered until a timely motion or a petition
for a rehearing has been disposed of, nor does the time for taking an
appeal commence to run before such time.
The purpose of the Rule is to afford the trial court a reasonable
opportunity to correct its mistakes, thereby avoiding needless appellate
litigation. Jurisdiction must be exclusively in one court or the other; it
cannot be in both courts at the same time. "The proper and timely
filing of a petition for a rehearing after the filing of a notice of appeal is
a subsequent event which destroys the efficacy of the notice of appeal." 15
The trial court decides in the first instance whether a petition for a
rehearing has been timely and properly filed.
I. Process in Behalf of and against Persons not Parties
Rule 3.18 has been more succintly restated. A comma has been
inserted after the phrase "not a party," which appears in the second
half of the sentence, to conform the rule to its original meaning when




(a) Issuance. No injunction shall be granted until a com-
plaint therefor is filed.
(b) Temporary Injunction; Notice; Bound. No tempo-
rary injunction shall be granted except after notice to the ad-
verse party unless it is manifest from the allegations of a verified
complaint or supporting affidavits that the injury will be done if
an immediate remedy is not afforded and in such event the court
may grant a temporary injunction until a hearing or further
order of court. When a temporary injunction is granted, the
court shall require the party obtaining it to give bond condi-
tioned for the payment of such costs and damages as may be
incurred or suffered by any party who is wrongfully enjoined
unless the court, after taking evidence from all parties of the
the truth of the complaint and the fact that the party seeking
the temporary injunction is unable to give bond, finds such to
be true, in which event a temporary injunction without bond
may be granted. When any injunction is issued on the com-
plaint of a municipality or the State or any officer, agency or
political subdivision thereof, the court, in its discretion having
due regard to the public interest, may require or dispense with
715. Id. at 7.
716. Notes of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure Rules, supra note 20, at 1136.
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the requirement of a bond, with or without surety, and condi-
tioned as the circumstances may require.
(c) Motion to Dissolve. Any party against whom an in-
junction has been granted may move to dissolve it at any time.
(d) Evidence. Either party may present evidence at any
hearing on an application for or motion to dissolve an injunc-
tion. On hearing the court may grant, dissolve or continue the
injunction or may require bond.
(e) To Stay Other Proceedings. No injunction to stay other
proceedings shall issue except on motion and notice to the
adverse party, nor unless the party applying therefor has pre-
viously paid all costs of the other proceeding and gives a bond
payable to the adverse party in the other proceeding and con-
ditioned (1) to pay to plaintiff all damages, losses, expenses and
charges which he may have sustained or have been put to by
reason of the issuing of the injunction if the injunction is dis-
solved, or if the complaint upon which it was granted is dis-
missed, if the application is to stay proceedings before verdict
or inquest of damages; or (2) to pay the debt, interest and such
damages as may be occasioned by the wrongful issuing of said
injunction, if said injunction is dissolved, or the complaint upon
which it is granted is dismissed if the application is to stay the
proceedings after verdict or inquest of damages.717
Subsection (e) is section 64.02 of the Florida Statutes; "with
redundant language eliminated and made applicable to 'other proceed-
ings' because of the recommendation to consolidate law and equity.
7 1
The subcommittee suggested that the subsection should be restored in
application to actions at law if the recommended merger did not occur.
Nevertheless, the supreme court retained the modified terminology
directing its application to "other proceedings."
The subcommittee further recommended the repeal of section
64.01-.06, with the exception of section 64.04, which, the subcommittee
suggested, should be transferred to the chapters on municipalities and
taxing districts after "injunction" is deleted.
2. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN A DIVORCE SUIT
The husband appealed from two interlocutory orders in a divorce
suit. The wife obtained the first order upon an emergency application,
717. This rule has been expanded to eliminate the need for 64.01-03 and 64.05-06 Florida
Statutes. Subsection (a) is 64.01 Florida Statutes omitting the last clause which is obsolete.
Subsection (b) combines present Rule 3.19, 64.021 and 64.03 Florida Statutes and some
of the language of Federal Rule 65(c).
Subsection (c) is 64.05 Florida Statutes from which redundant language has been deleted.
Subsection (d) is 64.06 Florida Statutes with redundant language removed.
718. Supra note 716.
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
before service of process and without notice to the defendant husband.
It restrained the husband from interfering with his wife, directed him
to deliver an automobile for her use, to remove himself from the parties'
residence, to pay necessary expenses and temporary alimony, and his
pregnant wife's future medical and hospital expenses. The defendant's
motion to vacate that order for want of notice and on its merits was
heard after notice and denied. No evidence was presented, and the
initial order was adhered to. The district court affirmed.719
.. . An injunction for a wife's protection from interference or
molestation by her husband may be granted without notice
properly on a verified divorce complaint which contains suffi-
cient allegations and an adequate showing under rule 3.19,
F.R.C.P., 31 F.S.A.; and without bond when inability to make
bond is shown as required under §§ 64.02 and 64.03, Fla.
Stat., F.S.A.72°
K. Receivers
Rule 3.20 has been more succinctly and clearly restated, but no
substantive changes have been made.
L. Declaratory Decree
The parties to the instant suit entered into an alleged leasing agree-
ment pursuant to the terms of which the plaintiff was alleged to have
rented a screen tower to the defendants at a stipulated total rental. The
lease provided that in 'the event of the defendants' default in making
rental payments, the plaintiff should have the right to enter the defen-
dants' property and repossess the screen tower without the interference
of the lessor, its successors or assigns. Upon the defendants' default, the
plaintiff cancelled the lease and demanded that they permit him to enter
the property pursuant to the terms of the parties' alleged agreement.
They refused. Thereupon the plaintiff brought the instant suit for a
declaratory decree 721 to determine whether he and his employees might
enter the defendants' property "without being guilty of trespass or any
criminal act, or the incurring of any obligation on the plaintiff's part for
the removal of the screen tower." After denying the defendants' motion
to dismiss, the chancellor tried the cause upon its merits and entered an
order in which he found that the court had jurisdiction of the parties and
the subject matter, and that the plaintiff could re-enter and repossess
his property without interference by any of the defendants. On appeal,
the district court reversed 22 and remanded the cause to be dismissed
without prejudice.
Where the lease agreement provided in clear and unambiguous
719. Voss v. Voss, 169 So.2d 351 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
720. Ibid.
721. FLA. STAT. ch. 87 (1965).
722. M. & E. Land Co. v. Siegel, 177 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
[VOL. XX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
language that, in the event of default, the lessor should at all times have
the right to enter and retake possession of the leased property without
interference from the lessee, the allegation of a default and a refusal of
the lessee to permit the lessor to enter and retake possession is not a
sufficient showing of "doubt" as to the lessor's rights to state a cause of
action under chapter 87 of Florida Statutes. Although the declaratory
judgment act is a remedial statute which should be liberally construed,
it was not intended to circumvent the traditional routes of judicial relief
that might be available to the plaintiff, such as the law action of replevin
or a bill for injunctive relief in equity, and thereby to evade posting the
bond which is required in such cases. In the instant case there was no
ambiguity as to the terms or meaning of the lease. The plaintiff's only
doubt was as to how to get possession of his property. Therefore, no bona
fide question was presented as to the proper construction of a contract
"with respect to any act not yet done or any event which has not yet
happened," as contemplated by section 87.05. Doubt, because of disputed
questions of fact, is not sufficient to make available to litigants the provi-
sions of the declaratory judgments act.723 "The special objective of
chapter 87 should not be perverted by permitting it to be used as a
catch-all for any type of proceeding at law or in equity." '724
Although our Declaratory Decree Act is broad in its scope and
should be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose,
it was never intended that it should supplant all other types of
civil procedure known to our jurisprudence.725
The case contained a cogent dissent by Judge Wigginton who would
have found that the facts presented a proper case for a declaratory
decree. The order appealed was entered after a full hearing on the merits
of which the chancellor listened to nearly forty hours of testimony. The
mere fact that the terms and provisions of the lease agreement entered
into between the parties are clear, unequivocal and unambiguous does
not necessarily foreclose the plaintiff's right to seek a declaratory decree.
His right to maintain the action arose because of a genuine dispute
between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of the plaintiff's
rights, status, and other equitable or legal relations under the agreement.
A sufficient controversy arose from extrinsic facts to activate the trial
court's authority to entertain the declaratory judgment suit.
The mere fact that the contract is clear and unambiguous on its
face does not prevent one from seeking a declaration of his rights
under such contract where there exist extrinsic facts which
would affect the clear and unambiguous language of the written
agreement.728
723. Barrett v. Pickard, 85 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1956).
724. Mayes Printing Co. v. Flowers, 154 So.2d 859, 862 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
725. Stark v. Marshall, 67 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1953). (Emphasis supplied.)
726. Bacon v. Crespi, 141 So.2d 823, 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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The fact that the plaintiff might also pursue other traditional
remedies under the facts of the case does not preclude him from main-
taining a suit for a declaratory decree if such suit is otherwise proper. The
declaratory judgment act expressly provides: "The existence of another
adequate remedy shall not preclude a decree, judgment or order for
declaratory relief .... 77
727. FLA. STAT. § 87.12 (1965).
